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In  this  thesis  I  confront  the  problem of  indeterminism in  quantum physics.  The  first  pioneers
accepted indeterminism as part of their Copenhagen interpretation and it was incorporated in Von
Neumann's formulation (as the “projection postulate”). But how deep does this indeterminism go?
With the arrival of quantum physics, the idea that the world is fundamentally deterministic has been
shattered.  Redhead's  work showed that  the experimental  confirmation of  the violation of  Bell's
inequality means that  determinism has broken down; he even formulated a version of the Bell
inequality that is not dependent on local hidden variables and showed that the violation thereof
negates even what might be called “stochastic” determinism – at  least in the framework of the
Lorentzian space-time manifold (Redhead 1987:83, 103). 
With the acceptance of non-determinism as part of our world, we are confronted with the question:
How can  the  possibility  of  non-determinism be  explained  and  how can  it  be  reconciled  with
determinism in one coherent conceptualization of the world? I use the philosophy of science that
Immanuel Kant developed in the Critique of the Power of Judgment to develop an answer to these
questions.  In  this  part  of  his  philosophy of  science Kant is  concerned with the  possibility and
conceivability of a spontaneous (albeit effective) causality in nature's producing its products. Kant
developed the idea of this causality in analogy to the achievement of human ends, conceptualizing it
as a capacity that non-extended wholes and parts have to be realized as parts forming an aggregated
whole in nature. 
An important feature of my approach is that I develop a new interpretation of Kant's philosophy as
presented in his well-known  Critique of Pure Reason. In contrast with the two-object and two-
aspect views in Kantian interpretation, I argue that the noumenal realm refers to an ontologically
distinct realm outside nature, problematically assumed. This agrees with Kant's view in the Critique
of the Power of Judgment where it is conceptualized as the substratum of nature and forms a central
part  of  his  philosophy  of  science.  It  is  only  when  the  noumenal  (supersensible)  realm  is
conceptualized in this manner that spontaneous causality becomes not only logically possible, but
also conceivable within the framework of his philosophy.
In my Kantian interpretation of quantum physics his concept of nature is taken as referring to the
“classical realm” (where the theories of relativity would apply). His non-extended wholes and parts,
which belong to the supersensible realm, find application in superpositions of states, which I argue
belong  to  an  ontologically  distinct  realm  –  the  pre-measurement  “quantum  realm”.  Since  the
classical and quantum realms are taken as ontologically distinct realms, there is no contradiction in
ascribing  two heterogeneous laws, namely of deterministic and spontaneous causality (which is
manifest  in  the  reduction  of  the  wave  packet),  to  these  realms  which  are  combined  in  one
description  in  quantum  mechanics.  In  my  view  spontaneous  causality  grounds  a  non-spatio-
temporal potentiality which explains why superpositions of states have the ability to collapse to
reduced states.  I develop these ideas in the framework of the various interpretations of quantum
mechanics.
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1. General introduction to the thesis
1.1. Introduction 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is one of the great modern philosophers of science.  In his famous
Critique of Pure Reason (the first Critique; 1781, 1787) Kant developed a scientific epistemology
that he used to produce a philosophy of science in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
(1786). In this he laid the philosophical foundations for Newtonian science. Through the years his
approach  has  been  reworked  and  adapted  in  such  a  manner  that  it  could  ground  all  classical
mathematical science, including the theories of relativity (Friedman 2001:31, 47). 
In the second part of the first  Critique, Kant engaged with the problem of freedom. In the third
antinomy (conflict of laws) he showed how the transcendental idea of freedom, that is, absolute
spontaneity,  can  be  introduced  without  contradiction  as  a  different  kind  of  causality  (this  is
sometimes  called  “freedom”  although  it  is  not  the  same  as  practical  freedom;  it  is  merely  a
precondition for practical freedom). He conceptualized this as a different kind of effective causality
in opposition to deterministic causality.
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment (the third Critique, 1790) Kant developed this concept of
causality further when he formulated another part of his philosophy of science. He now calls the
spontaneous causality of the first  Critique that is grounded in the transcendental idea of freedom,
“causality of freedom” and the “concept of a causality through freedom” (5:195-6). He develops the
idea further in the context of non-extended parts and wholes as a “spontaneity of a cause” (5:411),
which is  conceptualized in analogy with human ends. In this formulation Kant allowed for the
possibility  that  some  products  in  nature  are  not  produced  in  accordance  with  mechanistic
(deterministic) laws. In this thesis I show how these concepts can be fruitfully introduced in that
domain of physics where determinism has broken down, namely in quantum physics.
The question of non-determinism in quantum physics goes back to the early pioneers; it is central to
the  Copenhagen  interpretation.  Bohr  understood  the  observed  indeterminism  as  involving
spontaneity. This was formally introduced in the context of Von Neumann's formulation of quantum
mechanics  in  terms of  two conflicting maxims,  namely the deterministic  evolution of  quantum
states  and  the  so-called  reduction  of  the  wave  packet  (called  the  “projection  postulate”)  that
introduces an indeterministic (spontaneous, according to Bohr) aspect into physics. 
The question became even more accentuated in the context of Bell's inequality. Since the Aspect
experiment confirmed the violation of Bell's inequality in quantum mechanics, the debate regarding
non-determinism has intensified since determinism is assumed in this inequality as Redhead has
demonstrated (Redhead 1987:102). The violation of Bell's inequality is therefore also a violation of
determinism. Redhead has furthermore shown that the Bell inequality can be reformulated to show
that the violation thereof negates even what might be called “stochastic” determinism, that is, that
there are  not  even stochastic  causal  links  between the  particles  in  the two arms  of  the Aspect
experiment (Redhead 1987:102). 
There are various responses to the question of non-determinism in quantum physics. Some merely
assert the fact of such non-determinism taken in the more positive sense as absolute spontaneity
(Cartwright 1983); others have tried to adhere to a purely deterministic view (for example, Bohm's
theory). In this case action-at-a-distance may be assumed (which contradicts special relativity) or
even the idea of “many worlds”. In this thesis I develop a Kantian solution to this problem in which
determinism and non-determinism are reconciled. In this regard I understand non-determinism in
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quantum physics in terms of spontaneity (in accordance with the Kantian concept of spontaneous
causality or freedom). I argue that we have good reason to subscribe to an (Kantian) interpretation
of quantum physics in which such freedom is conceivably part of our understanding of how the
world is like.
In the same manner that Kant's philosophy answered the quest for the mathematical grounding of
Newtonian physics, Bohr made use of it in his effort to formulate an adequate response to the new
kind of observations found in quantum physics (Pringe 2007). Since that time various authors have
developed Kantian  approaches,  epistemically  grounding both  quantum mechanics  and  quantum
field theory (Bitbol 2007; Auyang 1995). Various methodological approaches have been developed,
some of which focus on Kant's third  Critique (Pringe 2007). In contrast, I follow an ontological
approach.  I  am  not  so  concerned  with  epistemological  issues,  but  with  absolute  spontaneity
(freedom) which  Kant  incorporates  in  his  conception of  “final  causality”  in  the  third  Critique,
which in my view describes quantum collapse.
My view is an ontological reading of Kant's philosophy which is then applied to quantum physics. I
argue that we have good reason to think that the quantum and classical realms belong to different
ontological modes of existence and that the non-determinism in quantum mechanics involves not
merely the logical possibility of spontaneity, but that such a spontaneous causality (in accordance
with the Kantian conception in this regard) becomes conceivable in our understanding of what the
world is like. I argue that this spontaneous causality governs a non-spatio-temporal potentiality (as
is conceptualized in the context of Kant's “final causality” in the third Critique), similar to Bohm's
quantum potential.  This  potentiality  allows  non-extended  wholes-and-parts  in  the  supersensible
realm to produce parts and wholes in nature. I apply this concept to quantum collapse which takes
superpositions of states (wholes-and-parts) to reduced states. My view is not a dogmatic (realist)
assertion, but merely a conceptual understanding that is in line with Kant's critical philosophy.
In my approach the mere logical possibility of freedom is contrasted with the conceivability thereof
– by which I mean that I also engage with conditions for the possibility of freedom, which includes
1)  a  problematically  assumed,  ontologically  distinct,  mode  of  existence  through  which  such
freedom becomes possible (as the ruling principle of this mode of existence) and 2) that this realm
has the ability to (absolutely spontaneously) produce outcomes in nature. I argue that this is the
Kantian position (see chapter 2), although he does not formally introduce this as a “condition” in
the context of his discussion of freedom in the first  Critique. The conceivability of freedom also
involves the construction of a conception of such spontaneous potentiality in the framework of the
ontologically distinct supersensible realm in the third Critique (see chapter 3).
Within this  context I introduce the questions that I engage with in this thesis:  How is absolute
spontaneity possible and how can it be accommodated in physics as part of our overall conception
of the world? I use the philosophy of science that Kant developed in the third  Critique,  which
involves exactly such spontaneity (freedom), to try and solve the problem. 
1.2 Outline of the thesis
The problems with such an approach are two-fold. The first concerns Kant's conception of this other
kind of non-deterministic causality and the other his conception of the noumenal realm. These are in
fact interwoven problems since such a causality can only be conceivably introduced as something
that can in principle really exist when the noumenal realm is taken as an ontologically distinct realm
outside nature, that is, where the deterministic laws of nature do not apply (The Kantian conception
of nature involves the totality of causal relations). 
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In the third  Critique the noumenal realm is taken as the substratum of nature and plays a very
important  role  in  the  philosophy  of  science  that  Kant  developed  in  that  Critique.  In  my
interpretation, the Kantian concept of nature refers to the “classical world” (where the theories of
relativity  would  apply),  his  concept  of  the  noumenal  realm  as  the  substratum of  nature  finds
confirmation in the pre-measurement “quantum world” and his concept of spontaneous potentiality
as a causality finds its application in the reduction of the wave packet. This makes his philosophy of
science in the third Critique applicable to the study of the above mentioned problems in quantum
physics.  I  argue  that  Kant's  metaphysical  position  as  described  above  can  be  formulated  as  a
working hypothesis which prescribes the characteristics that the quantum realm should have for it to
be taken as conforming to this interpretation. 
My application of Kant's philosophy of science requires that the Kantian concepts be understood in
a specific manner, especially that the noumenal realm refers to an ontological distinct realm outside
nature, problematically assumed. In this regard my interpretation stands in contrast with current
interpretations (in both the two-object and two-aspect views – see chapter 2) which assume that the
noumenal realm, especially in the first  Critique,  does  not refer to an ontologically distinct realm
outside nature. In my view the first Critique lays the foundations for both parts of Kant's philosophy
of science as presented in the Metaphysical Foundations as well as the third Critique, and it would
be very strange indeed if his view of the noumenal realm in the first Critique differs substantially
from that in the third Critique where it is presented as the substratum of nature (and human nature). 
To arrive at an interpretation of Kant's first Critique as well as that of his philosophy of science in
the third Critique which allows for a sensible application to the problem of spontaneity in quantum
physics, I present my view in three parts which also constitutes the three main chapters of the thesis:
1.  I  argue  that  the  most  viable  interpretation  of  the  noumenal  realm in  the  first  Critique (and
therefore also in his critical philosophy in general) is to understand it as a realm outside Kant's
conception of nature (governed by deterministic causality), regulated by the transcendental principle
of freedom (as an absolute spontaneous, albeit, effective causality). In this manner this principle of
freedom does  not  merely become logically possible;  it  becomes  conceivable as  something that
could really exist if the world is perceived in accordance with Kantian philosophy. I present this
reading as a third alternative in Kantian interpretation in contrast  with the two-object and two-
aspect views (which include about all streams of Kantian interpretation). I show that  Kant's two-
aspect and two-object views are reconciled in this manner. 
2. I present a new reading of Kant's philosophy of science in the third Critique that is in agreement
with my new reading of the first Critique (with the focus on the noumenal realm and other relevant
concepts). I  show that  the  conception  of  such a  realm,  now called  the  supersensible  realm,  is
essential to the concepts that Kant develops in this part of his philosophy of science. I also show
that Kant now argues for the conceivability of both such a realm and a different kind of causality,
namely of “final” causes, which is named in analogy to the achievement of human ends. I argue that
this causality involves a certain potentiality according to which non-extended wholes-and-parts (in
the supersensible realm) can produce aggregated parts and wholes in nature and builds upon the
transcendental idea of freedom introduced in the first Critique. This aspect of Kant's philosophy of
science stands apart from that presented in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science which
is directed to the study of matter (grounded on the epistemology developed in the Analytic part of
the first Critique). 
3. I show that, although Kant himself did not foresee this possibility, his philosophy allows us to
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engage with the noumenal realm empirically. This is possible when we rework it in such a manner
that time is combined not with space, but with mathematical space (Kant calls such space-forms that
are constructed through reason and applied to noumena, “ideal” space – see below), as is done in
quantum mechanics. I argue that the pre-measurement quantum realm adheres to the three basic
requirements that Kant has for the supersensible realm, namely that it is supersensible, that it is
beyond space/time and that it is outside nature (where all interactions are governed by deterministic
causality). As such the quantum realm can be conceived of as an ontologically distinct realm. The
concept  of  absolute  spontaneous  causality  can  therefore  be  ascribed  to  that  realm  without
contradiction and I argue that Kant's approach enable us to positively conceive how this is possible. 
I take the reduction of the wave packet as adhering to this kind of causality, namely as a physical
event that happens in various contexts, also outside measurement, for example during atomic decay
which is the paradigmatic indeterminate process. In my Kantian interpretation of quantum physics I
develop  a  unified  conceptual  framework  in  which  spontaneous  and  deterministic  causality  are
reconciled. When these two kinds of effective causality are regarded as heterogeneous laws that
govern two ontologically distinct modes of existence, namely the quantum and classical modes, the
well-known measurement problem in quantum physics (that involves the above mentioned conflict
in  laws)  is  also  resolved.  New  light  is  also  thrown  on  some  interesting  features  in  quantum
mechanics, for example non-separability and non-locality.
In  this  manner  three  interpretations  are  developed,  namely 1)  a  new interpretation  of  the  first
Critique (called the third alternative), 2) an interpretation of Kant's philosophy of science in the
third  Critique that is consistent with 1) and 3) a new Kantian interpretation of quantum physics.
These  interpretations  are  not  independent  of  each  other  –  together  they constitute  a  consistent
interpretation of the first and third Critiques (and the Critique of Practical Reason, although that is
not included in the discussion) that is also consistent with contemporary science. 
1.3 Methodology
In deciding on a methodology for my interpretation of Kantian philosophy, I considered what may
be called the hermeneutic problem. This problem is that the overall interpretation of a text and the
particular arguments are interwoven.  In all interpretation the particular arguments are important
whereas for all arguments the overall interpretation is important. The reason for this is that our
understanding of philosophical works always involve certain assumptions underlying our premises
that are not made explicit. There are so many strings of thought in the overall work (the horizon
behind the work) that we can think of it as a thing in itself beyond the possibility of ever bringing
those ideas in any objective sense into our premises and arguments. Kant explicitly acknowledged
this problem when he argued that reason always has certain limits insofar as we as humans are
sensibly  and  conceptually  constrained.  In  Kant's  formulation  of  the  antinomies  he  shows  that
conflicting paradigms (even mechanism and freedom) that cannot be shown to be true in any final
sense, may even under certain conditions both be true. 
In this context I believe that a typical Kantian approach should not be to even try to establish final
conclusions in this regard. It should rather acknowledge that the above-mentioned problem makes it
impossible to arrive at final conclusions when trying to understand the works of philosophers. As
such it is better to speak of interpretations: that we develop certain interpretations that are not truth
statements.  We  can  never  do  better  than  presenting  various  interpretations.  This  is  especially
relevant in the interpretation and understanding of Kant's philosophy.
In my reading I observed two strategies in dealing with the hermeneutic problem in the work of
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historical philosophers and especially Kant. The first strategy is to try and reconstruct the author's
arguments and in that manner to arrive at some conclusion that we may attribute to the author. In
this case the project is often  implicitly guided by a preconceived paradigmatic commitment to an
overall interpretation of the work (say the two-object view) which is never made explicit. Although
some seemingly  final  conclusions  are  sometimes  arrived  at,  there  cannot  be  any metaphysical
commitment to truth because of the implicit assumptions. The other approach is to start with a broad
interpretation (a contextualization) and to proceed within this context with particular reconstructed
arguments. In this case the paradigmatic commitments are made  explicit from the start. As such
there are also no truth claims to be made. We can call this the analytic and continental approaches
and in Kantian  studies  both are  well  presented in  the literature (for  the  first,  see Guyer  1987,
Langton 1998, etc.; for the second, see Allison 2004, Allais 2004 etc.). 
The hermeneutic problem is especially relevant to my own approach since I am not committed to
any of  the  current  paradigms  in  Kantian  interpretation  (namely  the  two-object  and  two-aspect
views).  I  can  therefore  neither  start  with  particular  arguments  (which  always  depend  on some
overall interpretation) nor work from within any accepted paradigm. The result is that readers who
have different paradigmatic commitments (standing outside my newly introduced paradigm) might
read the work in their own terms, understanding the terminology in their own way. 
The problem is alleviated by the fact that my interpretation accepts the two-aspect view insofar as
Kant's epistemology is concerned (i.e. in the Analytic part of the first Critique), but not insofar as
Kant's views regarding freedom and the noumenal realm are concerned (i.e. in the Dialectic part; for
which I hold a two-object view). This allows me to use a continental approach according to which I
first  provide a contextualization of Kant's overall program (i.e.  give my own take on it)  before
proceeding with arguments regarding the details of Kant's concepts and their relation with each
other. 
We find the same problem in mathematical texts where mathematical formulations are sometimes
thought  of  as  giving  precise  descriptions  of  what  happen  in  the  same  manner  that  precise
formulations of arguments are often conceived of. This is an extensive problem and I am not going
to discuss it in any detail. What is of importance, however, for my own approach, is that there are
always  various  ways  to  understand  the  physics  behind  the  equations  (and  even  the  equations
themselves). This is why various interpretations of quantum physics have been developed. 
In the chapter where I give my Kantian interpretation of quantum physics, I developed my ideas in a
formal  manner  but  have  on  purpose  not  included  any equations  –  I  have  tried  to  present  my
understanding of the mathematics and the physics involved without taking the short route through
mathematics where presenting equations is regarded as stating “obvious” truths or interpretations.
Although  mathematical  expressions  can  provide  logical  (methodological)  possibilities,  the
understanding of how this  relates to what  the world is  like goes beyond that.  In not including
equations  I  try  to  facilitate  the  reader's  engagement  with  my own  paradigm of  understanding
quantum physics. Even in this case I, again, give a contextualization of my Kantian approach before
commencing with the detailed discussion. 
I  follow  the  continental  approach  throughout  (in  all  the  main  chapters),  starting  with
contextualization before engaging with the details of Kant's position. I develop an interpretation of
Kant's  philosophy in  the  first  Critique,  of  his  philosophy of  science  in  the  third  Critique and
eventually produce a Kantian interpretation of quantum physics in which I use these interpretations.
In the final instance I produce arguments for my position but I do not try to establish any final
conclusions.  I  nevertheless  hope that  my arguments  will  be  convincing and my interpretations
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sophisticated  enough  to  accommodate  the  many  strings  of  Kantian  thought  into  a  unified
perspective.
1.4 Conclusion
Kant's philosophy is not easy to engage with. The historical context in which he presented his major
work played an important role in the formulation of the traditional two-object view in which Kant is
read  primarily  as  an  idealist.  This  has  changed  over  the  last  fifty  years  or  so  with  the  wide
acceptance of the two-aspect view (see Gardner 1999). I believe that this has brought more balance
to  Kantian  interpretation.  The  problem,  is  however,  that  Kant's  conception  of  freedom is  still
understood for the most part in moral terms. 
In this thesis I try to change that view and show that freedom constituted an essential part of Kant's
scientific thought – both in the groundwork that he laid in the first Critique as well as in the third
Critique. Once this is recognized, the way is prepared for the application of these Kantian concepts
to contemporary scientific debate. There is no short route – the work presented here involves many
detailed discussions of seemingly forgotten concepts. But I hope in the end it will be worth the
effort of the reader. 
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2.  Kant's  conception of  the  noumenal  realm in  the  Critique  of
Pure Reason: the third alternative
2.1. Introduction
Kant's conception of noumena and a noumenal realm figures prominently in the writings of his
critical period and is interwoven in the arguments of all three Critiques. There can be no doubt that
he regarded it as an important part of his philosophy. The problem is, however, that it became one of
the most problematic aspects (one could even say the most problematic) of his philosophy. 
Outside Kant's  moral  philosophy very little attention is  given to the noumenal  realm and there
seems to be a consensus that we should rather forget that he gave such prominence to it in both the
Critique of Pure Reason (the first Critique, except insofar as it relates to his moral conception), as
well  as the  Critique of  the Power of  Judgment (the third  Critique),  where it  forms part  of  his
philosophy of  science.  Scientifically  minded  philosophers  believe  that  some damage-control  is
needed to purify the non-moral aspects of Kant's philosophy from this relic of an ancient mode of
thinking. They regard the noumenal realm as a “quasi-theological” realm (O'Shea 2010:525) which
represents eighteenth century ideas which are “now thought to be nothing more than ghosts of
earlier ways of thought” (Butts 1990:13). 
The problem is magnified by the fact that there is no consensus in Kantian interpretation. Since
interpretation in turn determines our understanding of noumena – for the simple reason that this
concept is closely interwoven with Kant's wider philosophical thought – this has led to divergent
ways in which it was/is understood. This interrelatedness in Kant's thought is visible in the close
relation between Kant's concept of noumena and other concepts, like things in themselves and the
transcendental object. Any study of noumena and a noumenal realm should therefore commence
with the more basic question regarding the place that noumena occupy in Kant's overall program in
the first Critique and its relation to these other concepts. 
All scholarly views can broadly be allocated into two schools of Kantian interpretation, namely the
two-object view and the two-aspect view. The “two-object” (or “two-world”) view is the oldest and
goes back to Christian Garve's first review of the first  Critique in 1782 (Feder/Garve 2000). It
understands noumena as referring to the everyday objects  of our senses considered outside our
cognition of them, i.e. the unknowable “real” things (in the world as it really is) which stand in
contrast with the representations in our “mental realm”. In recent times P. F. Strawson (1966) and
Paul Guyer (1987) have been the best known proponents of this view. The most important criticism
against this view is that it ascribes gross inconsistencies to Kant which are eliminated in the two-
aspect view (Bird 2010a:2).
The two-aspect view goes back to Kuno Fischer in his debate with Adolf Trendelenburg in the
1860's (Bird 2010c:486-499). This is called the “two-aspect” (or “one world”) view because  the
same things that we encounter in experience are taken from two different standpoints, namely as
they appear to our senses, adhering to the epistemic conditions of cognition, and as we can think
them beyond that as things in themselves. Some of these interpreters, like Henry Allison, view
things in themselves (equated with noumena of which we can know nothing) in mere epistemic
terms (Allison 2004). Others, like Karl Ameriks, hold that things in themselves could also have
ontologically  distinct  (i.e.  noumenal)  intrinsic  properties  (Ameriks  1992;  Langton  1998;  Allais
2004). The problem with this view is that it is not able to account for the conceivability of freedom.
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In my view, none of these views gives an interpretation of noumena which sufficiently accounts for
the many strands of Kant's thinking. This poses the problem: Is the concept of noumena problematic
because Kant held some (now) outdated ideas in this regard or is it because of the distortion in our
interpretation of the Kantian view? I believe the second option is the case. I therefore propose a
third alternative in our reading of Kant, namely that the noumenal realm is transcendent to our
senses, not in the sense of being the “real” outside the confines of our senses, but in the sense of
being outside the Kantian conception of “nature” and consisting of ontologically distinct entities
(noumena). I show that in this interpretation  Kant's two-aspect and two-object views (i.e. not the
traditional two-object view) are not merely reconciled; it is integrated in a unified view in which the
first captures his epistemology (in the Analytic part of the first  Critique) in such a manner that it
allows for the second which is necessary to establish the conceivability of freedom (in the Dialectic
part). Although this alternative is implicitly (and sometimes explicitly; Guyer 1987:335) rejected in
the above interpretations, I believe that this is in fact the alternative that not only most accurately
captures Kant's thought, but also makes the most sense for the contemporary scientific mind.
To understand Kant's concept of noumena I first explore its place in Kant's overall program and its
connection  with  other  related  concepts.  I  show that  we  can  order  Kant's  program in  the  first
Critique into three paradigmatic moves, which grounds the three basic aspects of his philosophy,
namely his transcendental idealism, empirical realism (which together constitute his epistemology)
and his conception of freedom. Since the first two moves are in agreement with the two-aspect view
and do not contain anything new per se (except the manner of ordering them), I only discuss those
concepts introduced in these moves which directly relate to Kant's concept of noumena. 
The last Kantian move, which concerns his concept of freedom, is my primary concern. I take this
move not merely as establishing the logical possibility of freedom, but as designed to establish the
conceivability of  freedom  under  certain  (metaphysical)  conditions  which  include  a  particular
conception of noumena. It is within this framework that Kant's conception of noumena should be
understood: it makes the transcendental idea of freedom (as well as practical freedom) conceivable.
In  my  view  the  noumenal  realm  refers  to  an  ontologically  distinct  metaphysical  realm,
problematically assumed (A255). 
Although Kant does not explicate his idea of the noumenal realm in any detail in the first Critique, I
argue that we have every reason to think that he adhered to the same conception of the noumenal
realm throughout  his  critical  period,  but  especially in  the  third  Critique. In  the  third  Critique,
especially in the part called Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, where the noumenal
realm forms part of Kant's philosophy of science, he conceptualizes it as the substratum of nature
and human nature. This means that Kant thought that this concept is consistent with science. 
2.2. Kant's overall program in the first Critique
In  the  first  Critique Kant  is  concerned  with  the  question:  How  is  mathematical  science  (and
mathematics)  possible  for  humans  with  our  discursive  form  of  cognition  i.e.  that  needs  both
sensibility  (intuitions)  and  concepts  of  the  understanding  for  cognition  of  objects?  (Friedman
2001:10). In it he develops an epistemology in accordance with the conditions for and limitations of
human knowledge.  He establishes  the  limits  of  pure  reason and undoes  all  “proud ontologies”
(A247), but at the same time shows how certain ideas like freedom, which could conceivably be
true, can be fruitfully introduced. 
Within Kant's overall program, I distinguish three paradigmatic moves. Kant's first two moves are
interwoven in the first  part  of  the  first  Critique,  namely in  the Transcendental  Analytic  (using
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arguments  from  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  and  Logic).  The  third  move  is  made  in  the
Transcendental Dialectic. With each move another concept is introduced that has some bearing on
our  limits  of  knowledge,  namely things  in  themselves,  the  transcendental  object  and noumena
themselves,  all  of  which  are  closely  interconnected.  The  relation  between  these  concepts  is
discussed in section 2.4 (on noumena). 
2.2.1. The possibility and conditions of a priori cognition 
The first move concerns Kant's transcendental idealism. Kant presents his project as an inquiry into
the possibility of establishing something about objects  a priori before they (as real objects) are
given to us (Bxvii). According to Kant, it is not the objects which make representations possible,
but representations which make objects possible – in the first case the relation would be empirical
and not able to establish necessary and universally valid principles for mathematics and the natural
sciences, in the second case “[although] the representation in itself... does not produce its object as
far as its existence is concerned, the representation is still determinant of the object a priori if it is
possible through it alone to cognize something as an object” (Kant's accentuation, A93/B125). 
Central to the possibility of  a priori cognition, is Kant's well-known Copernican turn (see Bxvii-
xviii).  The essence of this  critical  turn in Kant's  philosophy is  the acknowledgment that we as
humans do not have access to objects of the senses, except through our human faculties. Objects are
always  objects  “for  us” (B138).  In  the same way that  Copernicus  incorporated the  perspective
(movement) of the observer in our understanding of the heavens, so Kant saw that we have no
choice but to incorporate the human perspective in cognition in general. Our cognition of objects
are dependent on our cognitive faculties – we do not have unconditioned access to the world.
Within such an anthropocentric model (Allison 2004:xvi), which would always be subjective, it is
nonetheless  possible,  according  to  Kant,  to  obtain  objective  cognition  when  various  epistemic
conditions which are necessary, and presumably together sufficient for that, are adhered to (Allison
2004:12). Such conditions involve the human abilities which make cognition possible in the first
place (Gardner 1999:83), namely the pure (a priori) forms of sensibility, namely space and time, the
pure “form of sensibly intuiting” (i.e. the manner/form in which intuitions are given for synthesis
with concepts; Allison 2004:15, 114) as well as the pure forms (concepts) of the understanding, all
of which relate to objects completely  a priori (A86/B118; A88-89/B120-122). The pure form of
space provides the manifold (B154, B156, A157/B196) in which the “form of sensibly intuiting” is
combined into a unity through apprehension (B129-131; note to A429/B457; Allison 2004:193).
The formal conditions which make our experience of objects possible at the same time makes them
into possible objects of experience. 
This mind-dependence of appearances (the manner in which objects appear to the mind) constitutes
Kant's  philosophy  as  a  form of  “idealism”  (Allais  2004:656).  It  differs  from both  Berkeley's
“dogmatic” (or “material”) idealism and Descartes' “skeptical” (or “empirical”) idealism in that it is
both “formal” and “critical”. It is formal because it concerns the formal conditions (involving the
“forms” of the mind) under which objects can be cognized and it is “critical” because it involves a
reflection  on  the  limits  of  discursive  cognition  (Allison  2010:112).  Kant  calls  his  philosophy
“transcendental idealism”. By “transcendental” Kant means that his idealism is concerned with the
possibility of and conditions for (objective) experience, and as such with a priori cognition. 
Kant's  transcendental  philosophy,  however,  does  not  only  concern  the  a  priori possibility  and
conditions of cognition; it is also occupied with the concepts of “objects in general” (A12) which
refer to objects as we can conceptualize them in general, even beyond the restrictions of sensibility
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(see A35/B52, A57/B81; A252 etc.).  When we abstract the subjective constitution of the senses
from these objects in general, we are left with “objects in themselves” of which we cannot know
anything (they are beyond the reach of our senses). Kant writes: “What may be the case with objects
in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to
us” (A42). In this way the concept of things in themselves in contradistinction to things as they
appear to our senses is introduced into Kant's philosophy (Bxxvi). 
Kant's first move culminates with the formulation of four rules or “principles” of cognition, based
on the four basic types of concepts/rules (called categories) of the understanding (quantity, quality,
relation,  modality).  These principles are  both  a priori (valid  before any actual  experience)  and
“synthetic”  since  they involve  human  sensibility.  They are  a priori objectively valid,  i.e.  they
constitute  the  real  possibility  of  experience  and  are  therefore  valid  for  all  possible  objects  of
experience. As mere rules which regulate the real possibility of experience, these principles are,
however,  not  sufficient  to  establish actual  experience.  Experience  involves  judgments  of  actual
perceptions according to these principles.
2.2.2. The objective spatio-temporal world of empirical cognition
The second move concerns Kant's realism. Kant now establishes the necessary a priori (i.e. before
experience) conditions for achieving actual empirical cognition (empirical truth) when objects are
given in empirical intuition (perception). This move compliments the discussion of the possibility
(a priori conditions) of experience with that of 1) the actuality of experience and 2) the necessary
and objective world of experience (see below). 
For experience to be actual,  it  must involve not merely establishing something about objects  a
priori before they (as real objects) are given to us (Bxvii), but also about the real objects of the
senses (both inner and outer objects). Objects must not only conform to our cognition; cognition
must also incorporate the real in objects. A priori cognition does not mean that no a posteriori data
is involved (Bird 2010b:127). On the contrary, the judgment that a cognition is true or false must
involve  both  a  priori (transcendental)  rules  (only  general  rules  can  have  necessary  and  strict
universal  application)  as  well  as  particulars  (when  pure  apprehension  is  particularized  in
experience) which are brought under those rules.  The undetermined (unconceptualized, i.e.  not
brought  under  rules)  object  of  an  empirical  intuition  is  called  “appearance”  (A20/B34);  the
determined object is called phenomenon (A249-9/B305).
This  mind-independence  of  appearances  constitutes  Kant's  philosophy  as  a  form “empiricism”
(Allais 2004:656). Kant describes this aspect of his philosophy as “empirical realism”. The term
“empirical” refers to the givenness of objects; that outer objects are given from outside us in the
senses (B166). The term “real” refers to their  independent existence,  which is not inferred,  but
directly perceived as “matter” in appearances: “[T]he transcendental idealist is an empirical realist,
and grants to matter, as appearance, a reality which is not inferred, but is  immediately perceived”
(A372; my accentuation).Whereas the conception of objects, which precede perceptions, signify
mere (though real) possibility, perceptions provide the material for these conceptions, and as such
“is the sole characteristic of actuality” (B273). 
2.2.2.1. Perception and the transcendental object 
The manner in which real objects are given to us in perception involves an “effect” on the mind.
Although this effect is in some sense “caused” by objects (our bodies are objects in a causal relation
with other objects), this should not be confused with objects as the ground or “cause” (taken in the
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weak sense, i.e. merely as something that is necessary for something else to happen) of appearances
(Allison 2004:65). What does Kant mean by this ground? Kant's realism accepts that we are directly
aware  that  appearances are  not  merely in  the mind but  involve independently existing objects
outside the mind (A372/3).  We are aware that appearances of objects  relate  to objects  existing
independently of us. 
When we conceptualize appearances as phenomena, this necessarily includes in the concept the
presupposition  of  such  a  ground  for  these  phenomena  (A252).  Without  such  a  transcendental
ground, phenomena would not be possible for us. In this case the term “transcendental” does not
refer merely to human conditions for the possibility of experience but to external conditions, i.e.
that objects really exist independent of us. There must be real objects for us to have experience of
them.
Kant now introduces the concept of the “transcendental object” as the ground of phenomena. Since
this concept involves everyday objects to the extent that they exist beyond our perceptual reach, it
stands in some relation with the concept of things in themselves (this relation is explored in more
detail below). The transcendental object does not refer to any particular object; it is the completely
undetermined thought, i.e. we do not even have a concept of it except merely that it is the object of
sensible intuition in general (as a mere “nothing” for us), which is the same for all appearances
(A251, A253). As belonging to the real world before our cognition thereof, it is “given in itself prior
to all experience” (A495/B523). 
Although the transcendental object, as ground of appearances, stands forever outside experience,
the transcendental matter (and its form) belonging to the transcendental object can be brought to
consciousness as the matter (and its real form) given in sensibility (see also Allison 2004:70; note
1). As such Kant speaks of “things themselves which appear” (A268/B324), i.e. which are brought
into sensibility. Clearly the transcendental object, as the mere intelligible ground of appearances in
general, is merely something corresponding to “sensibility as a receptivity” (A495), forever outside
sensibility. 
2.2.2.2. Experience of an objective world
At this point in the discussion we can focus in more detail on Kant's concept of judgment which
constitutes an essential part of the second move. Kant distinguishes between understanding and the
power of judgment: whereas the understanding is “the faculty of rules [concepts]”, the power of
judgment “is the faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e. of determining whether something stands
under a given rule or not” (A133/B172). The understanding provides the rules/concepts, whereas
judgment is the ability to subsume the particulars given in sensibility under those rules. For Kant
determinate judgment is the ability to subsume particulars under rules (Guyer 2000:xxii). 
How is judgment related to experience? In judgment the appearances of objects given in perception
are brought under the rules for objects (principles of the understanding) made possible through the
first move (in this way appearances are distinguished from mere “representations of apprehension”).
Kant writes in this regard: “The appearance that is given to me, in spite of the fact that it is nothing
more than a sum of the representations, is considered as their object, with which my concept, which
I  draw from the  representations  of  apprehension,  is  to  agree.  One quickly sees  that,  since  the
agreement of cognition with the object is truth, only the formal conditions of empirical truth can be
inquired after here, and appearance, in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can
thereby only be represented as the object that is distinct from them if it stands under a rule that
distinguishes it  from every other apprehension, and makes one way of combining the manifold
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necessary” (A191/B236; my accentuation). The judgment of truth/falsity involves determining the
necessary  manner  in  which  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  of  appearance  (or:  the  manifold  of
perceptions as he says elsewhere; B219) is accomplished. 
The  necessary connection  between perceptions  allows  for  a  definition  of  objects:  “That  in  the
appearance of which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension, is the object”
(A191/B236). This rule is provided by the third principle of cognition which governs the relations
between existences in time, i.e. the Analogies of Experience. Objectivity in experience is achieved
through the rules for perceptions (the analogies), which constrain our actual perceptions as Arthur
Melnick (2010:179) writes: “[W]e can represent objectivity by rules (for perceptions) that constrain
our actual perceptions. It is proper perceptions [constrained in this manner], that is, that constitute
objectivity”. 
Whereas the first two principles, called “mathematical” principles, justify applying mathematics to
appearances,  that  is,  determining  the  extensive  spatial  and  temporal  magnitudes  of  relations
between objects  (or  parts  thereof)  and the  intensive  magnitudes  of  matter  in  empirical  objects
(A165/B206,  A179),  the  analogies  (substance,  causality,  community)  concern  the  “relation  of
existence” (B222), namely the persistence, succession and simultaneity of the real existing objects
of  experience.  Although  the  mathematical  principles  are  constitutive  (i.e.  involve  numerical
magnitudes) and the dynamic principles (the third and fourth) regulative principles (i.e. involving
relations  of  existence)  of  the  understanding,  both  enable  us  to  make  determinate  judgments
regarding the world of experience. In the case of the analogies, they enable us  to determine the
necessity of the relations of existence, that is, the objective spatio-temporal order of the world. 
2.2.3. The conceivability of freedom
Kant's third move is made in the last part of the first Critique (in the Transcendental Dialectic, i.e.
the Logic of Illusion). I understand this Kantian move as establishing the conceivability of freedom.
Whereas the first two moves constitute a way of ordering Kant's epistemology (in accordance with
the two-aspect view), this move presents a new reading of the Dialectic within the framework of his
overall program. In my understanding Kant's goal with this last part of the first Critique is not only
to establish the limits of pure reason and to undo all “proud ontologies” (A247); it is to show how
freedom can be saved even though pure reason is limited in its reach. 
In my reading Kant is not merely introducing the possibility of freedom as just another topic in the
course  of  his  discussion  in  the  Dialectic.  On  the  contrary,  his  overall  aim  is  to  argue  that
transcendental  freedom is  conceivable under  certain  (metaphysical)  conditions  which  include  a
particular  conception  of  noumena.  When we want  to  understand how noumena fit  into  Kant's
overall program, we have to take this goal into account. It is my opinion that only when we take the
conceivability of freedom as the overall goal of Kant's third move, would our interpretation of the
first  Critique do justice to Kant's philosophy. In the same manner that the two-aspect view does
away with  various  inconsistencies  which  the  two-object  view finds  in  Kant's  philosophy (Bird
2010a:2),  this  understanding  of  Kant's  third  move  does  away  with  many  of  the  remaining
inconsistencies in the two-aspect view. After discussing Kant's conception of noumena in the next
few sections, I discuss these different views (in section 2.5) and show why they do not correctly
capture Kant's position. 
Kant's arguments for the conceivability of freedom are indissolubly linked with his conception of
noumena. Since all experience is governed by causality according to the second analogy, freedom is
only conceivable if it can be ascribed to an intelligible (noumenal) world beyond the sensible world,
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and if it can also operate as a cause for some phenomena in the world of experience. The only way
in which freedom can be secured in Kant's critical discussion of the limits of cognition (established
in the previous part of his work), is within the framework of the correct use of another human
faculty,  namely  reason.  Reason  has  the  impulse  to  proceed  beyond  the  sensible  world.  This,
however, is a dangerous space where various illusions lurk and Kant discusses the possible pitfalls,
but also shows how freedom can be fruitfully introduced as a transcendental idea of reason. 
This  move  is  of  great  importance  for  Kant  since  freedom plays  a  very  important  part  in  his
philosophy. We can even say that his philosophy can be regarded as a philosophy of freedom. He
says in the Critique of Practical Reason (the second Critique) that freedom is the foundation of his
philosophy (5.3-4). In the first Critique he demonstrates its conceivability, in the second Critique he
uses this as basis for his moral philosophy (speculative reason creates the space which is to be filled
by practical reason; Bxxii; Allison 1990:243). In the Critique of the Power of Judgment (the third
Critique) he engages with the problem regarding the gap between the realms of nature and freedom.
For my purposes, this move is important since it is so closely linked to his conception of noumena
and the noumenal world.  
2. 3. Proceeding beyond the limits of human cognition (introducing the noumenal realm)
In the first part of the first Critique Kant is primarily concerned with the possibility and conditions
of human cognition.  In the Dialectic he proceeds with an investigation into the possibilities of
achieving cognition beyond our sensible reach. He shows that since the cognition of objects beyond
sensibility,  i.e.  of things  as they are in themselves,  is  not possible,  no ontology thereof can be
established (A247). However, our natural questions regarding metaphysics can be put to good use in
both scientific inquiry and morality (Guyer 2000:14). 
Since our understanding is restricted by sensibility, and the principles of the understanding can be
related only to objects of sensibility, this faculty cannot be used to explore the domain of things in
themselves. For this another faculty is needed, namely the higher faculty of reason. Reason has the
characteristic that, in its logical use, it seeks for a synthesized whole (A307/B364; A409/B436). For
any conditioned it demands the unconditioned in the series of conditions (i.e. the whole). Reason
therefore proceeds from the categories of the understanding (for those categories which allow such
a  synthesis)  to  an  absolute  whole,  in  which  case  these  are  called  concepts  of  reason  or
“transcendental  ideas”  (A311/B368).  Three  kinds  of  such  ideas  are  possible,  namely  ideas  of
rational  psychology,  rational  cosmology and rational  theology,  generated according to the three
kinds of rational inference (the relation of a property to the subject, to another property and to its
ground; Guyer 2000:63; A334/B334). 
The cosmological ideas are of special interest in our discussion since they are the only ones which
presuppose an object (A479/B507). They are therefore of particular importance when we study the
limits of cognition, which always require real objects. In this case the demands of reason for the
unconditioned can  only be  satisfied  under  the  following assumption:  “when the  conditioned is
given,  then  so  is  the  whole  series  of  conditions  subordinated  one  to  another,  which  is  itself
unconditioned, also given” (A308/B365). Kant calls these unconditioned wholes “principles” (of
reason),  which  are  “a  logical  prescription  in  the  ascent  to  ever  higher  conditions  to  approach
completeness  in  them  and  thus  to  bring  the  highest  possible  unity  of  reason  into  cognition”
(A309/B366). When the absolute whole is taken to be the sensible world as a whole, the various
conditions thereof, as given by the applicable categories, can be synthesized in this manner.  
Kant's  philosophy  suggests  two  competing  strategies  for  thinking  the  unconditioned,  namely
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proceeding from the transcendental  idealist  and the  empirical  realism perspectives  respectively.
Reason in its transcendental use can think the unconditioned in a series of conditions regarding the
sensible world (a first moment in time or a limit in space, that matter is composed of indivisible
elements, etc.). This conceptualized unconditioned can, however, never be brought into experience
(it is merely an idea) and assuming such a reality (i.e. that it can be given in sensibility) would be
illusionist. Reason in its empirical use proceeds from empirical conditions to infinity taken as an
unconditioned whole (there is no first beginning or limit to space, no simple substances of matter
etc.). This infinite whole can also never as such be brought to experience (it would contain the
empirical  boundary  with  the  void)  and  assuming  such  a  reality  (i.e.  that  it  can  be  given  in
sensibility) would also be illusionist (Grier 2010:203; McLaughlin 1990:78). 
In bringing these thesis and anti-thesis positions into conflict in the framework of the antinomies (a
conflict of laws), Kant demonstrates the errors of the dogmatic rationalist and dogmatic empiricist
positions (Allison 1990:13).  When the principles of reason are used “constitutively” this would
enable us to expand both the conceptual structure and the empirical conditions which apply to the
sensible  world  (in  objective  cognition)  beyond  the  boundaries  of  possible  experience.  The
antinomies show that this cannot succeed. Kant, however, also introduces the “regulative” use of
reason in which the unconditioned is given merely as a problem and where these principles guide
scientific research towards an ever more complete understanding of objects, insofar as they may be
empirically given (B537; B692; Cicovacki 2010:88). 
These  antinomial  conflicts,  furthermore,  open  new  avenues  for  thinking.  In  this  regard  the
difference  between  the  “mathematical”  and  “dynamical”  antinomies  are  important.  Kant
accentuated such a difference already when he introduced the categories and also later with the
principles  of  the  understanding.  The primary difference  is  that  the  mathematical  principles  are
concerned with the manner in which appearances must be given in space and time, whereas the
dynamical principles concern the existence of appearances (Allison 2012:17).  The two dynamical
principles  are  concerned  with  the  modes  (third  antinomy)  and  ground  (fourth  antinomy)  of
existence.  The  thought of  the  unconditioned  in  these  cases  suggests  “absolute  spontaneous”
causality  (the  cosmological  idea  of  freedom)  and  the  existence  of  a  necessary  being.  The
empirically unconditioned would deny these. 
The mathematical principles are merely concerned with accumulation or division within sensible
conditions  (within  appearance),  whereas  the  dynamical  principles  in  their  consideration  of
existence alone (i.e.  no magnitudes of the series of conditions are considered; A536/B564) can
easily be absolved from those conditions (the condition of appearances can be outside the series of
appearances; A531-2/B559-560). As such, the transcendental and empirical use of reason (i.e. the
thesis and anti-thesis positions) can be extended to conceptualize both the intelligible and sensible
worlds, where the last is now taken not as an accumulative world-whole but as “nature”. 
Nature  is  comprised  of  the  totality  of  casual  relations  which  is  called  “mechanism”.  As  such,
mechanism stands in contrast  with transcendental  freedom. The “mechanism of nature” is  only
introduced in the second edition of the Critique in the context of the third antinomy (Bxxvii-xxx;
A419/B447 note).  It  should  be  distinguished from “material  mechanism” which  is  used  in  the
technical sense to refer to causality in the science of mechanics (Allison 2012:202/3). Mechanism
differs from Kant's concept of causality discussed in the second analogy in that it is a transcendental
idea of reason which applies to nature as a whole (which is also only a concept), whereas causality
is  a  rule  of  the  understanding  which  applies  to  phenomena.  Both  are,  however,  deterministic
concepts of causality. 
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Now in the dynamical antinomies the anti-thesis position thinks the unconditioned in the framework
of sensible conditions whereas the thesis position does not merely think the unconditional, it also
thinks it outside sensible conditions in an intelligible world. Instead of creating a conflict of reason,
this represents a real (logical) possibility. The value of the dynamical antinomies, when viewed in
this manner (with the thesis position taken outside possible sensible conditions), is that existence in
two different worlds can be brought into interaction with each other, i.e. an intelligible cause can
produce phenomenal effects or a necessary being can bring forth contingent existences. 
Since the mode of existence in an intelligible world outside nature is not governed by mechanism
we can without contradiction ascribe freedom to it. As such freedom, as a different type of effective
causality,  namely  of  absolute  spontaneity,  becomes  conceivable  as  a  transcendental  idea  that
belongs to that other mode of existence outside nature (Kant views this as the only alternative kind
of causality; A532/B560). Spontaneity as an effective cause of phenomena has no previous causal
links  in  the  structure  of  causal  relations  governed  by  the  second  analogy  (in  the  world  of
phenomena); this is why it is viewed as beginning “a series of occurrences  entirely from itself”
(A534/B562).   
2.4. Kant's conception of noumena 
With this background, we can now depart from the two-aspect view. I now present an explication of
Kant which builds on the two-aspect view (as presented in the previous sections), but which is
nonetheless different from that found in other interpretations.  I now argue for a two-object view
insofar as noumena are concerned. As said before, I believe that we can only understand Kant's
conception  of  noumena  (intelligibilia)  and  a  noumenal  realm  when  we  consider  it  within  the
framework  of  his  conception  of  freedom.  In  fact,  Kant  introduces  the  conception  of  noumena
exactly because without it his conception of freedom is nothing but a vague possibility (as we find
in the two-aspect view – see below), not necessarily something that can really exist in a conceivable
manner. Within the framework of Kant's conception of noumena, his transcendental conception of
freedom becomes conceivable.  Although we cannot  prove the reality or even the possibility of
freedom (A558/B586), we can think its possibility, and, when using reason, argue its conceivability.
We  can  even  make  a  slightly  stronger  claim.  Since  we  need  freedom  to  assert  personal
responsibility  (morality),  and  this  only  becomes  possible  through  the  transcendental  idea  of
freedom, Kant believes that he has good reason to think that noumena are conceivable, even though
we can never know that they really exist. Andrews Reath (2010:276) writes in this regard: “Kant
thinks that we can make warranted assertions about noumena if we have grounds for thinking of
entities that are governed by laws different in kind from the causal laws governing the occurrence of
events in space and time. Such assertions would be a way of conceiving of such entities, but are not
knowledge claims”. 
According to Kant, practical freedom, i.e. freedom associated with human action, is grounded on
transcendental freedom: “It is especially noteworthy that it is this transcendental idea of freedom on
which the practical concept of freedom is grounded, and the former constitutes the real moment of
the  difficulties  of  the  latter,  which  have  long  surrounded  the  question  of  its  possibility”
(A534/B562, B461-2; my accentuation). Although the transcendental idea of freedom is necessary
for the concept of practical freedom, only the latter regulates human action and morality; the first is
a concept of speculative reason, not practical reason. We therefore find that Kant also discusses
freedom in  the  human  domain  (from A546/B574  on)  only  after he  shows  how transcendental
freedom is conceivable as a different kind of causality once the existence of noumena is assumed
(A531/B559-A545/B573).  It  is also in the context of transcendental freedom that the realms of
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nature and freedom are first introduced (A537/B565). Although Allison (1990:24) follows a mere
epistemic  (methodological)  two-aspect  approach,  he  also  distinguishes  in  this  regard  between
transcendental freedom as effective cause and the freedom associated with causal agents. 
Viewed from this perspective, we can say that Kant formulates his conception of noumena at the
end of the Analytic, in a section called “On the ground of the distinction of all objects in general
into phenomena and noumena”, with his discussion of transcendental freedom in the antinomies in
mind.  Kant's  most  important  statement  in  this  regard  is:  “For  if  appearances  are  things  in
themselves,  then  freedom  cannot  be  saved”  (A537/B565).  Kant  says  that  for  (transcendental)
freedom to be conceivable, we need to go beyond appearances, which are governed by causality, to
things in themselves. What does Kant mean by “things in themselves” in this regard? Throughout
the  first  Critique Kant  often  mentions  that  this  concept  refers  to  things  considered outside the
conditions in sensibility. But this is quite a broad conception (as I will now show), which includes
various considerations of things in different contexts. 
2.4.1. Noumena in the negative sense
When speaking about things in themselves in the context of freedom (although Kant often does not
make this explicit) Kant has something specific in mind, namely noumena, taken in the negative
sense. In the second edition of the first Critique he introduces noumena in the negative sense, which
should be distinguished from noumena in the positive sense (B308-9). What are noumena in the
negative sense? By this expression Kant means that  we cannot positively cognize noumena in the
sense of knowing something about them (for this the concept of the object must be synthesized with
some intuition thereof as explained in the first part of the first Critique) (B309-11). But since we do
not have any sensible intuition of noumenal objects (they are pure objects of understanding), we
cannot cognize them.
Although noumena in the negative sense are not objects of our sensible intuition,  they could very
well be objects of another kind of intuition (B308). Although Kant in general refers to intellectual
intuitions in this regard, according to which some intellect (albeit not ours) can capture things as
they are in themselves, this is not necessarily the case here – he could just refer to such a possibility
without any specifics (see note 2 for another possibility). Kant mentions that we cannot assert that
no such intuition exists (A255/B311). The possible existence of objects as noumena can therefore
never be excluded. As such, they would be entities of another kind of intuition, but outside our
sensible  reach.  Although outside our sensibility,  they would,  nonetheless,  be real objects  of  the
world. Kant's conception of noumena in the negative sense captures this possibility, although only
problematically (i.e. the concept contains no contradiction). 
Kant  writes:  “[T]here  may  even  be  beings  of  understanding  to  which  our  sensible  faculty  of
intuition has no relation at all, our concepts of understanding, as mere forms of thought for our
sensible  intuition,  do  not  reach these  in  the  least;  thus  that  which  we call  noumenon must  be
understood to be such only in a negative sense... The concept of a noumenon, i.e. of a thing that is
not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself (solely through a pure
understanding), is not at all contradictory; for one cannot assert of sensibility that it is the only
possible kind of intuition... In the end, however, we have no insight into the possibility of such
noumena, and the domain outside the sphere of appearances is  empty (for us), i.e.  we have an
understanding that extends farther than sensibility problematically, but no intuition, indeed not even
the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside the field of sensibility could be
given” (B309-11).
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At this point of the discussion  it is important to distinguish between the positive content of the
conception  of  noumena and noumena in  the  positive  sense  (a  difference  which  is  ignored,  for
example, by Allison 2004:63). Noumena in the positive sense must be “grounded” on some intuition
(B308-9).  Alternatively  they  can,  according  to  Kant's  explication  in  the  second  Critique, be
grounded in our practical use of reason which is not our concern here (Allison 1990:242). The
positive conception of noumena, on the other hand, is not grounded on any intuition; it is merely a
concept with reference to a possible existing object which can be an object for another kind of
intuition than our own. 
The  positive  content  of  the  concept of  noumena  (i.e.  not  noumena  in  the  positive  sense)  is
determined from the third antinomy. We have seen that the only manner in which the thesis and
antithesis positions can be reconciled, and the conceivability of transcendental freedom established,
is when such freedom transcends not only sensibility (and the second analogy), but is also assigned
to  the  realm  outside  nature  (and  mechanism).  As  such  transcendental  freedom  is  ascribed  to
noumena, which would belong to another mode of existence outside nature where mechanism does
not apply, and which is only accessible to another kind of intuition than our own. This antinomy is
after all concerned with (modes of) existence. Paul Guyer is certainly right when he writes: “their
affirmation [i.e. of the two sides of the dynamic antinomies] is taken to refer to what might exist in
a noumenal or supersensible world of things in themselves” (Guyer 2000:17).
Such an existence would not merely be outside the conditions of sensibility;  it  would really be
outside  space  and  time.  The  reason  for  this  is  immediately  clear:  according  to  the  Kantian
conception of noumena they could only exist outside the conception of nature (and mechanism) and
as such they would forever be outside the reach of our sensibility which is restricted to the objects
of nature. Only objects in nature can become objects of sensibility and as such be perceived with our
forms of sensibility, namely space and time. The reason for this is that objects outside nature would
not stand in a community with us in accordance with the third analogy since they do not belong to
the causal structure of our world.  We cannot become aware of them. They therefore cannot be
perceived with our kind of sensibility in space and time. 
As a mode of existence outside space and time, this would encompass a realm that we can merely
think and as such it would be ontologically distinct from our sensible world. Already in the first
Critique Kant  mentions  the  distinction  between  these  conceptualized worlds:  “The  division  of
objects  into phenomena and noumena,  and of  the world into a  world of sense and a  world of
understanding,  can  therefore  not  be  permitted  at  all  in  the  positive  sense,  although  concepts
certainly permit a division into sensible and intelligible ones” (B312: the words accentuated are
added in the second edition; noumena in the positive sense are not allowed). He later spells out that
this involves existence outside time (and space) when he says: “this acting subject, in its intelligible
character [i.e. noumenal ground], would not stand under any conditions of time... insofar as it is a
noumenon,  nothing  happens,  thus  no  alteration  requiring  a  dynamic  time-determination  is
demanded,  and hence  no  connection  with  appearances  as  causes  is  encountered  in  its  actions”
(A540-1/B568-9). 
Of special importance to my interpretation is  the fact that Kant regards noumena as real entities
which are ontologically different from the objects of the senses. This is why Kant contrasts the two
kinds of objects with each other and refers to noumena as “other objects” than those given in the
senses: “[I]f  we call  certain objects,  as appearances,  beings of sense (phenomena),  because we
distinguish the way in which we intuit them from their constitution in itself, then it already follows
from our  concept  that  to  these  we  as  it  were  oppose,  as  objects  thought  merely  through  the
understanding,  either  other  objects  conceived  in  accordance  with  the  latter  constitution,  even
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though we do not intuit it in them, or else other possible things, which are not objects of our senses
at all, and call these beings of the understanding (noumena)” (B306; my accentuation, except for
“phenomena” and “noumena”). Kant here distinguishes between two types of noumena, namely
those objects which can be included in the framework of things as they are in themselves and those
which have no relation to the objects of the senses whatsoever (things like angels). 
At this point my interpretation shows some agreement with the two-object view which also takes
Kant's  conception  of  noumena  as  referring  to  ontologically  distinct  objects  seriously.  The
difference, however, is that they view things in themselves as equivalent to noumena, whereas I
interpret  Kant's  concept  of  things  in  themselves  as  being  wider  than  noumena  (see  below)  –
although he  admittedly sometimes  speaks  as  if  they are  the  same.  In  the  two-object  view the
everyday objects outside our sensible reach, i.e. as they are “really” in themselves, are taken to be
the same as noumena. I disagree. I mentioned in my discussion of Kant's second move that the real
outside our senses are fully given in empirical apprehension. When I discuss the two-object view
below I show that such a concept of noumena cannot make freedom possible, nor conceivable. 
We can now say that Kant confirms a positive conception of noumena, which refer to real but
ontologically distinct objects, which can only be taken in the negative sense as  problematically
assumed. This conception is more substantial than merely considering objects outside the conditions
of  sensibility;  it  includes  objects  of  the  understanding  which  can  be  given  in  some  intuition,
although not  a  sensible  one  (A255;  B311).  As  such,  noumena  as  objects  of  our  thoughts,  can
constitute a different mode of existence than that given in sensibility, although we cannot cognize
them  because  of  our  particular  form  of  sensibility  (A253).  Kant  construes  noumena  and  the
noumenal realm in these terms to make the transcendental idea of freedom conceivable.  Without
such a noumenal ground for the phenomenal effects of spontaneous causality, conceptualized in this
manner, the transcendental idea of freedom (albeit possible) would not necessarily be conceivable. 
2.4.2. The difference between noumena and the transcendental object
We can now further  delineate  Kant's  conception  of  noumena (henceforth  taken in  the  negative
sense). Although things in themselves encompasses the transcendental object (A268/B324 etc.), this
is not what Kant means by noumena (contra what is often accepted to be the case). The difference is
simple: noumena are objects of understanding conceptualized in a positive manner whereas the
transcendental  object  is  merely  the  empty  thought  that  real  objects  of  sensibility  underlie
appearances (see discussion in section 2.2.2.1.). The concept of noumena is introduced to make the
idea  of  freedom conceivable;  the  concept  of  the  transcendental  object  is  introduced to  enforce
Kant's philosophy as an empirical “realism” (as I showed in section 2.2.2). These moves are clearly
distinct in Kant's overall program.
Kant actually accentuates the point that the transcendental object is not a noumenon: “The object
to which I relate appearance in general is the transcendental object, i.e. the entirely undetermined
thought of something in general. This cannot be called the noumenon; for I do not know anything
about what it is in itself, and have no concept of it except merely that of the object of a sensible
intuition in general, which is therefore the same for all appearances” (A253). Allison (2004:59)
takes this as a reference to noumena in the positive sense (i.e. that noumena in the negative sense
can still be equated with the transcendental object), but there is no reason to think so – we find this
distinction between the transcendental object and noumena also elsewhere in the first Critique (see
below). Although it is true (as Kant mentions) that we can conceive of a conceptual non-sensible
representation of the transcendental object (i.e. all concepts assume some intellectual representation
of objects), and therefore in some very weak sense can consider it a noumenon, this representation
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remains absolutely empty for us, we cannot even form a definite concept of what it is. As such it is
not a noumenon as Kant conceptualizes it (A251; A289/B345). 
We can articulate the difference between noumena in the negative sense and the transcendental
object by referring to two places where Kant discusses both of these together in the same passage.
The first of these is in the first edition (A251-252) where Kant, in his discussion of the ground of
appearances, first mentions the transcendental object, but then adds that one can add the concept of
noumena  in  this  regard:  “But  the  cause  on  account  of  which,  not  yet  satisfied  through  the
substratum of sensibility, one must add noumena that only the pure understanding can think to the
phenomena, rests solely on this [i.e. namely, that sensibility and its field, i.e. that of appearances,
are  themselves  limited  by  the  understanding]”  (A252;  my  accentuation  except  for  the  words
“noumena” and “phenomena”).
The other passage appears in both editions of the first  Critique (A539-40/B567-8). Here, again,
Kant discusses the transcendental ground of appearances. First he says that we can include both the
transcendental  ground as  well  as  spontaneous causality in  the framework of  the  transcendental
object (i.e. when we take this as the transcendental ground in general). Then he is more explicit and
mentions that the noumenal ground (or: intelligible character) of phenomena (which as such would
be outcomes of spontaneous causality and be part of the observable empirical character), is different
from the transcendental ground embodied in the transcendental object. 
Kant  writes:  “For  since these appearances,  because they are not things in  themselves,  must  be
grounded in a transcendental object determining them as mere representations, nothing hinders us
from ascribing to this transcendental object, apart from the property through which it appears [i.e. as
the mere ground of appearance], also another causality that is not appearance, even though its effect
is encountered in appearance (A539/B567). And: “This intelligible character [which he explicitly
says  is  a  noumenon  in  the  next  paragraph;  A541/B569]  could  of  course,  never  be  known
immediately, because we cannot perceive anything except insofar as it appears, but it would have to
be  thought  in  conformity  with  the  empirical  character,  just  as in  general  we  must  ground
appearances in thought through a transcendental object, even though we know nothing about it as it
is in itself” (A540/B568; my accentuation).
The difference between the transcendental object (as the mere conceptual ground of appearances of
objects of the senses) and noumena in the negative sense is substantial. The transcendental object is
the transcendental  ground for  the appearances  of sensible  objects;  noumena are the ground for
spontaneous causality with its effects in the phenomenal realm. In the first case Kant speaks of
“things themselves which appear” (A268/B324); in the second he says that only the “effects [of the
intelligible  cause]  appear”  (A537/B565).   The  transcendental  object  contains  matter  in  the
transcendental  sense  (the  transcendental  ground of  empirical  matter);  whereas  noumena do not
contain any such matter (A357). The first is a mere general concept without any content, whereas
the  second  is  a  concept  which  includes  particular  characteristics  through  which  transcendental
freedom becomes conceivable.  The first  embodies merely the thought of something outside the
conditions of sensibility;  the second is often asserted to be outside space and time, yes, outside
nature. 
It  can,  in  fact,  be  shown that  the  transcendental  object  cannot  be  the  same  as  noumena.  The
transcendental object is the ground of those appearances which “appear” in the normal progress of
experience, i.e. in accordance with empirical laws (A495/B523). This is why Kant includes even the
“real things of past time” in the transcendental object – they belong to possible perceptions as part
of  a  regressive series  (“under  the guidance of  history or in the footsteps of cause and effect”)
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(A495/B523).  The transcendental object therefore grounds those appearances which stand under
the analogies (causality); which we  think as belonging to nature and the mechanistic laws which
govern nature. Although we do not actively restrict the transcendental object to be the ground of the
objects  of  nature  (then  it  would  be  a  positive  conception),  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  the
transcendental object is the ground of those objects that belong within the concept of nature.
Noumena, on the other hand, belong to the realm outside nature where the rules ascribed to nature
(mechanism)  do  not  apply.  As  such,  they  are  governed  by  another  law,  namely  the  law  of
spontaneity (transcendental freedom). In this essential aspect noumena (and therefore noumena as
such) can never be given in sensibility – only the effects thereof which appear can be so given. They
stand forever apart from sensibility (objects have to be objects of nature to be given  as such in
sensibility):  this means that noumena belongs to a supersensible realm beyond nature.  There is
therefore a gap between noumena (outside nature) and appearances (even though noumena can be
the effective cause behind certain appearances). 
We  can  put  it  differently:  it  is  not  merely  that  noumena  are  governed  by  a  different  law
(spontaneity); noumena can also never be part of the community of objects in accordance with the
third analogy. Objects have to be in causal relation with each other to be part of the community of
objects which at any time coexist. As Kant says: “[T]he light, which plays between our eye and the
celestial  bodies,  produces a...  community between us and them and thereby shows us that they
coexist” (A213/B260). We cannot even become aware of the coexistence of noumena because their
mode of existence does not stand in a community with our mode of existence. As such noumena are
supersensible and forever outside the possible reach of our type of sensibility.  Whereas we are
directly aware that appearances of the objects of the senses are real and as such are grounded by the
transcendental object (although we cannot know anything thereof; see section 2.2.2.1.), we cannot
even become aware of noumena at all. 
From this it follows that noumena are not the “ground” of appearances in the same sense as is the
transcendental object; although they “would have to be thought in conformity with the empirical
character,  just  as in  general  we  must  ground  appearances  in  thought  through a  transcendental
object” (A540/B568; my accentuation). Instead noumena are the conceivable spontaneous cause of
certain appearances as Kant says: “Of it [a noumenon] one could say quite correctly that it begins
its effects in the sensible world from itself, without its action beginning in it itself [i.e. the effect
does  not  originate  within  the  framework  of  the  world  of  sense  as  a  new beginning  in  time]”
(A541/B569; Kant's accentuation). Since noumena cannot be the direct ground of appearances they
cannot be the transcendental object. When Kant generalizes the transcendental object to include
noumena (A539/B567), this is clearly a different concept which refers merely to “anything” that in
any sense stands behind appearances. But even in this case, the concepts are clearly not the same.  
At this point in the discussion it becomes clear why my interpretation of noumena as real objects
(problematically assumed) is consistent with a two-aspect view. As mentioned in my discussion of
Kant's  second  move,  the  concept  of  the  transcendental  object  arises  in  the  framework  of  his
empirical realism when we view the objects of the senses from two viewpoints, namely within and
outside epistemic conditions (Allison 2004:12). In accepting this I agree with the two-aspect view.
When  I,  however,  differentiates  between  the  transcendental  object  and  noumena,  ascribing  the
transcendental object to nature and noumena to the realm outside nature, I depart from that view. In
my view it is exactly this difference that allows the necessary space to accommodate transcendental
freedom as the principle governing that realm. The problem with the two-aspect view is that the
transcendental object and noumena are collapsed into one conception (as is also done in the two-
object view), in which case it is difficult to see how freedom can be saved (see below). 
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2.4.3. Epistemic intelligibilia
We have now seen that the concept of noumena belongs to the space between noumena in the
positive sense (too strong a concept) and the transcendental object (too weak a concept). We can,
however, delineate the conception of noumena even more precisely by considering things as they
are in themselves in more detail. Although things in themselves are forever outside the possibility of
experience, this can be taken in various possible senses, for example, as discussed above, as the
transcendental ground of ordinary objects in their existence outside the conditions of experience
(i.e. the transcendental object). This is, however, not what Kant means by noumena. 
Things  in  themselves  can  also  be  outside  the  possibility  of  experience  in  two other  senses  as
determined  by  the  third  antinomy:  in  their  constitution  as  belonging  to  the  totality  of  causal
relations in nature (mechanism) and as being outside nature in the realm of freedom (A533/B561).
As mentioned before (section 2.4.1), Kant extends the transcendental and empirical use of reason in
the thesis and anti-thesis positions of the third antinomy to the intelligible and sensible worlds,
where the last is taken as “nature”. As such the unconditioned can be ascribed either to nature or the
realm of freedom, but always outside the possibility of our cognition of it, not even in the progress
of experience (A483/B512, A493/B521).
In  the  anti-thesis  position  the  unconditioned  incorporates  the  absolute  totality  of  all  causal
interactions in nature (mechanism), which we think to be real, but which can also never be brought
as such into experience (i.e. as an infinite magnitude of causal relations; only finite magnitudes can
be given in our cognition; B383). This absolute totality of causal relations is only accessible to a
God's eye view. Although Kant never develops the idea of the unconditioned in the framework of
nature any further in the first Critique, it is in my opinion possible that he may have included this
within the framework of the “something actual” in things in themselves (i.e. that we can think that
such an absolute totality of causal relations really exists) which he mentioned in the preface to the
second edition (Bxx). As such he says that the unconditioned can be present in things in themselves:
“the unconditioned must not be present in things insofar as we are acquainted with them (insofar as
they are given to us), but rather in things insofar as we are not acquainted with them, as things in
themselves”  (Bxxi;  my  accentuation).  The  unconditioned  is  present  in  things  as  they  are  in
themselves, outside our cognition of them. 
The  relations  of  ordinary  objects  of  experience,  insofar  as  they  are  given  as  appearances  in
sensibility, adheres to the principle of causality,  but insofar as they (as objects of our thoughts)
belong to nature, they are governed by the general mechanical laws of nature. As such, the relations
of appearances are thought to be part of the unconditioned totality of causal relations (mechanism)
in  the  framework  of  nature  which  includes  an  aspect  which  stands  forever  outside  sensible
conditions, i.e. which belongs to things as they are in themselves. In this case we form a positive
conception of something real in the framework of things in themselves which goes beyond the
empty concept of the transcendental object, which also has reference to objects of the senses in their
existence outside our sensibility in nature. 
These unknowable aspects in things in themselves stand  within the framework of the concept of
nature (I am only considering the anti-thesis position). As such it does not involve another mode of
existence than that governed by mechanism. This means that it involves no more than an epistemic
aspect of things in themselves (an ontologically different aspect would require a different mode of
existence). The interesting thing about such aspects of things is that, since they cannot appear in
sensibility, they can also not be presented in space and time which are the conditions of sensibility
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(being outside space and time is often taken to imply an ontological difference, but this is not the
case with the Kantian conception). 
Although these unknowable aspects remind of Kant's conception of noumena as being outside space
and time, Kant never relates this to noumena. The reason is simple: For Kant the anti-thesis position
(in which this possibility appears) involves one mode of existence (the concept of nature) whereas
the thesis-position allows for another mode of existence (i.e. noumena) outside nature. Although
Kant  merely  mentions  this  unknowable  aspect  of  things  in  themselves  (i.e.  the  unconditioned
therein) in the first  Critique (as discussed above), it nonetheless forms part of his philosophy. We
can therefore include such genuinely unknowable aspects in a positive conception of the objects of
nature outside our perception of them. I call such a conception of objects in themselves epistemic
intelligibilia. Although Allais (2004) also thinks that Kant allows for something genuinely unknown
in the framework of the causal structure of nature (and shows how we can sensibly conceive that),
she does not relate it to the unconditioned in Kant's philosophy and also does not present it as a
clearly delineated formal aspect within the framework of the concept of things in themselves (see
below). 
This  is,  however,  not  what  Kant  means  by  noumena  in  his  discussion  of  the  third  antinomy.
Working from the thesis-position, Kant assigns noumena to a transcendent intelligible world outside
nature which in the mathematical  antinomies  were left  empty (a mere void outside the world-
whole). Noumena are placed outside nature and as such they do not fall under the conditions that
regulate phenomena, namely space and time, as well as the laws of nature in accordance with
mechanism. The reason why noumena and the noumenal world are outside space and time is that
they belong to  a totally different mode of existence outside nature. As such, a different ontology
belongs to that world. Only when noumena are conceptualized in these terms would transcendental
freedom become realistically conceivable and can we think that totally different laws govern the
noumenal world, namely that of freedom. This is why Kant can distinguish the two worlds as that of
nature and freedom (A541/B569 etc.). 
Even if it were possible, for argument's sake, that the whole of nature “be revealed to us”, and that
we would therefore somehow gain knowledge of epistemic intelligibilia,  for which a faculty of
cognition different “in degree” from ours would be needed, i.e. to cognize the infinite totality of
causal relations in nature (the unconditioned), it would still not be possible to know anything about
the realm outside nature, for which a faculty different “in intuition and kind” would be needed. In
his discussion of these things, Kant writes: “[F]or they [who think we can know the inner in things]
would have us to be able to cognize things, thus intuit them, even without senses, consequently they
would have it that we have a faculty of cognition  entirely distinct from the human not merely in
degree but even in intuition and kind... Observation and analysis of the appearances penetrate into
what  is  inner in nature,  and one cannot  know how far this  will  go in  time [in the progress of
experience]. Those transcendental questions, however, that go beyond nature, we will never be able
to answer, even if all of nature is revealed to us...” (A279/B334; my accentuation).
2.4.4. The two-fold nature of things in themselves 
I have now distinguished between three concepts within the broader concept of things as they are
considered in themselves, namely the transcendental object, epistemic intelligibilia and noumena.
Since epistemic intelligibilia is merely a positive conception of the transcendental ground of objects
which are thought to belong to nature, it collapses into the transcendental object when the concept is
taken as empty since that concept also concerns the objects of nature (but only without any positive
content)  This means that things in themselves have a two-fold structure consisting of epistemic
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intelligibilia and noumena as positive conceptions which belong to the realm of nature and the
realm of freedom respectively. Both epistemic intelligibilia and noumena can conceivably include
genuinely unknowable aspects of objects, outside time and space. Epistemic intelligibilia (and the
transcendental object) would belong to an intelligible realm (a mere intelligible realm in the case of
the  transcendental  object)  which  has  only epistemological  significance.  Noumena,  on the  other
hand, which belong to a noumenal realm, also have ontological significance. 
Since Kant never develops the concept of epistemic intelligibilia as such in the first  Critique, we
can simplify matters by collapsing it into the transcendental object. The two-fold structure of things
in themselves would then include the transcendental object and noumena. This two-fold structure is
observable, for example, when Kant says that the “intelligible character [i.e. noumenon] could of
course,  never  be known immediately...  but it  would have to  be thought  in conformity with the
empirical  character,  just  as in  general  we  must  ground  appearances  in  thought  through  a
transcendental  object”  (A540/B568;  my accentuation).  This  two-fold  structure  goes  far  beyond
Kant's concept of things in themselves; it permeates Kant's philosophy and captures the exposition
of his epistemology in the Transcendental Analytic as well as his metaphysics (especially regarding
the conceivability of freedom) in the Transcendental Dialectic. Although Kant often refers to things
in themselves within the context of any one of these aspects, his general position includes both.
Although the concept of things in themselves in a general sense, therefore, refers to things outside
the conditions of sensibility, in a more specific sense it involves a two-fold structure as the ground
of  appearances,  namely the  mere  transcendental  ground (the  transcendental  object)  of  ordinary
objects,  as  well  as  the  noumenal  ground,  which  includes  objects  of  the  understanding existing
outside nature that can serve as the spontaneous cause of appearances (both of these can in fact be
included in general in the wider concept of a “transcendental ground”, A539/B567). 
This two-fold structure in the concept of things in themselves which characterizes my interpretation
can be further illuminated through Kant's conception of the object. The Kantian conception of the
object involves the unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with the concept of an
object  in  which  they  are  necessarily  connected  (see  section  2.2.2.2;  A108).  Although  Kant
sometimes uses the concept of an appearance to refer to an object as given in intuition (A109), he
also uses this concept to refer to the various representations of such an object which are synthesized
together under the concept of an object (A108). In the second sense, appearances can have two
origins:  they can be the mere appearances of the everyday objects of cognition or they can be
appearances caused by noumena. 
In the first case they are “representations, which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be
further intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e. transcendental object
= X” (A109).  In the second case they are the effects  originating with the intelligible character
(noumenal  ground) of  an  object  of  sense,  i.e.  of  a  noumenon,  which “begins  its  effects  in  the
sensible world [as appearances] from itself, without its action beginning in itself [i.e. outside nature
and therefore space/time]” (A538/B566 – A541/B569). 
Such appearances (i.e. according to the second case), which would be part of the empirical character
of an object (i.e. taken together with other appearances as belonging to the same empirical object),
would be caused by noumena situated outside nature and therefore outside space and time. We
therefore find that  two kinds of appearances can be ascribed to objects, namely those which are
directly perceived appearances of the everyday objects of the senses, and those which are caused by
noumena, which are not objects that appear but merely objects of the understanding, of which only
the effects (of this spontaneous causality) appear. 
24
In this interpretation I accept that objects have various layers of appearance that are discovered in
the progress of science which could include appearances of both kinds. As such it is possible that
their  different  origin  would  be  reflected  in  their  properties,  which  would  presumably  in  some
manner  be  distinguishable  from  each  other.  All  properties  of  objects  are  predicates,  that  is,
conceptualized appearances, of objects (B149, A250; Guyer 1987:125, 163). The properties would
therefore merely reflect  the kinds of appearances.  As such the properties associated with those
appearances that are the effects of noumena which exist outside nature (space/time) would reflect
this ontologically distinct noumenal ground. Since their objects (behind the appearances) are very
different from the normal objects of the senses, this difference would be reflected in these properties
(Kant never mentions this but it follows from my analysis). If this is so, this difference can be
discovered in the progress of experiment which would present at least indirect evidence for the
existence  of  the  noumenal  realm.  Since  this  discussion  took  us  beyond  Kant's  own
conceptualization, I will not pursue it further here.
2.4.5. The noumenal realm as substratum of nature
The conception of the noumenal realm which I presented above can be taken to be the substratum of
nature as Kant says: “I distinguish the substratum (the thing itself) from that which merely depends
on it” (A400). Although Kant does not develop this idea any further in the first Critique, he does so
in the second Critique and, especially, in the third Critique. Since Kant views the noumenal realm
already in the first  Critique as having a possible existence outside nature, but at the same time as
having effects within the sphere of nature, it seems quite possible that he viewed that realm already
in the first Critique as the substratum of nature. 
As I discussed above (section 2.4.2.), Kant's conception of noumena involves that we allow for the
existence of two ontologically different types of objects, namely those of the senses and those that
we  can  merely  think  to  exist  (noumena;  A250;  A253).  As  belonging  to  the  noumenal  realm,
noumena are not merely ordinary things considered as they are in themselves outside the conditions
of sensibility;  they can also involve another mode of existence which includes an ontologically
different type of entities which can never become objects of the senses; they would be objects for
another form of intuition than our own. Although we cannot confirm (know) that such entities exist,
we can problematically allow for their existence since there is nothing contradictory in thinking
them. 
At this point it is important to remember that Kant's conception of noumena is modeled on Leibniz's
monads,  the fundamental building blocks of the world – going beyond the physical monads or
elementary parts of matter of Kant's earlier days, to conceptualize noumena as non-material entities
(Cicovacki  2010:85;  Friedman  2010:243).  In  a  very  enlightening  passage  in  the  Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science, written during the height of Kant's critical period (1786), Kant
gives a charitable interpretation of Leibniz which is in agreement with his own view (he repeats this
interpretation in  On a Discovery (1790) where he identifies Leibniz's monads with his noumena;
this  differs  from his  interpretation  of  Leibniz  in  the  Amphiboly in  the  first  Critique;  Langton
1998:198): 
“[Monadology] is rather an intrinsically correct Platonic concept of the world devised by Leibniz,
insofar as it is considered, not at all as the object of the senses, but as a thing in itself, and is merely
an object of the understanding, which, however, does indeed underlie the appearance of the senses.
Now the composite of things in themselves must certainly consist of the simple, for the parts must
here be given prior to all composition. But the composite in the appearance does not consist of the
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simple,  because  in  the  appearance,  which  can  never  be  given  otherwise  than  as  composed
(extended), the parts can only be given through division, and thus not prior to the composite, but
only in it.
Therefore, Leibniz's idea, so far as I comprehend it, was not to explicate space through the order of
simple beings next to one another, but was rather to set this order alongside space as corresponding
to it, but as belonging to a mere intelligible world (unknown to us). Thus he asserts nothing but
what has been shown elsewhere [i.e. in Kant's own writings]: namely, that space, together with the
matter of which it is the form, does not contain the world of things in themselves, but only their
appearance, and is itself only the form of our outer sensible intuition” (4:507-8). 
From this quotation it is clear that Kant, during his critical period, regarded the noumenal realm as
an ontologically distinct mode of existence, which forms the substratum of nature as a whole. As
such, this substratum is viewed in a certain sense as the fundamental level of existence. Its basic
(albeit non-extensive) building blocks, namely non-material simples, can on their turn belong to
composites in the noumenal realm itself. Although this view about the noumenal realm is never
explicitly spelled out in any detail in the first Critique, everything that Kant says in that Critique is
in accordance with such a view. 
It is possible that Kant had these “simple beings” in mind when he wrote the following (see section
2.4.2.): “[T]here may even be beings of understanding to which our sensible faculty of intuition has
no relation at all” (B309; also B306). In his own copy of the first edition of the first  Critique he
actually made a note at the beginning of the chapter on phenomena and noumena in general, where
he wrote: “Noumena: beings that themselves have understanding” (Kant 1998:339), which was part
of the general concept of Leibniz's monads. This does not mean that this was Kant's own view (or
considered opinion) regarding noumena (although Kant does in fact think that the soul, or thinking
I, is intrinsically similar to noumena; A360), but confirms that his idea of noumena was derived
from monads and that Kant's “beings of the understanding” (B306/B309) have a distant relation to
monads as existing outside space/time.
According to the quotation from the  Metaphysical Foundations given above, Kant believed that
Leibniz was right to not ascribe space to the realm of simple beings, but “rather to set this order
alongside space as corresponding to it”. This implies that, although that realm is not in space, it
would have some structure “corresponding” to space. Kant seems to have the same idea in the first
Critique when he allows that we ascribe “ideal space” to things in themselves through reason: “Our
expositions accordingly teach the reality (i.e. objective validity) of space... but at the same time the
ideality  of  space  in  regard  to  things  when they are  considered  in  themselves  through reason”
(A28/B44; my accentuation). Thereafter Kant also mentions the “transcendental ideality” of space
which refers to the mind-dependency of space as condition for the possibility of all experience. 
This  passage  shows  that  Kant  allows  us  to  ascribe  some  ideal  space-structure  which  we  can
construct through reason to “things in themselves”. The difference between space and ideal space
would be that the first is an ability for and condition of experience whereas the second is merely
some conceptual space (or: space-time or space/time) structure or manifold which we can think
through reason. We can think of ideal space as the space-structure/manifold which reflects the form
of objects/entities as they are in themselves (even without trying to construct ideal space in practice)
in the same way that empirical space reflects the real form of appearances (A431/B459; see note 1)
to which Kant also refers in the above quotation: “space, together with the matter of which it is the
form”.
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Ideal space can obviously refer to any spatial  concept that we can construct through reason. In
accordance with the two-fold structure of things in themselves, we can apply such mathematical
(geometrical) structures both to the everyday objects (as they “really” are) outside our cognition of
them as well as to the noumenal world outside nature and outside space/time (Kant, however, never
makes this explicit). Ideal space can refer to some geometrical form (i.e. conception) that is applied
to ordinary space (B147; see also A29, A57/B81; see note 1) or some abstract mathematical form
that has reference to our conception of noumena. Since noumena cannot be presented in space/time,
we would not be able to imagine (visualize) such mathematical space/time (or: space-time) forms
(this takes us beyond the mathematics of Kant's time but is consistent with his position). (I have not
included Kant's ideas about ideal space in the Opus postumum because that falls outside his critical
period).
At this point I am in a position to make a proposal as to the origin of Kant's two-fold structure of the
concept of things in themselves, which includes both the transcendental object and noumena. The
concept of the transcendental object is a direct result of Kant's Copernican turn. When we view
objects from two perspectives, as they are given in appearances and as they are outside that, the
concept of things as they are in themselves as the transcendental object is necessarily introduced.
But this concept only applies to everyday objects of the senses. The concept of noumena, on the
other hand, is introduced into the concept of things in themselves along a different track: to allow
for the conceivability of freedom. Here Kant uses the age-old distinction between phenomena and
intelligibilia (or phenomenal and intelligible realms) going back to Plato, but reworked by Leibniz
into the appearances of the senses and monads. Since the phenomenal and intelligible realms stand
apart from each other, the last is a suitable candidate for Kant's realm of freedom. As is the case
with the transcendental object, this conception of noumena as belonging to a realm of freedom, is
original to Kant's philosophy.  
Although Kant focuses on the limits of cognition in the first Critique and makes the important point
that we can never gain access to the noumenal realm because of the restrictions to our kind of
sensibility, I have argued (I hope convincingly) that he allows us to think its existence, as well as
the existence of entities particular to it, although only problematically. Kant's arguments regarding
the conceivability of freedom lead to this conceptualization of the noumenal realm. 
2.5. The third alternative in the interpretation of Kant's philosophy
With  this  background  in  mind,  we  can  now  reconsider  the  well-known  views  regarding  the
interpretation of Kant's philosophy. I am not going to discuss them in detail; I am merely going to
focus on the fundamental assumptions underlying these views. In my opinion the main problem in
Kantian interpretation is his broad conception of things in themselves, which can refer to or include
the transcendental object, epistemic intelligibilia as well as noumena (see section 2.4.3. above). The
different views take different conceptions of things in themselves as point of departure. When these
conceptions are considered in the light of my discussion above, the correctness or not of these views
becomes obvious. 
1. The two-object (two-world) view accepts that things in themselves refer to ordinary objects as
they “really” exist outside our sensible (mental) reach. As such these are taken as the transcendental
ground of appearances (i.e. transcendental object).  When things in themselves are then taken as
noumena  (according  to  Kant's  statement  that  noumena  are  things  in  themselves;  B310),  the
transcendental object is effectively equated with the concept of noumena.
In this view Kant's statements that noumena are outside space and time are taken seriously (Guyer
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1987:333), which is taken to mean that noumena are ontologically distinct from appearances. From
this it follows that the transcendental object (equated with noumena) gains an ontological status.
The result is that Kant is taken to say that the everyday objects of cognition, viewed outside the
confines of the mind, are in fact ontologically distinct objects (outside space and time) from the
appearances of objects in the mind which are presented within the sensible forms of space and time
(Guyer 1987:335). In this way two types of objects are ascribed to two different worlds, namely that
of our mind and that outside our mind in the “real” world (This can be done in a variety of ways,
but I will not discuss it further since it has no bearing on my main argument; for a discussion, see
Allais 2004:657).
The  most  important  error  underlying  this  view  is  that  the  transcendental  object  is  effectively
equated with noumena. Kant explicitly says that this is not how he understands these concepts (see
section 2.4.2.). Furthermore, an ontological value is ascribed to the transcendental object, which in
fact has no value at all (it is merely an empty concept). The result is the very unintuitive claim that
the everyday objects and events of our senses, considered outside our mind, are really outside space
and time. Although such objects exist independently of our space/time intuitions of them, the real
magnitudes and relations between those objects (i.e. the real order in the world) are in fact reflected
in empirical space (see note 1; A431/B459). It is therefore not sensible to say that ordinary objects
are outside space/time and to ascribe freedom to them. 
The most problematic aspect of this view is that our cognition of the world is considered only in
mind-dependent  (idealist)  terms,  leaving  the  “real”  world  outside  our  senses  uncognizable
(Strawson 1966:16; Ward 2006:16). The “real” world, which is considered mind-independent and
outside our consciousness, is said to affect us through the “raw data of sensibility”. This form of
idealism, which comes down to “the mind making nature”, or that “the mind actually imposes its
rules on an otherwise formless reality” (Guyer 1987:61), does not take Kant's second move (his
empirical realism) sufficiently into account. Although it is a well-established reading of Kant, it is
nonetheless distinctly unKantian (Bird 2010a:6). 
I have shown that Kant's second move takes as point of departure the fact that in perception we
become aware that the world has its own order over and above the manner in which the mind orders
the world; the second move is exactly to establish the objective reality of the spatio-temporal world
of empirical cognition. The two-object view effectively misses this paradigmatic Kantian move in
his  philosophy  and  collapses  Kant's  empirical  world  of  apprehension  into  a  world-in-itself
(noumenal world) outside our senses. The manner in which the two-object view has neglected or
misunderstood this important Kantian move has been discussed in detail elsewhere (Allais 2004).
2. The epistemic two-aspect (one-world) view also takes things in themselves as the transcendental
ground of appearances, now considered as outside the conditions of sensibility.  When things in
themselves are then taken as noumena, the concept of the transcendental object is again equated
with the concept of noumena (see for example, Allison 2004:59). This view considers noumena to
be  merely outside  the  conditions  of  space  and time.  As  such this  view reduces  the  difference
between  ordinary  objects  considered  as  appearances  and  as  things  in  themselves,  to  a  mere
epistemic  difference  (“two  ways  of  considering  things”;  Allison  2004:16).  In  this  manner  all
“metaphysical claims” are removed and a mere methodological approach is followed.   
The most important error underlying this view is again that the transcendental object is equated with
noumena. Now a mere epistemic value is ascribed to the transcendental object, which as mentioned
before, should have no value at all (it is merely an empty concept), and with it, to the concept of
noumena  which  is  now also  considered  as  a  mere  empty  concept.  This  ascription  of  value  is
28
grounded on the false assumption that a positive conception of noumena is also a conception of
noumena in the positive sense (see section 2.4.1; Allison 2004:63). In doing so, Kant's elaborate
positive conception of noumena which serves an important goal, namely to make the conception of
transcendental freedom conceivable, is undone. 
Although this view appreciates the importance of Kant's first two moves, it effectively misses the
essence  of  his  third  move  which  is  to  establish  the  conceivability  of  freedom.  When  Kant's
noumenal  world  is  collapsed  into  the  mere  transcendental  ground  of  phenomena,  it  becomes
difficult to see how freedom can “be saved” as something that can conceivably be assumed. Without
noumena, conceptualized as situated outside nature and therefore outside space/time (not merely the
conditions  of  space  and  time)  and  the  mechanical  laws  of  nature,  Kant's  conception  of
transcendental  freedom loses  its  conceivability.  The result  is  that  Kant's  concept  of  freedom is
reduced to a mere vague possibility (which is then considered to be the only viable alternative to the
unacceptable assertion of the reality of freedom; Allison 2012:112). 
3. The last view that I consider is the noumenal properties two-aspect (one world) view which
appreciates  the  fact  that  things  in  themselves  have  a  broad meaning which  could  include  both
epistemic  and  ontological  aspects  (where  ontological  is  taken  to  mean  not  only  outside  the
conditions of sensibility, but really “outside space/time”). This view takes things in themselves as
including something more than the mere transcendental ground of appearances; it can also include
distinct noumenal “properties”. In this regard Ameriks (1992:334) writes that Kant held that “there
are objects  which in themselves have genuine ultimate properties  that  do not conform to those
[sensible] conditions”. In doing so, this view takes the best from the epistemic two-aspect view and
adds what they take as an ontological aspect to it.  
Kant is, however, making a stronger claim than merely that some intrinsic properties of objects can
be beyond sensible reach (i.e. that the labels “phenomena” and” noumena” refer merely to different
classes  of  properties;  Langton  1998:13).  Although  the  idea  of  complementing  the  phenomenal
properties of things with distinct “intrinsic” properties (or: complementing relational properties with
intrinsic properties; Langton 1998) captures something of Kant's ontological thrust, it does not serve
the  purpose that  Kant  has  in  mind with  his  conception  of  noumena,  namely to  make freedom
conceivable.  Although  we  can  complement  phenomenal  properties,  which  are  conceptualized
appearances  of  objects,  with  unknowable  properties  which  would  be  mere  intelligible
representations,  as long as such representations  are ascribed to the objects  of  nature,  freedom
cannot be saved and this view would not capture Kant's reason for introducing noumena in the first
Critique.
All sensible or intelligible properties must obviously be ascribed to some object, which can either
be an object for the senses, i.e. belong to the mode of existence that we associate with nature or
noumena, which belong to another mode of existence that we associate with the realm of freedom
(these are mutually exclusive for Kant). Since this view only recognizes noumenal properties, but
not noumena as entities of a different kind, the “intrinsic” properties can only be that of the objects
of the senses. One can understand this to mean that such properties belong within the framework of
an object's causal powers, although as “something genuinely unknown” (Allais 2004:678). As such
they would belong to things considered as they are in themselves as epistemic intelligibilia. 
Although such intrinsic properties can in some sense be outside space and time, they nonetheless
belong to nature. The mode of existence to which the objects of nature belong, however, does not
allow for the conceivability or  even the possibility of freedom (the solution to the third antinomy
requires that such existence must be outside nature and its laws of mechanism; see section 2.4.1.).
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As  long  as  we  stay  with  the  transcendental  object  or  epistemic  intelligibilia  we  cannot
accommodate the Kantian conception of freedom.
But  is  it  not  possible  to  think  that  objects  of  the  senses  could  in  themselves  have  “intrinsic
properties”  which  stand  outside  the  causal  structure  of  nature?  This  is  what  Langton  (1998)
proposes. She relates these properties to monads in accordance with Kant's charitable interpretation
of Leibniz and says they “cannot be given, as they are in themselves, to creatures whose sensibility
is passive” (Langton 1998:202; see section 2.4.5.). Although we can certainly view such properties
as “intrinsic” properties of objects of the senses in the sense that they belong to the substratum of
such objects, they can only be real if they at the same time belong to something which exists in that
substratum (see above: they must belong to some object or entity). How can we have “intrinsic”
properties if nothing exists in that realm outside nature and how can something exist if it would not
be some type of entity like monads or noumena? And when we allow for such entities we have a
two-object view.
4. My view is a coherent interpretation of Kant's philosophy which does away with all the major
inconsistencies ascribed to him. Although my own view can be regarded as considering things from
a  two-fold  standpoint  (as  Kant  says,  Bxix  note),  namely  as  things  given  as  appearances  in
experience and as things in themselves of which we can only have ideas of pure reason, it is also a
two-world (two-object) view (as Kant also accentuates) in that noumena, properly understood, can
involve ontologically distinct entities in such a realm. I show that there is no conflict between these
two perspectives. The two-aspect and two-object perspectives are reconciled in one view when the
broad conceptualization of things in themselves, as including the transcendental object,  epistemic
intelligibilia  as well as noumena (properly conceptualized), is taken into account. This obviously
does not include any discussion of the practical standpoint, which Kant develops to some extent in
the first Critique as well as the second Critique.  
My  view  allows  for  both  the  conception  of  an  epistemic  intelligible  realm  as  well  as  an
ontologically  distinct  noumenal  realm  (properly  speaking).  As  such  my  view  captures  the
complexity of Kantian philosophy without the reductive moves which characterize the other views.
All  the other views, in some way or another,  neglect some aspect of Kant's  three paradigmatic
moves. It is only when we understand all three moves in sufficient detail and see how the two lines
of  Kant's  thought,  namely the  transcendental  and empirical,  within  both  the  framework of  our
discursive understanding as well as reason, are interwoven to form a sophisticated whole, that we
are  in  a  position  to  correctly  interpret  him.  Only  then  can  the  conceivability  of  freedom  be
sufficiently established.
Freedom is only conceivable when we do not merely allow that objects can have properties outside
space and time. For Kant being outside space means that we cannot visualize such appearances in
any space-form. Being outside time can be taken as “timeless”, meaning that they do not change
with time (adhering to our conception of time), or as a-temporal, meaning that they are not in our
time. A mere negative statement about objects or properties (i.e. that they are outside space/time)
does not say how freedom would be conceivable. For that we need some positive statement (as Kant
does), namely that freedom is conceivable if something, i.e.  noumena, exists outside nature (i.e.
outside mechanism, which belongs to the concept of nature) and therefore also outside space and
time. A distinct noumenal ontology would necessarily be accompanied by a corresponding (ideal)
space/time conception which can be thought through reason (A28/B44; see section 2.4.5.). 
Although Kant never discusses ideal space in any detail in the first Critique, a possible answer as to
how we should conceive of it suggests itself in the framework of his critical philosophy, namely that
30
ideal space should be regarded in exactly the same manner as empirical space, i.e. as the structural
form of objects or entities (see note 1). As such we do not need any particular conception of ideal
space; we can merely say that ideal space would reflect the form of the entities belonging to the
noumenal realm. One can then say that that realm is outside space/time because the structure of its
entities is such that it cannot be brought into space/time (only its effects can); it adheres to another
space-time form which is  inaccessible  to  our  sensibility. Although we cannot  say that  freedom
rather  than  causality  would  necessarily  belong  to  such  a  realm  (we  cannot  prove  even  the
possibility  of  transcendental  freedom –  A558/B586) it  is  surely  conceivable that different rules
would apply in such a realm. An important outcome of this interpretation is that the traditional
problem of the “timeless self” is resolved, i.e. the self is not merely outside space/time, it belongs to
a different space-time manifold (as such we can easily conceptualize it). 
Regarding  Kant's  noumenal  realm,  I  can  summarize  Kant's  idea  thereof  as  follows.  Kant
conceptualizes that realm in a positive sense as filling the void outside nature in such a manner that
it underlies (or grounds) nature. He thinks that the freedom that we ascribe to ourselves as rational
and moral agents can only realistically be assumed to be actual (even if we cannot prove it) if there
is a supersensible realm in which transcendental freedom, which underlies practical freedom and
makes it possible, has its ground. The reason for assuming such a realm, outside space and time, is
that freedom cannot be ascribed to the world of objects in space and time, where causality rules
according to the second analogy (or by extension to nature, where mechanism rules). At the same
time such spontaneous causality must have effects in the phenomenal world, when actions are taken
in this world. Regarding the interaction between these realms of nature and freedom, Kant returns to
that in the third Critique. 
The Kantian view involves a positive metaphysics of the noumenal realm which is ultimately based
on (and argued from) human freedom of choice. Although it shows that transcendental freedom,
which for Kant underlies practical freedom, is conceivable, it does not prove even the possibility of
such freedom. To show this, some type of empirical proof would be needed, at least of the existence
of the noumenal realm. Kant, however, excluded that possibility for the simple reason that noumena
are only accessible to an intuition other than our own.
2.6. Conclusion
In the reconsideration of Kant's noumenal realm, I have taken the path that has until now been
implicitly  or  explicitly  rejected  in  all  interpretations,  namely  that  we  can  understand  Kant's
noumenal realm, as presented in the  Critique of Pure Reason,  as an ontologically distinct realm,
different from nature. It is not only in Kant's moral philosophy or his theory of taste or teleology
that the noumenal realm is taken as the substratum of nature; it is also the best way to understand
the  first  Critique.  As  such,  this  constitutes  a  third  alternative  in  interpreting  Kant.  This  is  an
alternative in which both Kant's views, namely that his philosophy allows us to take two viewpoints
on things, but also considering them in the context of two worlds (and therefore as “two objects”),
are reconciled. I believe that the view presented above, does justice to Kant's philosophy and is
closer to his own position than any of the other views.  
I structure Kant's program in the first Critique into three moves. When we fail to understand the full
implications of any of these moves, we end up with inconsistencies in our interpretation of Kant's
philosophy. The first two moves show how a priori synthetic judgments of objects are possible and
save  objective  principles  in  mathematics  and the  natural  sciences.  The third  move shows how
freedom is  conceivable  and  saves  morality.  The  importance  of  the  third  move,  however,  goes
beyond morality. Kant uses the outcome of this move in the Critique of the Power of Judgment as
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part  of  his  philosophy of  science.  In  all  of  this  Kant's  conception of  the noumenal  realm as  a
substratum of nature plays a central part.
Kant rejects any possibility of knowledge regarding the noumenal realm, and with it all efforts to
establish a “proud ontology”, but at the same time he has a positive inclination towards metaphysics
as long as it is used in a legitimate manner. One can even say that his positive conception of the
noumenal realm constitutes exactly such a critical metaphysics. Kant cannot see any problem in
establishing such a metaphysics on reasonable grounds, as long as it is problematically assumed. 
Although the conceptual structures which are developed in the sciences can serve as regulative
ideas guiding research in the progress of experience (and experiment), the noumenal realm as such
cannot in Kant's view ever be empirically tested accordingly. Only practical reason can provide the
grounds for the metaphysics of the noumenal realm. In the third Critique, however, Kant introduces
new tools through which new avenues are opened. The question is: How much further can that bring
us? This is the topic of the next chapter. 
Note 1: Kantian space
As is the case with other aspects of Kant's epistemology, space can be determined both a priori and
a  posteriori.  When  space  is  determined  a  priori,  some  geometrical  form  (i.e.  conception)  is
constructed in space: “Through determination of the former [i.e. sensible intuition] we can acquire
a priori cognitions of objects  (in mathematics [i.e.  geometry]),  but only as far as their  form is
concerned, as appearances; whether or not there can be things that must be intuited in this form is
still  left  unsettled”  (B147;  see  also  A29,  A57/B81;  here  “appearances”  refer  to  imagined
geometrical objects in inner sense). When space is determined a posteriori, objects determine the
form of empirical space: “if it [i.e. space] is restricted solely to objects of the senses, then it is called
empirical” (A57/B81; see also A377). 
Since space (as an ability and sensible condition for experience) is “nothing other than merely the
form of all appearances of outer sense” (A27/B43, my accentuation), empirical space is just the
particular form which is exhibited in the extensive magnitudes and relations between the various
parts of objects given in any particular appearance. In this case Kant says that space is “the form of
appearances  themselves...  Thus  things,  as  appearances,  do  determine  space,  i.e.  among  all  its
possible predicates (magnitude and relation) they make it the case that this or that one belongs to
reality” (A431/B459,  my accentuation).  Clearly Kant  differentiates between space as the “mere
form of appearances” and (empirical) space as the “form of appearances themselves”, which is  a
posteriori determined  by  objects:  “things,  as  appearances,  do  determine  space”.  Real  objects
determine the real form of empirical space.
When some empirical space form is brought under a (geometrical) concept of space, the objective
validity of space can be established: “Our expositions accordingly teach the reality (i.e. objective
validity) of space in regard to everything that can come before us externally as an object...  We
therefore assert the empirical reality of space (with respect to all possible outer experience), though
to be sure at the same time its transcendental ideality, i.e. that it is nothing as soon as we leave out
the condition of the possibility of experience” (A28/B44). Such concepts of space can include  a
priori synthetic geometric determinations of space (B41, A57/B81, A165/B206) which are applied
(in  judgment)  to  the  empirical  form  of  space  given  through  objects  (see  the  mathematical
principles).
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Note 2: Another kind of intuition?
When we want to inquire about the possibility of another kind of intuition, we should probably
focus on inner experience. Kant distinguishes (at least) two kinds of inner experience, namely a
very basic kind where I have the mere awareness of my own existence (in apperception; even before
being aware of my identity as the same self) and another kind where I am conscious of my own
representations (as well as the representation of myself; B159) in inner sense, which is “a sensory
consciousness of the contents of thought" (Allison 2004:277).  The first kind merely involves an
indeterminate (non-conceptualized) sensible intuition in time (B423, note); the second kind involves
sensible intuitions both in time and space in the sense that the imagination is involved in ordering
representations in inner sense at least conceptually in a line (continuous in time; B156, B292). 
Insofar as the first kind of experience is concerned, Kant says that a mere indeterminate intuition in
time is necessary to provide the material for thinking, for the act “I think” to take place. The “I
exist” is contained within this “I think” (B423, note). The problem, however, is that time does not
have its own manifold (B154-156; B197). So, how is the matter for this intuition provided if it
cannot be presented in some manifold? We can say that the inner self as noumenon produces effects
in sensible intuition even when the space manifold is not involved. As such sensible intuitions are
taken  up  in  time  even  without  any  manifold  involved  (although  it  would  be  necessary  for
presentation in inner sense).  
There is, however, another possibility. We can allow that time be combined with another manifold
than space, say the manifold of ideal space associated with the inner self as noumenon. If we have
such a  noumenal  awareness,  we would  be able  to  become aware  of  this  noumenon when this
manifold  (given  with  its  own  kind  of  intuition)  is  combined  with  time.  In  this  case  we  are
noumenally aware of it in time. In this manner the gap between the noumenal and phenomenal
realms is bridged by combining time not with objects in space, but with the entities that exist in the
noumenal  mode of  existence which have their  own ideal  space-time manifold (A57/B81).  This
could provide the bare feeling of existence that Kant refers to in the  Prolegomena to any Future
Metaphysics:  "the  feeling of an existence without the slightest concept" (Proleg 334n). Although
this short exposition does not prove the existence of such an intuition, it does show in what sense
we can possibly conceived of it. 
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3. The noumenal realm in Kant's philosophy of science
3.1. Introduction
The noumenal realm plays an important role in Kant's philosophy. Kant introduces it as a central
aspect of his critical philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason (the first Critique; first edition 1781,
second edition 1787) and makes extensive use of it  in his  moral philosophy in the  Critique of
Practical Reason (1788; the second  Critique) and elsewhere. It also features prominently in his
philosophy of  science  as  presented  in  the  Critique  of  the  Power  of  Judgment (1790;  the  third
Critique). This last aspect is not that well known, and due to the close association of the noumenal
realm with Kant's  moral  philosophy,  interpreters  often tie it  exclusively with that aspect  of his
philosophy. Scientifically minded contemporary interpreters who engage on a more substantial level
with the third  Critique,  typically try to minimize the role of the noumenal realm in this regard
(mostly due to those associations).
Kant's philosophy of science is for the most part appreciated for its important contribution in laying
the philosophical foundations for Newtonian science. Kant's epistemology, as presented in the first
Critique,  explained  how  actual  mathematical  physics,  and  especially  Newton's  mathematical
physics,  is  possible  in  the  first  place  (Friedman  2001:10).  He  used  the  conceptual  framework
developed in the first  Critique as  basis  for the formulation of his  philosophy of science in the
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science  (1786). In more recent times modified versions of
Kantian scientific epistemology have been developed in which his  a priori constitutive principles
have been reworked into dynamic and relativized principles consistent with contemporary scientific
theory (Friedman 2001:31, 47; Bitbol 2007:240/1). It is generally accepted that the noumenal realm
has no place in this part of Kant's philosophy of science.
This, however, is not the full extent of Kant's philosophy of science. In the third Critique, and more
especially in the introductions (both the published and unpublished versions) as well as the second
part called Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, Kant is concerned with more general
questions in science (again building on the foundations laid in the first  Critique,  especially the
Transcendental Dialectic). In this regard interpreters accentuate concept formulation and hypothesis
development  in  empirical  research  (McLaughlin  1990:128)  as  well  as  the  problem concerning
underdetermination in  scientific theories (Allison 2012:210; 5:180).  The third  Critique has also
been understood as having special application to the life sciences (although Kant's main concern
therein is with biology) – and that it holds out the possibility that both the physical and life sciences
can be comprehended in a common meta-framework (Friedman 2001:126). 
The third Critique is primarily concerned with purposiveness (teleology) in science. In this regard
Kant  is  not arguing for the traditional teleologies (and thus for old Aristotelian science; Guyer
2010:433).  He  argues  that,  at  a  basic  level,  purposiveness  has  a  necessary  place  in  science.
Scientists have no choice but to accept the general purposiveness of nature as a heuristic principle
(5:411),  namely that  nature  (and its  products)  is  treated  as  if it  is  designed even  though only
mechanistic explanations would eventually be available (5:413). All general laws of nature, which
purport to describe the whole of nature as an ordered system (in contrast to mere empirical laws
which describe particular phenomena), are grounded in this principle of purposiveness. As such this
principle guides science as a research programme.  
One of the most important questions with which I am concerned in this chapter is: How does the
noumenal realm fit into Kant's teleological approach? Scientifically inclined authors do not think it
is important for Kant's main argument. They view the above-mentioned concept of purposiveness
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(and the other related concepts) as the full extent of Kant's contribution in the third Critique. For
them purposiveness is merely a scientific guideline which does not imply that any product of nature
could in fact be produced in accordance with a teleological principle (see Butts 1990; Ginsborg
2010 etc.).  Since the noumenal realm is not important to this aspect of Kant's theory,  they can
effectively discard it. Since they think that the noumenal realm is a remnant of outdated modes of
thinking, they try to remove it from this part of Kant's philosophy of science (or at least minimize
its role; O'Shea 2010:525; Butts 1990:13).
There  is,  however,  another  sensible  way to  interpret  Kant's  teleology that  does  not  reject  the
supersensible realm out of hand. In this case the general transcendental principle of purposiveness is
understood not merely as allowing for the conceptualization of nature as ordered; it also allows that
two seemingly opposing principles, namely mechanism and teleology, could both be involved in
producing the products of nature. In this case these principles are taken as deterministic and non-
deterministic causes; in the framework of the antinomy introduced in this part of the third Critique,
Kant shows that both can logically  be true even though this can never be empirically confirmed.
Allison (1012:205), who is known for his methodological approach which strips Kant's work of all
metaphysics, accommodates both these principles as logical possibilities. As such the supersensible
realm does not play a significant role in his analysis.
In my interpretation I take a stronger view. I argue that the Kantian concept of teleology takes the
concept of freedom that Kant develops in the first Critique as basis. This does not merely involve
Kant's  concept  of  practical  freedom  which  serves  as  analogy in  his  conceptualization  of  the
teleological  principle  as  a  “final”  causality – that  is,  that  Kant  views this  kind  of  causality in
analogy to human achievement of goals. In my view Kant's remarks concerning freedom in the third
Critique should not be regarded exclusively in such practical terms as is often thought to be the case
(McLaughlin  1990;  Guyer  2010).  I  argue  that  Kant  actually  takes  the  transcendental  idea  of
freedom, or absolute spontaneous causality, as point of departure in his conceptualization of final
causes. The difference with the first Critique is that Kant now applies this concept to non-extended
wholes and parts  in their  role  in producing the products of nature.  To my knowledge no other
interpreter mentions this concept of freedom in the context of the third  Critique, which is, in my
opinion, important to Kant's overall argument concerning final causes. 
I argue that Kant is not merely arguing for the logical possibility of final causes in opposition to
mechanism; he is arguing that such causes can conceivably exist in the supersensible ground of
nature. Kant thinks that the manner in which he conceptualizes final causality in the framework of
his overall philosophy makes it conceivable that such a causality could in fact exist as an effective
cause alongside mechanism in producing the products of nature.  This is  why the supersensible
realm plays such a significant role in the scientific part of the third Critique: it is only outside nature
that such a “spontaneity of a cause” (5:411) can be conceived of. Kant's concept of final causality
and the supersensible realm goes hand in hand – the one makes the other into a real possibility as
well as conceivable, i.e. in thinking about how the world really is. 
The main thrust of Kant's philosophy of science in the third Critique is that both determinism and
freedom (absolute spontaneity) are allowed a role in the production of the products of nature. Kant
argues in this regard  “for extending natural science in accordance with another principle, namely
that of final causes, yet without harm to the mechanism of nature” (5:379). Kant effectively uses the
concepts that he developed in the Dialectic part of the first  Critique (in the discussions following
the third antinomy) and apply it to the study of nature in the third Critique. 
After a general introduction to the concepts that stand at the basis of Kant's philosophy of science in
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the third Critique, I present the arguments for my own interpretation. I show how closely the third
Critique aligns with the first one, but also the significant moves beyond that. If Kant is successful in
his  approach  it  may  be  possible  to  apply  his  concepts  to  that  area  of  science  where  both
determinism and non-determinism (spontaneity) has to be accounted for, namely quantum physics. 
3.2. The purposiveness of nature as transcendental principle
As is the case in the other Critiques, Kant engages with a particular problem in the third Critique.
Whereas the problem of the first  Critique was: How is mathematical science (and mathematics)
possible for humans with our discursive form of understanding?, the problem discussed in the third
Critique is: How do we proceed with research into nature and its multiplicity of forms given the
rationally  constrained  nature  of  our  (human)  understanding?  According  to  Kant  our  discursive
understanding has certain fundamental limitations in its cognitive reach which force us to consider
strategies in dealing with it. The Kantian answer situates, and tries to solve this problem, within the
framework of his transcendental philosophy. 
Kant  refers  to  the  rationally  constrained  nature  of  our  understanding as  a  “contingency in  the
constitution of our understanding” (5:406). This contingency is found in the relation between the
particular and the universal. Allison says it well: “The basic problem, which is central to the third
Critique as a whole, is that the universal principles underdetermine the particulars falling under
them” (Allison 2012:210). 
In both introductions Kant discusses this contingency in the relation between particular empirical
laws  and general  (universal)  laws  that  we ascribe  to  nature  as  a  whole  (20:203).  Although all
particular  experiences  which  are  interconnected  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the
understanding, could be further interconnected in accordance with empirical laws in which nature is
taken as an “aggregate”,  there would always be a contingency according to which this  field of
objective cognition falls short of the universal laws (lawfulness) which reason ascribes to nature
when taken as a totality, as a unified “system” (20: 209). This problem was already discussed in the
first Critique, where Kant mentions that the unity of reason presupposes an idea, namely that of the
systematic “whole” for the aggregate of particular cognitions. Since this whole cannot be given in
sensibility, such a universal can only be problematically assumed as an idea (or general law) for the
purposes of systematization. Kant calls this a “regulative principle” (A646-7/B674-5; B708).
In the framework of the third Critique Kant allows that this contingency between the particular and
universal could even be more substantial than that assumed in the first Critique. We must also allow
for  the  possibility  that  our  understanding  would  not  necessarily  grasp  the  universal  (Allison
2012:171).  This  possibility  arises  in  the  case  where  we  assume  that  nature  could  have  a
supersensible ground. When such a supersensible ground is assumed, the universal could even be
“beyond the sphere of the insights into nature that are possible for us” (20:218; see also 5:170). In
that case some laws, as empirical, “may indeed be contingent in accordance with the insight of our
understanding” (5:180; see also 5:183-4). The assumed unity of empirical laws (i.e. the universal)
would not be fathomable by us (although it is thinkable); it would be beyond our cognition and only
available to another (non-human) understanding. 
When the problem is stated in this way, it is immediately clear that this is actually a problem for the
faculty of the power of judgment which subsumes particulars under universals. In the first Critique,
the function of the power of judgment is to determine whether given particulars fall under the rules
(concepts/universals)  given  by  the  understanding.  But  how  do  we  judge  particulars  when  the
universals  are  not  given  (as  discussed  above)?  Kant's  answer  is  to  distinguish  two  kinds  of
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judgment, namely “determinate” judgment (the kind specified in the first Critique) and “reflective”
judgment. Reflective judgment is the ability to subsume a given particular under a rule that is not
given, i.e the rule under which the particulars may be subsumed must be sought for. In this case an
a priori principle is required for the power of judgment according to which such universals can be
found (in the case of determinate judgment such a rule for the given rules would be on pain of an
infinite regress), which necessitates a critique of its own for this faculty of the mind (i.e. the third
Critique; Allison 2010:240). 
Kant identifies the transcendental principle which guides the reflective power of judgment (both in
aesthetic  and teleological  judgment)  as  the purposiveness  of nature which he describes as  “the
lawfulness of the contingency as such” (20:217). This principle basically says that we have to take
nature heuristically as if it is designed for the purposes of the scientific study of nature (i.e. for us),
even though we recognize that the objectivity of such a cognizable order is contingent (5:185). In
contrast with determinate judgment, there is no objectivity nor can any be claimed for this kind of
judgment (due to the contingency in the relation between the particulars and the universals). There
is  an  explicit  acknowledgment  of  the  subjective,  reflective  (self-referential)  character  of  this
principle of judgment which does not prescribe rules to nature but merely to itself. Kant calls this
the “heautonomy” of the power of judgment (20:225; 5:185). 
The  reason  why  we  must  take  purposiveness  as  a  (subjective)  universal  and  necessary  (i.e.
transcendental) principle guiding empirical research, is that without it no “thorough interconnection
of  empirical  cognition into a  whole of [i.e.  unified]  experience” is  possible  (5:184).  Kant says
further: “[W]ithout presupposing this [principle], we would have no order of nature in accordance
with empirical laws, hence no guideline for an experience of this in all its multiplicity and for
research  into  it”  (5:185).  Transcendental  principles  always  ground  the  possibility  of  a  unified
experience a priori.
Allison writes that in the deduction in the published introduction Kant establishes “the subjective
necessity of presupposing the purposiveness of nature in the process of empirical inquiry. In other
words, the claim is not that nature is purposive, i.e. that we have some sort of a priori guarantee that
it is ordered in a manner commensurate with our cognitive capacities; nor even is it that we must
believe it to be purposive in this sense (which is basically Hume's position). The claim is rather that
we are rationally constrained to approach nature as if it were so ordered” (Allison 2010:186). Butts
describes this approach as follows: “Determinate judgments are either true or false of objects of
possible experience. Reflective judgments, based as they are on subjective maxims, are neither true
nor false, not even probable or improbable; they are rather rational  estimates of the way nature
operates” (Butts 1990:4).
The purposiveness of nature which Kant introduces in the third Critique as a regulative principle for
the reflective power of judgment is much broader than the purposiveness (systematicity) of nature
that he introduces in the first  Critique as a regulative principle for the hypothetical use of reason
(Allison 2010:171). Whereas the concept of systematicity merely involves the mechanism of nature
(the  totality of  all  causal  laws)  which  allows the  understanding to  think  it  as  a  whole  (as  the
condition  for  determining the  place  of  all  the  parts  in  the  whole;  A646/B674),  the  concept  of
purposiveness goes further and also includes the concept of freedom in its range (it accommodates
the supersensible substratum of nature) resulting in the whole (lawfulness) being potentially beyond
the grasp of our understanding. 
Such  purposiveness,  as  the  a  priori principle  of  the  power  of  judgment,  also  functions  as  a
mediating concept between the concepts of nature and freedom because in Kant's system the faculty
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of  judgment  stands  between  the  understanding  (the  systematic  unity  of  concepts  of  the
understanding produces the concept of nature) and reason (which produces the idea of freedom)
(Allison 2012:217; Guyer 2000:xxii-xxiii).  Kant writes in this  regard: “Now this transcendental
concept [of purposiveness] is neither a concept of nature nor of the concept of freedom, since it
attributes nothing at all to the object (of nature), but rather only represents the unique way in which
we must proceed in reflection on the objects of nature with the aim of a thorough interconnected
experience” (5:184). As such the principle of purposiveness does not merely assume that nature is
ordered (i.e. take it as if it is designed); it is also a principle “for the possibility [of the products] of
nature” (5:186). Since it accommodates the supersensible substratum of nature, it allows that the
ground for the possibility of the products of nature may lay therein.  
3.3. The internal purposiveness of nature
Kant's transcendental principle of purposiveness does not only have reference to nature as a whole,
but also to the individual  products of nature.  Kant calls this the “technique” of nature, i.e.  that
nature  is  “purposive  in  its  products”  (20:249).  In  this  way Kant  accentuated  the  idea  that  the
products  of  nature are  judged as  if  they are  produced by the  technical  skills  of  some artist  in
accordance with some design (plan). Such reflective judgments, which are neither theoretical nor
practical, “do not determine anything about the constitution of the object nor the way in which to
produce it” (20:201).
According to Kant there are two ways in which the products of nature can be so considered, which
occupy the two parts of the third  Critique. When the form of things are judged as purposive (in
intuition  prior  to  any  concept  of  the  faculties  of  cognition)  for  our  feelings  of  pleasure  (and
displeasure) it is called the “formal” technique of nature. In this case a judgment of taste (called an
aesthetic judgment) is made on mere subjective grounds and considers the relationship between the
object and the human subject. When things are judged as purposive in accordance with concepts (of
objects and their possibility) it is called the “real” technique of nature. In this case a logical (i.e.
cognitive although still reflective) judgment (called a teleological judgment) is made on objective
grounds, through the understanding and reason, which considers the relationship which is supposed
to subsist in the object of cognition (5:193).
In teleological judgments nature and the products of nature are considered as a system (or systems)
of  purposive  relations  (McLaughlin  1990:51).  As  such  this  kind  of  judgment  considers  the
“objective”  and  “material”  (i.e.  not  merely  mathematical)  purposiveness  of  things  and  their
possibility  in terms of relations of cause and effect. Kant writes: “Experience leads our power of
judgment to the concept of an end in nature only if there is a relation of cause and effect to be
judged which we can understand as lawful only insofar as we find ourselves capable of subsuming
the idea of the effect under the causality of its cause as the underlying condition of the possibility of
the former” (5:367). 
Two  such  judgments  are  possible,  namely  when  relative  (extrinsic)  or  internal  (intrinsic)
purposiveness is considered. In the case of relative purposiveness, which explores the existence of
one thing for the sake of another (or the existence of one part for another within the framework of a
product of nature), things are explained according to mechanical laws (McLaughlin 1990:43). In the
case of intrinsic purposiveness a thing's internal possibility for the production of its outer form is
considered (in analogy to production by the causality of a concept).  
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3.3.1. The teleological principle
In this way Kant introduces two regulative principles according to which natural products could be
considered in reflective judgment in accordance with its own rule (i.e. the transcendental principle
of purposiveness), namely mechanism and teleology. When causal relations of such products in
general are considered in mechanistic terms the first principle is used. When we cannot explain
something in those terms we can consider it in accordance with the teleological principle. In fact,
the same product could be considered in accordance with both these principles (When the parts are
considered as an aggregate whole, Kant also uses the term mechanism, although then it would be a
constitutive concept; 20:218). 
The relation between this teleological principle and the transcendental principle is complex (Allison
1990:214). Some authors regard the teleological principle (just as a transcendental principle) merely
in methodological terms as a heuristic device guiding scientific research. They argue that, although
the products of nature can be considered as if they are produced in accordance with the teleological
principle, they are nevertheless still produced according to some form of mechanism. In this way
the supersensible realm (and with it all reference to freedom as absolute spontaneity) is removed
from Kant's philosophy of science. Ginsborg (2010:465), for example, views these two principles as
“two different, although related, senses of mechanical explanation”. Butts (1990:5) writes: “The
conclusion  is  that  a  deep  teleological  principle  operates  as  an  a  priori presupposition  of  any
scientific  inquiry.  Teleology  subordinates  mechanism,  while  at  the  same  time  vindicating  its
employment”.
In my view this is not Kant's position. I believe and will now argue (in the following sections) that
with  the  teleological  principle,  which  concerns  intrinsic  purposiveness,  Kant  introduces  the
possibility  that  there  could  be  aspects  of  some  products  of  nature  which  are  not  produced  in
accordance with deterministic  causality at  all. He allows for the possibility of another  kind of
causality, namely that of final causes, which builds upon the causality according to freedom which
was  first  introduced  in  the  first  Critique.  In  this  regard  Kant  grounds  the  condition  for  the
possibility of the products of nature in the supersensible realm. 
Although this kind of causality is not empirically accessible according to Kant, it is nonetheless
non-contradictory, (logically) possible and the broader framework in which he embedded it suggests
that he is in fact arguing for the conceivability of the existence of such a kind of causality. In this
regard my view is stronger than the methodological approach taken by Allison (1012:205) who
accepts the logical possibility of another kind of causality; I argue for an ontological reading of the
third  Critique within  the  framework  of  Kant's  critical  philosophy  in  which  such  spontaneous
causality can be conceived of as something that really exist.
3.3.2. The possibility of things in themselves
When the products of nature are considered as systems (and not merely as aggregates), we can
consider  both  the  relative  purposiveness  of  its  material  parts  (governed  by  the  principle  of
mechanism), as well as its intrinsic purposiveness which involves the possibility which the products
have in themselves to produce such product systems (governed by the principle of teleology). At this
stage  of  the  discussion  I  tentatively  propose  that  Kant's  distinction  between  the  two  kinds  of
purposiveness reflects  (or builds  on) the two ways of considering objects  discussed in  the first
Critique, namely regarding their external relations as well as their intrinsic nature, i.e. as they are in
themselves (Langton 1998:19). The difference is that now we are not merely considering everyday
objects, but rather the (production of the) products of nature and their internal parts in this manner.
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This reading is supported by the manner in which Kant seems to understand intrinsic purposiveness,
namely that it is the intrinsic ability that a product of nature has in itself, i.e. as a thing in itself, to
produce its form. We find that the concept of intrinsic purposiveness (and the teleological principle
belonging to it) is consistently related to the possibility that products of nature have in themselves to
produce their forms, in contradistinction with the mere representation of the forms of such products
(and the relation of the parts to each other). In this regard Kant, for instance, says in his discussion
of teleological judgment in the unpublished introduction that its concept of purposiveness (which
seems  to  include  both  kinds  of  purposiveness)  is  designated  “not  merely  for  the  manner  of
representation, but for the possibility of the things themselves” (20:234; my accentuation). 
There are also other textual support that intrinsic purposiveness involves the possibility which the
products have in themselves to produce such product systems. In the published introduction Kant
mentions that for objects given in experience, (intrinsic) purposiveness involves “a correspondence
of its form with the possibility of the thing itself, in accordance with a concept of it which precedes
and contains the ground of its form” (5:193; my accentuation). Here he accentuates the relation
between the form of a product of nature and the possibility that it contains in itself. In the rest of the
third  Critique Kant sometimes refers to products of nature judged “in itself and its internal [i.e.
intrinsic] possibility” (5:373-4) which again seems to suggest that the intrinsic purposiveness refers
to this intrinsic possibility that the products of nature have when considered in themselves. 
What does Kant mean by “the possibility of the things themselves”? At the most basic level this
would refer to the idea developed in the first Critique that things in themselves (as noumena) could
have a certain causal relation with phenomena (as the absolute spontaneous cause thereof). This
does not refer to things in themselves as the mere transcendental ground of objects, i.e. when we
merely consider the real ground of everyday objects that are given as phenomena in perception
(A253; see 2.4.3. above). It rather refers to things in themselves (things themselves)  considered
only as noumena, i.e. objects of our understanding which could exist  outside nature although for
another  kind of  intuition  (than  ours),  to  which  the  transcendental  idea  of  freedom,  also called
“absolute spontaneity”, could be ascribed without contradiction (since mechanism belongs only to
nature; see the third antinomy). I presented this way of understanding the concept of noumena in the
first Critique as a third alternative in Kantian interpretation (in the previous chapter).
The ground for this kind of (spontaneous) causality lies in the noumenal realm, although its effects
are produced in the phenomenal realm. According to Kant there are only two kinds of causality,
namely deterministic causality (in accordance with the second analogy; called mechanism when
nature  as  a  whole  is  considered)  and  absolute  spontaneous  causality  in  accordance  with  the
transcendental idea of freedom (A532/B560; see 2.4.1.). The ability that things have in themselves
to  eventually  produce  their  phenomenal  form  would  involve  both  these  causal  concepts,  but
especially that of absolute spontaneous causality according to which the ground for the phenomenal
effects is situated in the thing as it is in itself, which Kant equates with the supersensible (5:175).
According to Kant the idea of the supersensible “underlies the possibility of all those objects of
experience” (5:175).  
3.3.3. The concept of a causality through freedom
Although freedom is at first introduced as a moral concept in the third Critique (5:172), and some
interpreters  understand  it  throughout  the  Critique in  that  way  (McLaughlin  1990:118;  Guyer
2010:433), Kant does eventually distinguish between freedom as moral concept of practical reason
and as a formal concept of pure reason (i.e. transcendental freedom; see note to 5:196) in the last
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section of the published introduction after his discussion of teleological judgment (these two kinds
of freedom are, however, closely interwoven in his discussion). This distinction goes back to the
first  Critique where  he  said  that  practical  freedom is  grounded  on  the  transcendental  idea  of
freedom  (A534/B562).  He  now  calls  the  spontaneous  causality  that  is  grounded  in  the
transcendental  idea of  freedom “causality of  freedom” and the “concept  of a  causality through
freedom” (5:195-6). He argues that this kind of causality can be included in a teleological principle
under the reflective power of judgment. 
Kant writes that the idea that the supersensible can have consequences (effects) in the realm of
nature is  already (before its use in the practical concept of freedom) included in the concept of a
causality though freedom: “But although the determining grounds of causality in accordance with
the concept of freedom (and the practical rules that it contains) are not found in nature, and the
sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, nevertheless the converse is possible (not
in regard to the cognition of nature, of course, but in regard to the consequences of the former on
the latter) and is already contained in the concept of a causality through freedom, whose effect in
accordance with its formal laws is to take place in the world, although the word cause, when used
of the supersensible, signifies only the ground for determining the causality of natural things to an
effect that is in accord with their own natural laws but yet at the same time is also in unison with the
formal principle of the laws of reason, the possibility of which cannot of course be understood,
although the objection that there is an alleged contradiction in it can be adequately refuted” (5:196;
my italics).
This reference to freedom in the introduction suggests that the possibility (and conceivability) of a
causality though freedom (as an idea of reason) is important for Kant's overall argument regarding
the teleological principle since it allows for the possibility that such causality could be real and that
all  products  of  nature  are  therefore  not  necessarily  produced  in  accordance  with  deterministic
causality  (mechanism).  Although  Kant  admits  that  the  existence  of  the  supersensible  and  its
accompanying kind of  causality though freedom cannot  be proved,  the concept  thereof  is  non-
contradictory  and  it  can  be  incorporated  in  a  principle  of  reflective  judgment:  “The  power  of
judgment, through its  a priori principle of judging nature in accordance with possible particular
laws for it, provides for its supersensible substratum (in us as well as outside us) determinability
[i.e. that it can determine outcomes as phenomena] through the intellectual faculty [i.e. we can think
it]” (5:196). 
At this point we have reason to think that the teleological principle is not merely a methodological
device which guides us in our search for mechanical causes (although it surely does); it also allows
for the real possibility that another kind of causality than the deterministic sort, namely that of
absolute spontaneity (freedom), could in fact contribute to the form of the products of nature. In this
regard the possible  relation between things  in  nature and the supersensible  realm,  which could
contain the ground for the possibility of the forms of nature which would be realized (at least in
part) though spontaneous causality, should be considered. 
When Kant  introduced the teleological  principle  in  the preface  to  the  first  edition of  the  third
Critique,  he  already  emphasizes  that  this  involves  the  relation  between  the  things  of  nature
(regarding their form) and the supersensible realm (which contains the possibility for the expression
of its form). He writes: “[I]n the case of the logical judgment of nature, where experience imposes
on  things  a  conformity  to  law that  the  understanding's  general  concept  of  the  sensible  is  not
sufficient to understand or explain, where the power of judgment can derive from itself a principle
[i.e.  the  teleological  principle]  for  the  relation  of  the  thing  in  nature  to  the  uncognizable
supersensible but can only use it  with respect to itself  for the cognition of nature” (5:170; my
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accentuation). 
3.3.4. Two cohering principles
Although absolute spontaneous causality is of great importance to Kant's argument, he does not
think that it could alone (i.e. without deterministic causality) accounts for the forms of the products
of nature. In this regard he mentions that the coherence of the effects of these two kinds of causality
in one product of nature does not contain a contradiction. He discusses this “alleged contradiction”
in  more  detail  in  an  accompanying  note  (5:196)  where  he  says  that  it  refers  to  two  kinds  of
appearances cohering in the same subject, namely that of nature as appearance as well as the effects
of the causality of freedom as appearances in the sensible world. In this regard his reference is to
the first Critique where he already argued that both kinds of causality could without contradiction
be accommodated in the framework of the empirical character (both of causes and causal agents;
Allison 1990:24; see section 2.4.4 for a discussion). The fact that there is no contradiction in this
regard is important for Kant's later argument that both mechanism and teleology (and therefore both
relative and intrinsic purposiveness) could cohere in nature and its products.
After  Kant  dissolved  the  antinomy of  teleological  judgment  in  the  Dialectic  part  of  the  third
Critique (this  is  the seventh antinomy in total)  he shows how these two principles  can cohere
through the supersensible. In that instance he again refers to both mechanism and “the spontaneity
of a cause”, which would be “another kind of causality”, and “without which no ground of those
forms [i.e. of the products of nature] would be given” (5:411). Of special importance is the name
that he uses for this other kind of causality,  which without any doubt refers to the causality of
absolute spontaneity. 
I  have  now argued  that  the  two  kinds  of  causality  which  Kant  originally  introduced  after  the
dissolution of the third antinomy in the first Critique, is again used in the third Critique as the basic
building blocks for his principles of mechanism and teleology. As such, there can also be no doubt
that the idea of the supersensible is central to Kant's concept of teleology and that this principle
allows for a real alternative to mechanism according to which the products of nature are produced.
As such, these products contain in themselves, i.e. in their supersensible ground, the possibility for
the realization of its material forms.  When we remove the supersensible realm from this part of
Kant's philosophy of science, we lose all prospect that another kind of causality could really exist  –
even though it would be beyond our sensible reach.
3.4. The concept of natural purpose (end)
In  the  Analytic  part  of  the  Critique  of  the  Teleological  Power  of  Judgment  Kant  introduces  a
concept in accordance with intrinsic purposiveness (and the teleological principle), which is suitable
for application to biological structures, namely that of natural purpose. This is not a constitutive
concept through which we can achieve objective cognition; it is merely a regulative concept for
reflective judgment (in accordance with the transcendental principle of purposiveness). This is also
not an empirical concept, taken from experience. It is, rather, an analytically acquired concept with
application to  organisms insofar  as  they are conceived by us  as  natural  purposes  (McLaughlin
1990:46; see 5:376). 
The concept of natural purpose does not only involve the internal possibility that things have in
themselves to produce their external form; it also says  how that could conceivably be realized. In
this  regard  Kant  introduces  the  relation  between  the  “whole”  and  the  “parts”  as  well  as  the
particular causal relation which governs them. There are two conceivable ways in which this could
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be possible (according to Kant), namely through “mechanism of nature”, when the material whole is
explained by the causal relation between the component parts (the parts determine the whole), and
through a “natural purpose”, when the idea of the whole serves as ground and condition for the parts
and their  internal arrangement (the whole determines the parts) (Allison 2012:203; McLaughlin
1990:129). Kant writes already in the unpublished introduction: “[T]he whole should be the cause
of  the  possibility of  the  causality  of  the  parts,  rather  [than  in  the  case of  physical-mechanical
causes] the latter must be given first in order for the possibility of the whole to be comprehended
from it” (20:236).
The main difference between the transcendental ideas of mechanism and freedom introduced in the
third antinomy and the corresponding ideas of mechanism and natural purpose in the third Critique,
is that the two last mentioned ideas do not merely involve two different kinds of causal relation
(deterministic  and non-deterministic),  it  also  describes  those in  the  framework of  a  whole-part
relation (which can be ascribed to the products of nature). In this extended sense the “mechanism of
nature” cannot be equated with the mechanism introduced in the first Critique (Allison 2012:204),
just as the concept of natural purpose cannot be equated with the concept of absolute spontaneous
causality which Kant again introduces in the introduction to the third Critique, although it includes
those concepts (see below). 
In the third  Critique the idea of the “whole”, which contains the ground and possibility for the
production of the products of nature (of the material whole with its parts), effectively supplants the
concept of noumena that Kant used in the first  Critique, that is, “objects of the understanding”
existing  outside  nature  which  is  introduced  merely  problematically,  i.e.  non-contradictory,  and
would only be accessible for another kind of intuition. As I argued in my interpretation of the first
Critique (presented as a third alternative viewpoint), when noumena are conceptualized in this way,
they could  contain  the  ground  and  possibility  for  absolute  spontaneous  causality  which  could
produce effects  in  nature.  One can say that the whole-part  relation introduces a more complex
concept of noumena.
3.4.1. Final causes 
According to Kant the concept of natural purpose means that we take things as the “cause and effect
of itself”, i.e. in the production of material wholes. The Kantian concept involves the production of
things in accordance with its own internal possibility (although Kant mentions the reproduction of
things when he provisionally presented the concept (5:371), he does not engage with that in any
detail).  Kant  distinguishes  three  aspects  that  determine  the  concept,  which  have  some  distant
relation to the three properties of reproduction that he observed in organisms (powers of growth,
reproduction and self-repair; Guyer 2010:433; McLaughlin 1990:49). 
A body would be a natural purpose “in itself and in accordance with its internal possibility”, when
the following apply (5:373): 1. The parts of a natural purpose, as far as their presence and their form
(properties) are concerned, are only possible through their relation to the whole. The whole (which
for us can only be an idea) serves as the ground for all the parts in their relation to each other and
the material  whole.  2.  The parts  reciprocally produce each other as far as their  form and their
combination  is  concerned (see  also  5:408).  They produce  the  material  whole  out  of  their  own
causality. 3. Each part is conceived as if it exists only through all the others, as existing for the sake
of each other and on account of the whole. A product of nature which adheres to these rules would
be an “organized and self-organized being” (5:373). 
In  the  framework  of  this  conception  of  a  natural  purpose,  Kant  introduces  a  new  concept  of
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causality, namely of “final causes”, according to which such beings are both the cause and effect of
themselves  (the  parts  are  mutually the  cause and effect  of  each other  in  the  production  of  the
material whole). In this case the causal relation is not that of a series of causes and effects, with
each cause having an effect (called “effective” causes; not even when such causality is taken as
reciprocal causality in the context of “community” as in the third analogy). Such a series would be
“descending”,  i.e.  it  moves  from  the  condition  to  the  conditioned.  Kant  contrasts  it  with  an
“ascending” series which moves from the conditioned to the condition (McLaughlin 1990:86). With
final causes, however, as a concept of reason (as such it is an “ideal” cause; we can think it, but
cannot understand it), when considered as a series, a mutual dependency between ascending and
descending series occurs such that each cause is also an effect. “[T]he thing which is on the one
hand designated as an effect nevertheless derives, in ascent, the name of a cause of the same thing
of which it is the effect” (5:373). This is not the causality that we find in the context of nature.
Although this kind of causality (final causes) can be logically conceptualized without contradiction
(5:371), and can be used as such in our conceptualization of a natural purpose, it cannot be part of
nature, which Kant understands in terms of deterministic causality (mechanism). When we allow
that the unity of the forms of nature is produced in accordance with a rule (as an ordered outcome),
and not merely “contingently” in accordance with mechanism, then such an a priori principle would
be outside the concept of nature: “[W]ithout the help of a special kind of causality, namely that of
ends (nexus finalis), this [order in nature] is all in the highest degree contingent, i.e. that nature,
considered as mere mechanism, could have formed in a thousand different ways without hitting
precisely upon the unity in accordance with such a rule, and that it is therefore  only outside the
concept of nature, not within it, that one could have even the least ground a priori for hoping to find
such a principle” (5:360, my accentuation; see also 5:371).
Within nature everything is regulated by the concept of mechanism (deterministic causality), which
means that it is only outside nature, in the supersensible substratum of nature, that we can have the
least possibility of another kind of causality,  namely in accordance with final causes (that have
ordered outcomes). Kant makes it clear that this kind of causality could only be possible in the
context of the supersensible realm “[W]e have related such an effect [in the products of nature] in
the whole to a supersensible determining ground beyond the blind mechanism of nature” (5:377). 
3.4.2. The productive capacity (potentiality) of a natural purpose
Kant's concept of final causes provides a process (as a manner in which it  could be achieved)
according to which the intrinsic possibility of natural products could be realized in nature – in a
manner not possible through the mechanism of nature. We can, however, only realistically conceive
of a final cause if its ground, from which it begins its work, lies in the supersensible realm outside
nature. As such, the concept of final causes involves a “productive capacity” (5:370, 379) which the
products of nature have in themselves to produce their material forms. Kant writes: “[W]e have
discovered in nature a capacity for bringing forth products that can only be conceived of by us in
accordance with the concept of final causes... [The idea of which], as far as its ground is concerned,
leads us  beyond the sensible  world” (5:381;  my accentuation).  Kant  also calls  it  a  “productive
cause” (5:421).
This “productive” capacity or potentiality that natural products have in themselves to produce their
material forms is clearly based on the more basic concept of absolute spontaneity. In both cases the
ground for this kind of causality lies in the supersensible realm, while its effects are produced in the
phenomenal world. In the first case it is grounded in noumena; in the second it is grounded in
“wholes” (which is just another way to think of noumena), on which the possibility of the parts, as
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far  as  both  their  constitution  and  their  combination  are  concerned,  depends  (5:408).  Whereas
absolute spontaneity is a cause grounded in noumena in the noumenal realm with its effects in
nature, productive capacity (potentiality) through final causes is a similar kind of cause grounded in
the whole (of which we can merely form an idea) in the supersensible substratum of nature from
with its material form in nature is produced. 
Kant relates absolute spontaneity and productive capacity (potentiality) in different ways to a series
of  events.  Absolute  spontaneity as  a  cause  of  phenomena is  viewed  as  beginning  “a  series  of
occurrences  entirely  from itself”  (A534/B562).  Productive  capacity  also  involves  such  a  series
which begin from itself (i.e. from a whole), but it is not merely producing effects; it involves a
whole  and its  parts  which  are  realized  through the  mutual  dependency between ascending and
descending series according to which each cause is also an effect, producing material wholes in
nature. We can say that the idea of absolute spontaneity of the first Critique is expanded with the
idea of productive capacity (potentiality) through final causes (or: a productive cause) in the third
Critique which makes it more suitable for application to the products of nature. Kant even refers to
this  last cause as “the spontaneity of a cause” (5:411), a name which is clearly borrowed from
absolute spontaneity. 
In both Critiques Kant mentions that these are the only two kinds of causalities possible. These are
clearly the same kinds of causality that Kant introduced in the first Critique (Butts 1990:5) although
the concepts  of both mechanism and spontaneous causality have been expanded to include the
whole-parts relation to make them suitable for application to the products of nature. In including
these concepts within the broader framework of Kant's philosophy, especially when noumena or the
whole-parts relation is considered, the second kind of causality is not only non-contradictory, it is
also conceivable that it could in fact exist.
In the final instance Kant also contrasts these kinds of causality in terms of “forces”, namely the
“moving force” in accordance with mechanism which is explained in terms of the fundamental
“forces of matter” (the forces of attraction and repulsion discussed in Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science; Ginsborg 2010:458; Langton 1998) and the “formative force” in accordance with
teleology which we can think of in terms of final causes. Kant writes: “An organized being is thus
not a mere machine, for that has only a motive power, while the organized being possesses in itself
a formative power, and indeed one that it communicates to the matter, which does not have it (it
organizes the latter):  thus it has  a self-propagating formative power, which cannot be explained
through the capacity of movement alone” (5:374; my accentuation).
In Kant's conception, matter is the lowest level of nature, as an aggregate of numerous substances
external to one another, with its forces governed by mechanical laws (5:420-1). According to Kant a
natural purpose, on the other hand, has a formative power (force) which is not a force of nature (i.e.
of  attraction  or  repulsion),  but  which  is  “self-propagating”  (i.e.  in  accordance  with  absolute
spontaneity) and can be “communicated” to matter and in that way organizes matter. The seat of this
formative  power  is  in  self-organizing  beings  as  they  are  in  themselves  outside  nature,  in  the
supersensible substratum of nature. The whole-part relation that Kant has in mind, which grounds
the formative process of a natural purpose, is therefore not referring to extended parts and wholes,
but to non-extended wholes-and-parts (they are not in nature and therefore also not extended in our
space/time). Kant, however, never spells out how these non-extended wholes-and-parts are related
to the material parts and wholes produced in nature.  
My analysis is in agreement with Kant's sympathetic reading of Leibniz in accordance with his own
view,  according  to  which  non-material  monads  are  viewed  in  similar  terms  to  noumena  (This
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follows  because  Kant's  conception  of  noumena  is  modeled  on  Leibniz's  monads;  Cicovacki
2010:85; Friedman 2010:243). In this regard Kant mentions that composites of things in themselves
could be composed of simples which seems to be the same idea that he develops in more detail in
the  third  Critique,  namely  of  non-extended  wholes-and-parts.  He  writes  in  Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science:
“[Monadology] is rather an intrinsically correct Platonic concept of the world devised by Leibniz,
insofar as it is considered, not at all as the object of the senses, but as a thing in itself, and is merely
an object of the understanding, which, however, does indeed underlie the appearance of the senses.
Now the composite of things in themselves must certainly consist of the simple, for the parts must
here be given prior to all composition. But the composite in the appearance does not consist of the
simple,  because  in  the  appearance,  which  can  never  be  given  otherwise  than  as  composed
(extended), the parts can only be given through division, and thus not prior to the composite, but
only in it.
Therefore, Leibniz's idea, so far as I comprehend it, was not to explicate space through the order of
simple beings next to one another, but was rather to set this order alongside space as corresponding
to it, but as belonging to a mere intelligible world (unknown to us). Thus he asserts nothing but
what has been shown elsewhere [i.e. in Kant's own writings]: namely, that space, together with the
matter of which it is the form, does not contain the world of things in themselves, but only their
appearance, and is itself only the form of our outer sensible intuition” (4:507-8; my accentuation). 
When we read the third Critique in this light, it follows that the wholes which Kant introduces in
this  Critique are  the  above-mentioned “composite  of  things  in  themselves” consisting  of  parts,
which  would  be  simples,  that  is,  elementary  non-extended  entities.  These  would  exist  in  the
supersensible realm outside nature. When Kant says that another kind of causality applies to these
wholes-and-parts, namely of final causes, according to which the parts are the cause and effect of
each other, this implies that they are interconnected (coupled) in a manner that we do not find with
extended (material) parts (which is why I talk about “wholes-and-parts”). It also means that their
effects (realization of themselves?) in the phenomenal realm would be governed by that rule, i.e.
that each outcome would be produced in such a manner that it is the cause and effect of the other
outcomes. The outcomes would be spontaneously produced from the co-operation of the elementary
non-extended parts (without any preceding deterministic causal structure). On the whole, all the
parts together would have the self-propagating potentiality in themselves to produce the product in
co-operation with the material parts and mechanical forces of nature.  
At  this  point  I  can say the following:  Kant  assumes a  two-level  world-system – involving the
supersensible substratum of nature as well as nature. We can distinguish between the wholes-and-
parts that things have in themselves, i.e. as non-extended entities, and the related material parts and
wholes in nature. The first kind (of wholes-and-parts) involves an absolute spontaneous causality
and  on the  whole  a  formative  power  (a  potentiality)  that  we do not  find  in  nature,  where  all
interaction happens in accordance with mechanical laws. As such the first kind has a determining
impact on the material form of the products of nature. 
According to Kant both kinds of causality could possibly belong to the products of nature: “It might
always be possible that in, e.g., an animal body, many parts could be conceived as consequences of
merely mechanical laws (such as skin, hair, and bones). Yet, the cause that provides the appropriate
material,  modifies  it,  forms  it,  and  deposits  it  in  its  appropriate  place  must  always  be  judged
teleologically, so that everything in it must be considered as organized, and everything is also, in a
certain relation to the thing itself, an organ in turn” (5:377). The aggregated parts can account for
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mechanical  changes  (according  to  deterministic  laws);  the  non-extended  wholes-and-parts
“provides” and “deposit” material (matter) in its appropriate place in the framework of the material
whole.
3.4.3. The restricted nature of our understanding
With the introduction of the concept of natural purpose Kant faced a problem, namely how to think
of this kind of causality within the framework of the science of his day. On the one hand, it is not
like any kind of causality that he knew (they obviously knew only deterministic causality). On the
other hand it shows some distant analogy with causality through ends. Already in the published
introduction,  Kant  mentioned that  we can think  of  the possibility of  the products  of  nature  in
analogy to human action, namely that some phenomenal outcomes (actions) have their ground in
the supersensible realm (through which practical freedom becomes possible).  He writes:  “[T]he
latter [the supersensible] should have an influence on the former [the sensible], namely the concept
of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible world; and nature
must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at
least in agreement with the possibility of ends that are to be realized in it in accordance with the
laws of freedom” (5:176).  
Natural purpose, however, is “entirely distinct from practical purposiveness (of human art as well as
morals)” and does not involve any intentionality (5:181; 20:237). We can, nonetheless, think of
“natural purpose” in analogy with human purpose (which is also where the name originates), where
an idea, representation or concept of the result can be viewed as the “cause” of it (McLaughlin
1990:38), or as Kant defines it, “[T]he concept of an object insofar as it at the same time contains
the  ground  of  the  reality  of  this  object  is  called  an  end”  (5:181).  In  various  passages  Kant
accentuates that the concept of a “natural end” is merely conceived in analogy with human agency,
especially in artistic production, without trying to explain it in this manner (5:181, 360-1 etc.).
Although  Kant  formulated  his  concept  of  natural  purpose  in  analogy with  human  purpose,  he
acknowledged that this is not really satisfactory: “Strictly speaking, the organization of nature is
therefore not analogous with any causality we know... inner natural perfection, as is possessed by
those things are possible only as natural ends and hence organized beings, is not thinkable and
explicable in accordance with any analogy to any physical, i.e. natural capacity that is known to us;
indeed, since we ourselves belong to nature in the widest sense, it is not thinkable and explicable
even through an exact analogy with human art” (5:375) 
The main problem with the concept of a natural purpose is  that the whole which underlies the
production  of  the  material  parts  and form of  natural  products  (viewed as  natural  purposes),  is
ascribed  to  the  supersensible  realm.  The  representation  of  such  a  whole  which  precedes  the
possibility of the parts could be nothing more than an idea for us (20:236; 5:381). According to
Kant, our understanding is constrained due to the contingency of its constitution (see section 3.2.)
and can therefore not grasp this kind of non-extended whole, which is prior to and conditioning its
parts and their internal arrangement; it cannot represent the whole as the ground for the possibility
of the parts. Our discursive, “image-dependent”, understanding, tries to form a representation of
such a whole, which is not possible; we can only grasp material wholes as aggregates of its parts
(5:408; Allison 2012:211).
Kant accentuates this problem by introducing another kind of (non-human) understanding, which he
calls an “intuitive intellect” which is not constrained in this manner (doing so does not contain any
contradiction). This understanding is not restricted to the use of general concepts, called “analytic
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universals” (with their contingent relation with particulars). It can grasp the “synthetic universal”,
i.e. the (non-extended) whole could as such be given as an intelligible representation to its intuition
(there is no contingency between this universal and particulars). As Allison says, “a supersensible
ground would be accessible only to an intuitive intellect” (Allison 2012:213). 
Kant thinks that such an intellect, and the kind of intuition associated with it, also shows how the
supersensible  realm itself  could be possible:  “[S]ince it  is  still  at  least  possible to  consider the
material world as a mere appearance, and to conceive of something as a thing in itself (which is not
an appearance) as substratum, and to correlate with this a corresponding intellectual intuition (even
if it is not ours), there would then be a supersensible ground for nature, although it is unknowable to
us, to which we ourselves belong” (5:409). When such a supersensible substratum is assumed, the
design  which  is  expressed  in  the  products  of  nature,  could  be  present  in  that  realm  (Guyer
2010:435). In this regard Kant also allows that such an intellect, now taken as God, could have
intentionally produced such designs  in  the  supersensible  substratum of  nature  which  find their
materialization in the products of nature (5:425-6). 
3.5. The importance of the supersensible realm
I have now argued that the supersensible realm is of crucial importance in Kant's philosophy of
science as presented in  the third  Critique.  We cannot  eliminate  this  from Kant's  philosophy of
science without seriously damaging his arguments for the concept of natural purpose, which he
applies to organisms through reflective judgment. Without the supersensible realm there cannot be
any kind of non-deterministic causality and therefore nothing but deterministic causality. Such a
realm  is  necessary  for  any  concept  which  involves  absolute  spontaneous  causality  (the
transcendental idea of freedom) in any manner, namely natural purpose which involves the self-
propagating formative power or potentiality (productive capacity) that things in themselves have as
non-extended composite wholes to produce their material forms. 
3.5.1. Unifying the principles
The introduction of such a new kind of non-deterministic causality at the same time introduces the
problem of its coherence with mechanism. According to Kant this kind of causality as well as its co-
existence  with  mechanism  is  only  possible  through  the  presupposition  of  the  existence  of  a
supersensible realm. Kant formulates this problem as an antinomy (a conflict of laws) in which the
two kinds of causality, namely mechanism and final causes, are presented as equally necessary, but
conflicting, alternative maxims (Allison 1012:205). Although all generation of material things must
be judged as possible through mechanistic laws, some products of nature (organisms according to
Kant) cannot be judged as such and require an entirely different law of causality, namely that of
final causes (5:386). 
As principles for the reflective power of judgment, these principles are not assertions but rather
guidelines  (they  cannot  be  more  than  this  due  to  the  contingency  in  the  constitution  of  our
understanding).  When  they  are  dogmatically  asserted  (which  happens  when  the  principle  of
reflecting  judgment  is  confused  with  the  determining  power  of  judgment;  5:389)  an  antinomy
ensues. When they are, however, recognized as mere regulative principles of the reflective power of
judgment, the conflict disappears because both can be possible although we can gain no insight into
the way this happens (5:415). 
I have argued above that Kant does not merely argue for the logical possibility, but also for the real
conceivability of both these principles (that they can really exist). This is why he now proceeds to
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argue  that  it  is  conceivable  that  both  principles  could  cohere  in  nature,  which  would  only be
possible if they can be united in one principle. This is where the supersensible realm is of central
importance in Kant's argument – just as was the case when he argued for the conceivability of the
transcendental idea of freedom in the first Critique. The unifiability of the two ways of representing
the possibility of nature “may well lie in the supersensible principle of nature (outside as well as
inside us)” (5:429).  In the same manner that  the effects  of both mechanism and transcendental
freedom (or: the causality though freedom) can cohere in the same subject (as was shown in the first
Critique and which Kant mentions in the published introduction of the third Critique; 5:196), the
outcomes of mechanism and teleology can cohere.
Central to Kant's argument that these heterogeneous principles and their corresponding kinds of
representation can cohere in the same product of nature, is the idea that the outcomes of mechanism
merely involve nature, whereas the outcomes of teleology have their ground in the supersensible
realm.  Kant  writes:  “[I]t  is  just  as  necessary to  conceive of  a  kind  of  causality for  it  [i.e.  the
products of nature] that is not, unlike the mechanism of natural causes, found in nature, since to the
receptivity various and different forms than those of which matter is capable in accordance with that
mechanism there must  still  be added the spontaneity of a cause (which thus cannot  be matter)
without which no ground of those forms could be given” (5:411). We can therefore think without
contradiction, according to Kant, that both kinds of causality could produce their outcomes in nature
when the ground of the “spontaneity of a cause” is taken to be outside nature (to be possible at all).
According to Kant it is entirely undetermined how much each of these kinds of causality contributes
to the products of nature (5:415).
In the final instance (and this is my essential claim) Kant explicitly states that causality according to
final  causes  could  describe  a  real  non-deterministic  causality and  that  its  unification  with
mechanism is objectively possible. He views this as the outcome of his arguments in the Critique of
the  Teleological  Power  of  Judgment:  “for  at  least  the  possibility  that  both  [mechanism  and
teleology]  may  be  objectively  unifiable  in  one  principle  (since  they  concern  appearances  that
presuppose a supersensible ground) is secured” (5:413).  As such Kant asserts  in concluding his
arguments,  not  only  that  we  can  conceptualize  the  “possibility”  of  the  products  of  nature  in
accordance  with  two  seemingly  opposing  principles,  namely  mechanism  and  teleology  (final
causality), but also that both of these can be real although this can never be empirically confirmed.
Kant's  conception  of  final  causality  shows  how this  could  be  possible  within  the  conceptual
framework of his philosophy when applied to the study of nature. The only reason why Kant thinks
that this cannot be empirically explored, is that we as humans do not have the kind of intuition that
would be necessary to confirm it (5:416).  
According to Kant the two principles of mechanism and teleology (final causes), insofar as these
have reference to really existing causes, could be combined in a single research program only if we
allow for the existence of a supersensible realm. Since Kant thinks that there is no manner in which
the  existence  of  final  causes  could  be  empirically  confirmed,  this  aspect  of  his  philosophy of
science could be regarded as critical metaphysics. Although no dogmatic metaphysics is intended, it
is nonetheless a metaphysics. Even so, if there is a manner in which the Kantian concepts can be
taken  as  relevant  to  contemporary  physics,  his  general  conception  can  serve  as  a  theoretical
framework (hypothesis) in which both determinism and spontaneous causality (and the two kinds of
outcomes associated with them) can be reconciled in a single research program. As such one would
have to say in what sense this spontaneous causality find its application in scientific context as well
as how the supersensible realm, which serves as ground for such causality, could be accounted for.  
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3.5.2. The implications of Kant's third Critique
Kant thought that his concept of final causes is applicable both to the study of the products of nature
as well as nature itself (5:381, 388, 409 etc.). According to Kant we can think that the “maternal
womb of the earth” had an original purposiveness without which the “possibility of the purposive
form of the animal and vegetable kingdoms cannot be conceived at all” (5:420). He proposed a
theory of evolution according to  which one species  could have evolved though adaptation into
another. The alterations which species could undergo and then successfully pass on, can be judged
as “purposive potentialities” which were originally present in the fundamental constitution of the
species (5:419-20; Butts 1990:7). 
As such we can think that the design for all life on earth is present in the supersensible realm and
unfolds through time. The various “wholes” (“designs” of animals and plants) evolved out of each
other, from the most simple to the most complex, until the human noumenon (the noumenal self)
became possible (5:435). In this case the transcendental idea of freedom makes practical freedom
possible. At this point the noumenal realm which forms the substratum of nature both outside and
inside us (5:429) becomes part of Kant's moral philosophy. 
Since Darwin's theory of evolution, which proposed a purely mechanistic process of evolution, all
teleological explanation has fallen out of favour in the scientific community. But Kant's approach is
only teleological in name, not in substance. And can we assert that the products of nature are only
possible in accordance with mechanism? Would that not be a dogmatic assertion of the kind that
Kant warned against in the framework of his seventh antinomy? In Kant's critical philosophy this
door must  remain open – and he gave us the concepts that he thought could establish at least the
conceivability of an alternative kind of causality (a  non-determinate causality)  than mechanism
through which we can think that nature has the inbuilt potentiality to produce her products. 
Kant had correctly foreseen, in spite of the modernist impulse in that direction, that everything in
our world cannot be explained merely in deterministic terms. With the arrival of quantum physics
the  supremacy  of  determinism has  indeed  been  fundamentally  challenged.  In  this  regard  it  is
especially the reduction of the wave packet (mathematically expressed as the “projection postulate”)
that is taken as spontaneous, for example, in Niels Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation. Some authors
have even proposed that the reduction of the wave packet be viewed in causal terms (Cartwright
1983:182; 1989:249; Bartels 1999:S170; Pringe 2007). As such, it makes the ordered (statistical)
outcomes that are observed in quantum physics possible.  
We may ask: Is it possible that Kant's philosophy of science as presented in the third Critique can be
reinterpreted and reformulated in such a manner that it has relevance to these issues? When we take
the  Kantian conception of  “nature” as  referring to  the “classical  world”  (where  the  space-time
theories  of  relativity  apply),  his  supersensible  substratum  of  nature  as  referring  to  the  pre-
measurement “quantum world” and understand the reduction of the wave packet in some way in
terms of the spontaneous causality (potentiality) that Kant argued for, such a reinterpreted Kantian
philosophy of science may be relevant and could even contribute to contemporary physics debate.
In such an interpretation it may make sense to furthermore consider superpositions of states, which
is closely tied with the reduction of the wave packet, in terms of Kantian non-extended wholes-and-
parts. In multi-particle systems such superpositions do in fact combine elementary particles into
more comprehensive non-extended “wholes”. Establishing a sophisticated interpretation, however,
would require an in-depth and systematic study to determine whether the quantum realm adheres to
the basic characteristics that Kant ascribes to that realm.  
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The discovery that our world is not governed solely by deterministic causality has not only led to a
breakdown in the classical worldview; some philosophers of science even take this as a significant
challenge  to  the  unified  picture  of  an  ordered  world  (Van  Fraassen  2008:278-80;  Cartwright
1999:32). Friedman (2001:121) mentions the “difficulties in unifying or synthesizing the conceptual
framework of quantum mechanics with those of our best contemporary space-time theories (both
the special and the general theories of relativity)”. He bemoans the fact that the quantum revolution
has  not  invoked “ongoing traditions of meta-scientific  reflection” like those on absolute  versus
relative  motion  and  the  foundations  of  geometry  (Kant's  philosophy  was  important  in  these
reflections) that played a major role in Einstein's thinking when he formulated his theories. 
Maybe Kant's  approach in the third  Critique can help us out in providing a unified conceptual
framework in which determinism and non-determinism can be reconciled in quantum physics – in a
similar manner that the other branch of his philosophy of science stimulated scientific reflection and
theorization until the formulation of Einstein's theories. As discussed above, in Kant's philosophy of
science  in  the  third  Critique,  he  provides  clues  as  to  how  two  conflicting  principles,  namely
mechanism and final causality, or determinism and absolute spontaneity, could cohere in the same
research program. If we explore the interpretation mentioned above in which the reduction of the
wave packet is taken as the kind of effective causality that Kant conceptualized as final causes,
there is at least the possibility that not only the classical and quantum pictures of the world, but also
determinism  and  non-determinism,  can  be  reconciled  in  one  conceptual  framework  in  (a
reinterpreted) Kantian philosophy. 
When we return to biology, we can now ask whether Kant's ideas have any relevance for today. If
we allow for the application of his ideas in the framework of quantum physics as mentioned above,
this may indeed be the case. Not only is quantum decoherence used to study of the interaction
between quantum and classical systems; quantum physics plays a central role in the new field of
quantum biology. According to decoherence models in quantum physics, quantum information is
shared with the surroundings. Michel Bitbol writes: “[There is a] growing consensus, derived from
decoherence, that a material body at our scale should itself be construed as an emergent appearance
out of some sort of dispositional background” (Bitbol 2007:263). This implies that spontaneous
causality (if we regard reduction in such terms) underlies these emerging processes in biology very
much in the manner that Kant proposed. In fact, the writers of Life on the Edge: The Coming of Age
of Quantum Biology (2014) suggests that quantum processes may play a role in genetic mutations –
implying that a mechanistic approach to evolution may not be sufficient.
Although physicists and biologists may not (yet) think of a higher level of quantum complexity
which  involves  the  kind  of  potentialities  that  Kant  had  in  mind  (which  could  be  regarded  as
“plans/designs”) that become manifest in the material forms of the products of nature through this
kind of causality (in collaboration with mechanism), it is surely possible that future research could
find this. According to Kant we can think that such “designs” would evolve from basic to more
complex forms. 
3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I focus on Kant's philosophy of science as presented in the third Critique. In my view
we should not try to cast Kant's teleological approach merely in methodological terms in the sense
that nature should be regarded as if “designed” in all scientific research. I argued that Kant had
more in mind. Kant's teleology allows for the possibility that another kind of causality than the
deterministic sort may be at work in nature, namely that of final ends. He held the opinion that we
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have no choice but to regard at least some products of nature in such terms. 
I show that Kant did not merely argue for the logical possibility of such a non-deterministic kind of
causality; he also argued for its conceivability as a real effective causality operative in nature. In his
view both teleology (final causes) and mechanism may be objectively “unifiable in one principle”
(5:413). That principle is the supersensible. As such final causes can only be conceived of as really
existing (as a conceptualized potentiality) if the existence of the supersensible realm is assumed.
And this is the key question: Can we today consider this as a realistic proposal? In my view it may
be possible to consider the quantum realm as the confirmation of the supersensible realm. Although
I  have  not  presented  any  detailed  arguments  in  this  regard,  it  would  certainly  be  of  great
consequence for both our understanding of Kantian philosophy as well as the natural sciences (both
physics and biology) and the life sciences if this estimation holds. 
Although we can interpret Kant's position merely as a critical metaphysics, it seems possible that his
conceptualization could also be taken as a theoretical framework (or hypothesis) through which
determinism and spontaneity could be reconciled in a single research program. In that case one
would have to show how the Kantian concepts find application in contemporary physics. We can
explore this possibility further, which would be the topic of the next chapter.  
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4. A new Kantian interpretation of quantum physics
4.1. Introduction
A century after the paradigm shift introduced by quantum physics, physicists and philosophers of
science are still  struggling to  come to terms with the implications  of  the theory.  An important
challenge is to understand and explain how determinism and non-determinism can be reconciled in
one description of the world. 
In  the  quantum picture  of  the  world  both  our  conception  of  objects  in  space-time  as  well  as
deterministic causality as governing all  reality are challenged. In general,  the breakdown in the
picture of space-time as a Lorentzian manifold is typically associated with regions where quantum
effects become dominant (Earman 1986:188). The Aspect experiment also confirmed the violation
of  the  Bell  inequality  which  assumes  determinism as  Redhead  has  shown (Redhead  1987:89).
Redhead has also shown that the Bell inequality can be reformulated in such a manner that the
violation  thereof  even negates  what  might  be  called  “stochastic”  determinism,  that  is,  that  the
probabilities for possible values to occur are also not determined – at least in the framework of the
Lorentzian space-time manifold (Redhead 1987:83, 102/3).
It is sometimes thought that Immanuel Kant's philosophy of science played an important role in
establishing  the  supremacy  of  the  deterministic  picture  of  the  world.  Kant's  epistemology,  as
presented in the Critique of Pure Reason (the first Critique, 1781, 1787), played an important role
in  establishing  the  philosophical  foundations  of  mathematical  physics  (especially  Newton's
mathematical  physics;  Friedman  2001:10).  According  to  Kant,  experience  (and  experimental
knowledge) is only possible within the framework of space and time, with all matter in space/time
governed by deterministic causality in accordance with his second analogy.
Van Fraassen (2008) mentions that this Kantian grounding of science in time became a criterion of
completeness, i.e. that any complete description of reality would be deterministic. He writes: “As
Kant saw it, the very coherence of experience requires that it takes a form of experiencing ourselves
as living in a spatio-temporally definite causal order. The context in which physics was changing
around  1900  thus  included  a  strong  conviction,  inherited  from  classical  physics  and  modern
philosophy,  that  all  phenomena  in  nature  derive  from  an  underlying  deterministic  physics.
Determinism has become a criterion of completeness: any apparent gap in determinism so far is
filled with statistical laws, but the statistical probabilities can only be a measure of ignorance” (Van
Fraassen 2008:279). 
Although  one  could  acknowledge  that  physicists  and  philosophers  of  science  interpreted  the
Kantian epistemology in support of a deterministic picture of the world, this, however, is not the
Kantian position. Already in the second part of the first  Critique,  Kant used the third antinomy
(conflict of laws) to argue that his epistemology does not present us with a complete picture of the
world!  He  argues  that  we  can  logically  as  well  as  conceivably  (within  the  framework  of  his
philosophy – see my arguments in  the previous  chapters)  allow for  another  mode of  existence
outside nature. 
Kant  conceptualized  “nature”  as  that  mode  of  existence  governed  in  totality  by  deterministic
causality (or  just  “causality”)  – one can take it  as the “classical  world” (where the space-time
theories  of  relativity  apply;  see  note  3).  In  the  context  of  this  discussion I  take  “deterministic
causality” as applying only within the framework of proper (Lorentzian) space-time.  The other
mode  of  existence,  in  contrast,  would  be  governed  by  a  different  principle,  namely  that  of
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spontaneity or freedom. 
Kant calls this other mode of existence the “noumenal” or supersensible realm because we cannot,
according to him, gain any experiential (or experimental) access to it; we are merely able to think
about it with our understanding (“nous” in Greek). Although the conception of the noumenal realm
has traditionally been equated with Kant's moral philosophy, this, again, is not the Kantian position.
Already in the first Critique, Kant introduces this other mode of existence to allow for another kind
of effective causality, namely absolute spontaneous causality, which, although it produces effects in
nature (which is why it is called a “causality”), begins “a series of occurrences entirely from itself”
(A534/B562) without any previous causal links in any structure of causal relations. Although Kant
uses this concept of causality to argue for practical freedom, it is in itself not a practical (or moral)
concept. 
The noumenal (or supersensible) realm as well as spontaneous causality play an important role in
the philosophy of science that Kant developed in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (the third
Critique) which complements that presented in the  Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
(1786). This work provides a conceptual framework to study those appearances in nature which do
not seem to conform to the deterministic (mechanistic) picture of the world. In Kant's view non-
deterministic causality (absolute spontaneity) can be accommodated when it is assumed that it does
not have its origin in nature, but in the supersensible substratum of nature.  I argue in this chapter
that we can identify the pre-measurement “quantum world” with this realm.
What  would  a  Kantian  interpretation  of  quantum  physics  consists  of?  As  Healey  says,  “An
interpretation of quantum mechanics is an account of what the world is like if that theory is true. To
be convincing, the interpretation should explain how the observations we take to support quantum
mechanics  in  fact  do so,  given that  the  world  is  the way that  interpretation say it  is”  (Healey
2009:272). I argue that the Kantian approach can be reworked in such a manner that it accounts for
both the classical as well as the quantum pictures of the world, not only insofar as the observations
are concerned but also in understanding how they are possible. More importantly, it also allows for
a  unified  conceptual  framework  in  which  both  determinism  (deterministic  causality)  and
spontaneity (non-determinism) are reconciled. 
As a first step I show that superpositions of states should be regarded as another mode of existence,
i.e. that the “quantum mode of existence” belongs to a different ontology and is not merely some
feature of nature. Superpositions of states conform to the Kantian conditions for a supersensible
ontology: their amplitudes are irreducibly complex and as such supersensible, they are not in proper
space-time (instead an abstract mathematical space-form (in quantum mechanics) or “primitive”
space-time manifold (in quantum field theory) is introduced) and are outside nature (in their non-
extended wholes-and-parts relation). 
As  a  different  mode  of  existence  this  realm  may  be  governed  by  a  different  principle  than
deterministic  causality.  Following  Kant,  I  ascribe  absolute  spontaneity  (which  underlies  a
potentiality to actualize) to this realm. In my view this spontaneity is manifest in the framework of
the reduction of the wave packet that is associated with superpositions of states which take them to
their  individual  components  and  the  accompanying  measurable  outcomes.  I  view  reduction  in
accordance with this principle as spontaneous (“absolutely spontaneous” in the case of quantum
fields) and discontinuous. In my view this spontaneous potentiality becomes conceivable (instead of
a mere logical  possibility)  once the quantum realm is  taken as a different ontological  mode of
existence.
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In my view the Kantian conception of the supersensible realm is to be identified with the quantum
realm in the context of quantum fields.  In quantum mechanics the situation is more complex. The
reason for this is that the general description that we find in quantum fields is constrained in a
certain manner; in the Schrödinger description the quantum mode of existence is constrained in time
(see the discussion below). In quantum mechanics space and time are decoupled (when taken in
special  relativity  terms)  and time is  coupled  with  another  kind  of  mathematical  space  (Hilbert
space) which I take to in some manner represent the “quantum space” that corresponds with the
quantum mode of  existence.  Although the  quantum mode of  existence  is  constrained  within  a
temporal ordering in quantum mechanics, it is nonetheless present. 
Although  Kant  did  not  foresee  the  possibility  that  time  can  be  coupled  with  another  mode of
existence (i.e. to which can be ascribed some ideal “space” that agrees with its structural form – see
section 2.4.5), this possibility is easily accommodated in his critical philosophy. This makes his
conceptual  framework  applicable  to  quantum mechanics.  I  show  that  in  this  manner  both  the
classical and quantum descriptions in quantum mechanics can be accommodated within the Kantian
framework of nature and the supersensible realm (outside nature) respectively. 
My  interpretation  explains  many  of  the  interesting  features  of  quantum  mechanics,  like  non-
separability  and non-locality.  I  look into  the  extent  that  these  features  involve  moving beyond
proper space-time. These features are also closely connected with the Aspect experiment and the
question  of  non-determinism  in  quantum  physics.  I  discuss  the  manner  in  which  the  various
interpretations of quantum physics account for (or try to overcome) non-determinism. In the final
instance I  argue that,  although the classical  picture of the world can be successfully described
within the context of Lorentzian space-time and deterministic causality (i.e. in terms of Einstein's
theories  of  relativity),  the quantum picture requires  the conception of  quantum entities as non-
extended  wholes-and-parts  (superimposed  states)  that  are  connected  outside  proper  space-time
where another kind of causality (grounded in absolute spontaneity) governs the potentiality that
these have to be realized in space-time. 
In  the  same  way  that  Kant's  epistemology  laid  the  philosophical  foundation  for  classical
mathematical science; his philosophy of science in the third Critique could now be viewed as laying
the foundation for a  viable  interpretation of quantum physics  which does not merely bring the
classical and quantum pictures into one conceptual perspective, but which also reconcile the two
heterogeneous laws governing the two different modes of existence, namely of determinism and
absolute spontaneity, in a conceivable manner in a united conceptual framework. In my view the
two descriptions involve two different modes of existence governed by these two heterogeneous
laws – both of which should also be reconciled (if not united) in any viable interpretation.  
4.2. Reworking the Kantian approach
There are various interpretations of Kant's epistemology. I follow the two-aspect view according to
which objects may be viewed from two standpoints, namely as they appear to our senses and as we
can think them as they are in themselves. I showed in chapter 2 that things in themselves may
include noumena,  taken  as objects existing outside nature (perceivable only to  another  kind of
intuition than the sensible one; this is the essence of my third alternative interpretation). Although
the  possible  existence  of  such  noumena  in  an  ontologically  distinct  noumenal  realm is  first
introduced in  the  first  Critique,  it  is  only in  the  third  Critique that  it  becomes  part  of  Kant's
philosophy of science (see chapters 2 and 3). 
The goal that Kant set out in constructing his epistemology was to establish “objective” cognition
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through  which  the  necessary  and  universally  valid  principles  for  mathematics  and  the  natural
sciences could be established (A93/B125). In his view our discursive intellect necessitates that the
appearances that are given in perception be brought under the principles of the understanding for us
to make truth judgments. 
Although his epistemology is only applicable to our mode of existence, it is not restricted by the
crudeness  of  our  human  sensibility.  Kant  allowed  that  our  conceptual  formulations  can  in  the
progress of experience (and experiment) be applied to “possible” perceptions “in accordance with
the laws of the empirical progression”,  i.e.  “in the footsteps of cause and effect”  (A493/B521;
A495/B523). Kant has no problem that we can “observe” very small objects; he even mentions the
existence of the magnetic field force (“magnetic matter”) in this regard (A226/B273). As long as a
detailed  causal  structure  can  be  established,  scientists  can  apply  some  conceptual  structure  to
appearances given in experiment. 
In this regard it is presupposed that both our measuring instruments and the appearances that we
measure belong to the same mode of existence (both of which can be given in perception), which
Kant conceptualized as “nature”. As such they share the same space-time structure that belongs to
this mode of existence and stand (in accordance with the Kant's third analogy) in a “community” of
relations  with  each  other  that  are  governed  (in  accordance  with  Kant's  second  analogy)  by
deterministic causality (just as we stand in such a relation with the objects of experience). 
In the second part of the first Critique, Kant used the third antinomy to argue that another mode of
existence (than nature) is not merely logically possible, but can be conceptually conceived of within
his critical philosophy (see section 2.4). This is the “noumenal” or “supersensible” realm. The mode
of existence which constitutes this  realm does not  stand in any “community”  with nature; it  is
outside  nature  (taken  as  the  totality  of  causal  relations).  Since  human sensibility  cannot  reach
outside nature and we do not (according to Kant) have an intuition which allows any experience of
such a mode of existence (5:416), it is called a “supersensible” realm. This is the first characteristic
of the noumenal realm that is confirmed in the quantum mode of existence (see below). 
The supersensible mode of existence is also outside proper space and time. According to Kant we
have two forms of sensibility in which intuitions are given, namely space and time. These provide
us with the ability to perceive objects in space and time (A27/B43) and such perception (empirical
intuitions) would constitute empirical space (A57/B81, A377, A431/B459; see note 1). Although the
supersensible realm is not in space and time, we can accept that its ontologically different structure
would be reflected in something similar to and corresponding with our space-time but which is not
accessible to our forms of sensibility (see discussion in section 2.4.5). We can, therefore, in the
same manner that we construct a priori geometrical space-time forms (taken from a contemporary
perspective) which apply to our mode of existence, also construct abstract mathematical space-time
forms (that we cannot visualize, otherwise it  would be in our mode of existence) which would
correspond to the supersensible mode of existence. 
When we find that the pre-measurement quantum mode is not in proper space-time, but that we can
nonetheless ascribe some abstract mathematical space-time manifold to it (see below, in quantum
field  theory),  I  take  this  as  the  second  characteristic  of  the  noumenal  realm confirmed  in  the
quantum realm.  Since  this  space-time manifold reflects  a  different  ontological  structure (in  the
Kantian  conception  according  to  which  structural  relations  reflect  ontology)  that  stands  in  no
community with our mode of existence (see section 2.4.5, note 1), I take this as implying that the
quantum realm conforms to an ontologically different mode of existence. As such we can, without
contradiction,  allow  that  it  is  governed  by  a  different  rule  than  deterministic  causality  which
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becomes conceivable in the framework of such a supersensible realm. Absolute spontaneity may be
such a rule.  Whereas  nature is  governed by deterministic causality,  the quantum realm may be
governed by spontaneity. 
Which objects belong to the supersensible mode of existence? I previously (in chapter 2) showed
that Kant distinguishes between the objects that we may encounter in experience and those that we
can merely think of as existing outside nature. In the first Critique Kant calls this last kind “objects
of understanding” or noumena. In the third Critique he develops a more sophisticated view based on
arguments  that  such  entities  can  produce  not  merely  outcomes,  but  ordered  arrangements  of
outcomes,  within the framework of nature.  As such he cast  that mode of existence in terms of
“wholes and parts”. 
In contradistinction with material wholes which are explained by the causal relation between the
component parts (the parts determine the whole), Kant conceptualizes the idea of non-extended
wholes and parts (existing in the supersensible realm outside space and time) according to which
such wholes (and their parts) serve as ground and condition for the material parts and their internal
arrangement  (the  whole  determines  the  parts,  see  section  3.4;  Allison  2012:203;  McLaughlin
1990:129). In this case the non-extended wholes and parts are connected outside nature in such a
manner that the parts are mutually the cause and effect of each other in the production of the parts
that  form the  material  whole.  I  argue  below that  the  quantum mode  of  existence  can  also  be
characterized in these terms when superpositions of states are regarded as non-extended wholes-
and-parts which produce a particular arrangement of outcomes where the states (parts) mutually
produce “each other” (even non-locally) in multi-particle systems. 
Kant casts these wholes-and-parts in the framework of a concept of causality, according to which
such non-extended wholes and parts, which exist outside nature in the supersensible substratum of
nature, would produce its effects within the framework of nature. He calls this “final causality” in
analogy to the  accomplishment  of  human ends.  This  kind  of  causality is  viewed as  a  kind  of
capacity (potentiality)  to  produce certain outcomes in nature.  In this  regard this  ideal  causality
(which we can merely think of) is grounded on the concept of spontaneous causality which can
without contradiction be ascribed to the noumenal realm as was first discussed in the first Critique
(see chapter 3). The concept of final causality is therefore also called a “spontaneity of a cause” in
the third Critique (5:411). This is not merely a logical possibility; it is conceptualized as something
that may conceivably really exist in the context of the supersensible realm. In my interpretation of
quantum physics the reduction of the wave packet is understood in accordance with this kind of
causality.
In this manner two kinds of appearance are possible in the framework of nature, originating from
the  objects  of  nature  and  noumena  respectively,  and  produced  in  accordance  with  these  two
heterogeneous principles (deterministic  and absolute  spontaneous causality).  The first  is  merely
those appearances that belong to the causal structures of nature (which stand under the principles of
the understanding); the second is grounded in the supersensible realm but produced in nature. These
correspond with the two kinds  of  appearances  that  we observe in experiment,  namely those in
accordance with deterministic causality (even when regarded in stochastic terms) and those which
result from the reduction of the wave packet. When we regard the reduction of the wave packet as
an  event  in  accordance  with  spontaneous  causality,  then  these  appearances  reflect  the  Kantian
distinction. 
In  total  we  can  distinguish  five  essential  characteristics  of  the  supersensible  realm  in
contradistinction with nature, namely that it is 1) supersensible, 2) outside space-time, 3) noumenal
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entities  are  conceptualized  as  non-extended  wholes-and-parts  existing  outside  nature,  4)  two
heterogeneous principles govern the two modes of existence 5) two kinds of appearances can be
discerned accordingly. The first three characteristics distinguish it as another mode of existence, i.e.
as belonging to another ontology, the fourth involves the basic principle associated with that mode
of existence. I will now show that these characteristics are confirmed in the quantum realm when
we take superpositions of states as the supersensible mode of existence.  
There  is,  however,  an  important  manner  in  which  I  rework  the  Kantian  program.  Kant  never
envisioned the possibility that time could be combined, not with space, but with that “ideal” space
which reflects the structural form of the supersensible mode of existence. There is no reason why
time cannot also be logically and conceivably combined with the supersensible mode of existence –
which would then be partially constrained in time. I argue that this is what we find in quantum
mechanics  where  the  superposition  of  states  are  described  in  Hilbert  space,  with  the  quantum
system constrained in time. The result of this reworking of the Kantian system is that we can gain
partial access to the supersensible realm – something that Kant did not think possible. One can even
argue that this change makes another kind of intuition possible that Kant did not foresee, which
would enable us to have some kind of experience of the supersensible realm (see note 2). 
4.3. The quantum realm is supersensible
The one feature that uniquely characterizes all quantum systems is “superposition of states”. This is
something that we do not find in any classical system. What is a superposition of states? Albert
writes: “Electrons seem to have modes of being, or modes of moving, available to them which is
quite unlike what we know how to think about. The name of that new mode (which is just a name
for something we don't  understand) is  superposition” (Albert  1992:11). In quantum physics the
various possible states of physical systems (i.e. physical objects or collections of objects), which are
mathematically expressed as “state vectors” (or wave functions), are entangled in such a manner
that they cannot be individually distinguished without some loss in information. This entanglement
of states is called “superposition of states” and the possibility of superimposing two states to form
another is  reflected in quantum mechanics by the possibility of adding or subtracting two such
vectors (Albert 1992:30).
All physical systems have both intrinsic properties like mass and charge (which determine the kind
of object) as well as variable or state-dependent properties (like position, momentum, spin, velocity,
energy), which are called “observables” in quantum physics. They are represented by operators on
the state space (the state space includes all the possible states of the system). Such representations
would  describe  the  physical  system  in  terms  of  some  property,  for  example  the  position  or
momentum representation. Various representations of the same physical situation is possible which
is invariant among transformations between such representations (Healey 2009:xvi).  
There is a fundamental difference between quantum and classical properties, which is also reflected
in their mathematical formalization (Cartwright 1999:217). Even though the quantum properties of
the system are called “observables” and they (in the relevant cases) assign a discrete spectrum of
possible  eigenvalues  to  the  superimposed states  in  reference  to  probable  outcomes,  neither  the
superpositions of states nor their properties are in fact observable in experiment. As Van Fraassen
says, quantum properties are merely a “theoretically described” reality which can never be given in
experiment (Van Fraassen 2008:299). Quantum systems  as such have no eigenvalues; they only
have  amplitudes.  To  realize  some  eigenvalue,  another  condition  is  required,  namely  classical
realization  (Auyang 1995:79)  when the reduction  of  the wave packet  produces  a  reduced state
associated with an eigenvalue (taken on the individual level).  
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The reason why quantum properties cannot be given in experiment, is that the amplitudes associated
with them are complex quantities while our instruments can only measure real numbers.  Whereas
some  complex  quantities  can  be  decomposed  into  real  and  imaginary  parts,  which  could  be
separately represented by real numbers, this is not the case with these quantum values. They are
“irreducibly complex”, they cannot be decomposed into real and imaginary parts (they have no real
parts) (Auyang 1995:73). 
Auyang  (1995),  who  discusses  this  aspect  of  quantum  physics  in  some  detail,  regards  such
irreducibility complex values as outside the possibility of human perception.  In this  regard she
formulates  a  criterion  which  serves  to  decide  what  falls  within  the  bounds  of  our  form  of
perception, namely that we must be able to map object structures into a real number system or its
direct products (which is possible, for example, when a complex number is decomposable into real
and imaginary parts). Her arguments in this regard is that perception involves the ability to visualize
which is not possible with regard to irreducibly complex numbers.
This irreducible complexity of the quantum states (superposition of states) and their amplitudes, as
well  as  the  amplitudes  of  the  quantum properties,  implies  that  they  are  beyond our  ability  of
representation in perception. They can therefore never be empirically given in experiment (which is
always representable in perception). Auyang writes in this regard: “In stipulating that quantities
admissible as measured results  [i.e.  eigenvalues] must be real numbers, quantum theories make
explicit a general limit to human empirical capabilities. The general form of our sensible capacity is
representability by real numbers... Eigenvalues are numerical and fall within the bounds of our form
of perception, whereas quantum amplitudes do not” (Auyang 1995:72; 81). The reduction of the
wave packet takes the system from such irreducibly complex amplitudes to eigenstates which are
associated with measurable real eigenvalues. 
Although  the  superpositions  of  states  and  their  accompanying  quantum  properties  cannot  be
empirically given in experiment, they do exist in reality since they can be physically manipulated
with observable effects. One can say, as Auyang does, that they are “kickable”. This means that the
quantum state (and its properties) is “a genuine feature of reality” (Cartwright 1999:232). But since
no direct measurement of quantum quantities is possible, this mode of existence is clearly not the
classical  one.  We  can  therefore  think  that  superpositions  of  states  embody  another  mode  of
existence than the classical one, a mode which is beyond the reach of our human sensibility and is
as such supersensible.  
The  unmeasurable  (“supersensible”)  aspect  of  entities  in  the  pre-measurement  quantum  mode
represents a change in ontology that is widely recognized. This is especially problematic in the case
of entities which constitute quantum fields where field theorists have no clear idea as to what new
ontology should replace the classical one (Bartels 1999). Healey writes in this regard: “[Whereas
there  is  a  problem with]  quantum particle  theories  insofar  as  they leave  it  quite  unclear  what
properties  the  particles  have  and  when  they have  them,  the  problem becomes  much  worse  in
quantum field theory. For a quantum field theory removes even the basic particle ontology, while
leaving it quite unclear what is to replace it” (Healey 2009:221). 
4.4 The quantum realm is not in space-time
Another  important  feature of  quantum physics,  is  that  the  space-time manifold associated with
quantum states is distinctly different from the space-time that we know. In quantum physics abstract
mathematical  space-time  (or:  space)  replaces  proper  space-time.  Before  discussing  this  in  the
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framework of Auyang's interpretation of quantum field theory, which in my opinion closely agrees
with the Kantian position, I first focus on the restricted case where the pre-measurement quantum
mode is constrained in time, namely quantum mechanics. 
In contrast with the classical picture where particles can be described in terms of both time and
space, in quantum mechanics the entities (in superpositions of states) could be described in time but
not in space. They are described as mathematical objects (represented by state vectors or wave
functions) in  a  mathematical  space,  called a Hilbert  space (which is  also the state  space).  The
problem is to understand this space which is clearly not the kind of space associated with classical
particles.  Earman expresses  this  frustration  vividly when he  says  that  the  path  of  the  physical
system is located in a Hilbert space, “which resides in Plato's heaven or wherever it is that Hilbert
spaces reside” (Earman. 1986:203). 
4.4.1 Hilbert space
The  main  problem  is  that  in  quantum  physics  the  Hilbert  spaces  are  complex  vector  spaces
(Cartwright 1999:217). Although there have been efforts to describe quantum mechanics in a real
Hilbert space (as was done independently by Mackey and Stueckelberg), these formulations merely
make the complex nature of Hilbert space implicit, it does not remove it (Auyang 1995:74). The
reason why the complex nature of Hilbert spaces is important, is that it reflects something about the
nature  of  the  quantum entities  associated  with  that  space-form if  we  interpret  state  spaces  as
reflecting the kind of the entities to which it belongs (as Auyang 1995:65 argues). As such we can
take the Hilbert space as reflecting the ontology of the quantum state which has irreducibly complex
amplitudes (in line with the Kantian view that space reflects ontology) and can regard it as in some
manner reflecting the “quantum space” associated with quantum entities. 
In this reading the complex nature of Hilbert spaces is merely a mathematical expression of the fact
that  quantum states  with  their  complex  amplitudes  cannot  be  represented  in  our  space. When
entities cannot be represented in space they are not visualizable since this involves our ability to
spatialize. In the Kantian approach, the representability of objects in space is closely associated with
human perception which involves the ability to visualize objects in space (time is visualized as a
line). For Kant this presents the limits of both human sensibility and understanding. 
When entities cannot be visualized (i.e. their object structure cannot be mapped into a real number
system – Auyang 1995:72), and therefore cannot be presented in space,  they belong to a different
mode of  existence  than that  which  is  accessible  in  sensibility.  They are  supersensible  (see  the
previous section) and outside space and as such they are difficult to understand. 
Although the quantum state as it is in itself cannot be presented in space, some appearance thereof
in terms of observable properties is nonetheless possible. Mathematically this is described by the
representations of the quantum state (through linear operators on the Hilbert space) insofar as these
involve a prescription of the eigenstates associated with the property as well as their eigenvalues
and the probability of these appearing in  observation.  When we conceive of the quantum state
merely in terms of its possible outcomes, we can say that it occupies some “probability” space; this,
however,  does  not  describe  the  quantum mode  of  existence  but  merely its  appearance  (in  the
classical  mode  of  existence)  in  experiment.  In  this  manner  the  position  representation  would
describe the space-time points (regions) where the particle(s) could be found in measurement. In
reference to this  actualization in space-time, Bitbol (2007:258) says: “[In quantum physics] the
objectified  structures  are  state  vectors  or  wave  functions  in  a  Hilbert  space,  and  the  situated
appearances are experimental events occurring in ordinary space-time”. 
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What is strange about quantum mechanics, is that although the quantum state is not in space, it is
nonetheless evolving in time. In the move from classical to quantum mechanics, the new description
entails the combining of time with mathematical space (i.e. Hilbert space) instead of the coordinates
of  ordinary  space  as  before.  In  this  regard  space  and  time  are  not  merely independent  (as  in
Newtonian physics); they are decoupled when viewed in terms of special relativity and time is then
coupled  with  that  space  associated  with  quantum  states.  The  only  relation  between  time  and
ordinary space that is retained, is the position representation which tells us what possible position
values  the  system  may  have  upon  measurement  (time  is  a  parameter  while  position  is  an
observable). 
The  time  framework  in  the  quantum  mechanical  description  is  taken  from  the  Hamiltonian
formulation  which  is  incorporated  in  the  Schrödinger  equation.  One can  view the  Schrödinger
equation  as  extending  the  classical  time  framework  into  quantum  physics.  As  such  the  most
important  contribution  of  the  time  framework  is  that  it  allows  the  quantum system to  evolve
continuously  in  time  which  in  turn  allows  for  the  deterministic  propagation  of  causes  in  this
framework. The time parameter therefore allows the introduction of classical characteristics to the
quantum system: the time evolution of the superposition of states is governed by deterministic laws
which subject  the  state  vector  to  given forces  and constraints  in  a  manner  similar  to  classical
equations of motion (Albert 1992:34). 
We can read the time parameter as placing a (classical) constraint on the quantum mode (which is
then in some manner constrained to be in time but not in space). The dynamic evolution of the
quantum system, which is made possible through the time framework, constrains the superposition
of states to evolve in a certain manner in time. In the quantum fields description (see below), the
quantum  system  is  not  constrained  in  this  manner.  In  placing  this  constraint  (through  the
introduction of the time framework) on the quantum system, classical characteristics are effectively
included with the quantum mode in one description. The classical characteristics are manifest in the
deterministic evolution in time of the superposition of states which belong to the quantum mode of
existence. 
This strange combination of classical characteristics with the quantum mode of existence in one
system is reflected in the way in which quantum particles differ from their classical counterparts.
They are not situated in space-time like classical particles; they do, however, retain some definite
classical  characteristics  (deterministic  evolution)  due  to  their  continuous  time  evolution  which
disappears in the quantum fields description. When compared with the quantum fields description,
on the other hand, where quantum entities have no classical particle characteristics at all, we can
view  the  ascription  of  such  semi-classical  characteristics  to  those  entities  in  the  quantum
mechanical description as a constraint on their ontology, i.e. they are constrained to evolve in a
certain manner in time in the Schrödinger description. Quantum mechanics describes an in-between
world where the classical and quantum modes of existence meet. 
4.4.2 Space-time in quantum field theory
When we move from quantum mechanics to quantum field theory, the space-time manifold that
belongs to special relativity is reintroduced (now both time and space are parameters). But what
does it mean? As in all these matters, this depends on our interpretation thereof. In this regard I
found Auyang's (1995) formulation and interpretation of quantum field theory (which is grounded
on a Kantian approach) of special relevance to the present discussion. 
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Auyang  first  distinguishes  free  matter  fields as  idealized  components  of  interaction  fields,  i.e.
interaction  is  neglected  (she  later  reintroduces  it;  Auyang  1995:129,  158).  She  then  takes  the
idealized  free  local  fields  as  representing  the  basic  quantum entities  in  such fields  (which  are
analyzable into local fields and their interactions; Auyang 1995:129, 158). As such these local fields
correspond with the state vectors in the quantum mechanical description; the coupling between
them corresponds with the introduction of superpositions (Teller 1995:104) which was previously
described in terms of adding and subtracting vectors (in the vector formulation). The entities in the
quantum fields are conceptualized as existing (with identities) before any definite descriptions of
their qualities (properties) through (so-called “creation” and “annihilation”) operators on their state
space are introduced (similar to such descriptions of quantum states in quantum mechanics; Auyang
1995:170-2). 
The entities that Auyang is concerned with are the “basic entities or individuals of the physical
world” which are “extensionless in all four dimensions” (they have no space or time parts) even
though they could be indexed in the framework of a “primitive” space-time manifold M (Auyang
1995:123, 129). These include elementary entities like electrons,  but not field quanta. She calls
these entities “events” to express the fact that their indexing in M involves both space and time (as
such they have the potentiality to be realized in space-time). These “events” should not be confused
with what is normally understood by events in space-time. (If Auyang's Kantian approach is not
taken into consideration, it is difficult to understand her view; see Bartels 1999, Healey 2009:202).
 
In  the  same  manner  that  the  association  of  quantum  states  in  quantum  mechanics  with  a
mathematical space (Hilbert space) reflect their quantum ontology, the entities in quantum fields are
associated with a primitive space-time manifold that reflects their ontology (in the quantum mode of
existence) before any definite qualities are expressed in ordinary space-time (Auyang 1995:183).
According to Auyang, the primitive space-time manifold M is not something existing apart from the
quantum entities; it reflects the structure of the real world of quantum entities (events). She writes:
“Space-time is a structural property of the fields [i.e. field entities], not the other way round. This
agrees  with  the  common sense notion  that  the basic  ontology is  a  thing,  not  a  spatial  region”
(Auyang 1995:150). 
The spatio-temporal structure M, in it's “coordinate-free [i.e. representation free] form, contains no
explicit relations. It lacks notions such as contiguity, orientation, distance, extension, and all metric
notions”  (Auyang  1995:134).  It  is  four  dimensional  and  sets  of  four  indexes  are  required  to
coordinate it. Insofar as time is concerned, M is “too primitive to confer special meaning on the
time dimension... M is not in time; it is all time. More correctly, it is the condition for the possibility
of introducing the time parameter and the notion of being 'in time'... [it] is independent of temporal
concepts. It contains the time dimension as one aspect and makes possible the introduction of the
time parameter, but is itself beyond time and change” (Auyang 1995:170; my accentuation). Only
once events are  actualized in some manner,  are  they represented mathematically as timelike or
spacelike curves which are generated by mapping some part  of a real  number system onto the
manifold M (Auyang 1995:171). This introduces constraints on the quantum mode; the quantum
mechanical description involves such constrained conditions.  
There are two aspects of Auyang's notion of “events” in M that are of importance to the present
discussion, namely that these entities are conceptualized as existing beyond our representation of
them and that (as such) their mode of existence is not in proper space-time; they are, however, “free
to  choose  their  own  convention  in  expressing  definite  qualities”  (Auyang  1995:183).  This
corresponds with the manner in which quantum states in quantum mechanics are conceptualized as
existing in a Hilbert space beyond any representation of them (which characterizes their properties).
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I  take this  description of quantum fields,  instead of the quantum mechanical  one,  as  the more
suitable  description  of  my  conception  of  a  “quantum  mode  of  existence”  since  no  classical
constraints are placed on it. For me the quantum mechanical description represents a constrained
subsystem of that conception, for example, when such a state is represented in the Schrödinger
formulation as evolving in time. As such the quantum mode of existence (in the fields description)
does not merely stand in contrast  with the classical mode of existence; it  can also be sensibly
compared with Kant's supersensible realm which is outside space and time.  
Auyang's  formulation  explicitly  builds  upon  the  Kantian  conceptual  framework  in  which
appearances  (representations) of objects  are  distinct  from the objects  as  they are in  themselves
(Auyang 1995:99-100). In the framework of my third alternative in Kantian interpretation, we can
distinguish in this regard between the transcendental object and noumena (see section 2.4.2). When
we consider the everyday objects of experience, Kant says that we have a direct awareness of their
reality. As the ground of those appearances which stand under the principles of understanding, it is
conceptualized in the Kantian system as the “transcendental object”, which does not refer to any
particular object; it is the completely undetermined thought of the object of sensible intuition in
general which is the same for all appearances (A251, A253). 
In  the  case  of  noumena,  on the  other  hand,  there  is  a  gap between the  appearances  in  nature
associated with these objects and the objects themselves which exist outside space/time (and nature)
in a supersensible realm and are the spontaneous cause behind the associated appearances. Although
Auyang does not distinguish between the transcendental object and noumena (or even mentions
these),  it  is  immediately clear  that  Kant's  conception of  noumena corresponds closely with her
conception of extensionless objects (events) in quantum fields. Just as is the case with noumena in
the supersensible realm, the quantum mode of existence is also supersensible and outside space-
time (replacing space/time) in the case of quantum field theory, whereas the appearances caused by
these quantum entities are in space-time. 
4.5 The quantum realm is outside nature
The existence of the quantum mode outside space-time has serious implications for the manner in
which we conceive of the entities in that mode of existence. We can now consider the entities that
belong to the quantum mode in more detail and ask how they differ from those existing in the
classical  mode?  From a  Kantian  perspective  things  can  only  consist  of  matter  if  they  can  be
presented in some manner in space/time (matter constitutes that which exist in the framework of the
divisibility of space). This means that entities that belong to the quantum mode of existence (when
they are in that mode of existence), do not consist of matter. They are not aggregated wholes which
can be divided into smaller parts to which properties can be individually ascribed. 
4.5.1 Wholes-and-parts
We can distinguish between aggregated wholes that exist in space-time and non-aggregated wholes
(wholes-and-parts)  existing  in  the  quantum realm in the  same way that  Kant  does  in  the  third
Critique. As  such the  superimposed  states  are  taken  as  the  parts  that  together  form entangled
superpositions of states or wholes. As in Kant's conception, these parts and wholes are non-extended
(i.e they do not occupy proper space-time; section 4.4). This means that these wholes-and-parts
cannot as such be individualized as extended entities in space-time; it is not possible to map real
numbers  onto  the  individual  superimposed  states.  We can,  nonetheless,  conceptualize quantum
entities in terms of parts and wholes, i.e. as wholes-and-parts. 
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In  calling  the  non-aggregated  wholes  “wholes-and-parts”,  I  try to  capture  something about  the
interwoven nature of such entities. In quantum physics the superposition of states, which I take as
the basic feature of the quantum mode of existence, makes the superimposed states possible (insofar
as they exist in that mode as physical states) as states that cannot be individually distinguished
empirically – neither as states of a single particle nor that of multi-particle systems. Even in the case
where the system is comprised of fundamental entities like electrons, for example when the electron
cloud of the helium atom is considered,  it  cannot  be decomposed into well-defined states with
measurable properties (Albert 1992:49). The states in such multi-particle systems are said to be
“nonseparable” (in contrast with the “mixtures” produced after the reduction of the wave packet). 
As long as the parts (states) are not individualized (in experiment), variable properties cannot be
assigned  to  them individually  (i.e.  locally  in  a  spatial  region).  This  is  confirmed  by the  EPR
experiments which tested for hidden variables, i.e. variables (properties) which are supposed to be
hidden because they cannot be directly measured or controlled. According to a paper by Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen (1935;  EPR) the  individual  quantum states  should  already possess  values
associated with these variables before they are measured in experiment. Using the proof developed
by Bell, the EPR experiments, especially that done by Aspect, confirmed that such variables do not
exist. 
In quantum physics we can conceptually distinguish the different states that belong to the entity or
entities simultaneously, both in single and multi-particle systems. Although these states cannot be
realized  in  space-time and their  existence  demonstrated  empirically,  they can in  principle  exist
physically in the quantum mode of existence. We can therefore think that they exist as real, albeit
non-individualizable, parts in the whole. This, however, is not the classical mode of existence in
which properties can individually be ascribed to these parts. From our human perspective, they can
only be regarded in terms of their possible realization. 
When  we take  the  superimposed  states  as  the  parts  that  constitute  the  whole,  we broaden  the
Kantian conception where parts refer to fundamental entities. Kant took Leibniz's monads as point
of departure for his concept of noumena (Cicovacki 2010:85; Friedman 2010:243); he regards them
in the third  Critique as  non-extended fundamental  parts  which  together  comprise  supersensible
wholes. In his reinterpretation of Leibniz's view in  Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
these parts of are even called simples: “[T]he composite of things in themselves must certainly
consist of the simple, for the parts must here be given prior to all composition . But the composite in
the appearance does not consist of the simple, because in the appearance, which can never be given
otherwise than as composed (extended), the parts can only be given through division, and thus not
prior to the composite, but only in it” (Kant 2004:4:507-8). At bottom, in multi-particle systems it is
in fact these fundamental entities (through their states) that are coupled into wholes-and-parts as
Kant proposed. 
The main feature of such wholes-and-parts are that they are beyond our sensible reach and as such
Kant concluded that, although we can think them, we are nonetheless not able to understand them
(see section 3.4.3). In this regard his view prefigured (motivated?) that of Bohr who recognized the
limitations of the use of our classical concepts which would not be definable in quantum context.
Bohr, for example, accentuated the unknowability of quantum properties before the reduction of the
wave packet which he grounded in its undefinability (Redhead 1987:50). 
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4.5.2 Non-locality
The wholes-and-parts that we (conceptually) associate with superpositions of states of multi-particle
systems are not only non-extended and non-separable; they are also not linked (coupled) within the
space-time framework even in the quantum mechanical description. This becomes clear when we
consider the mathematical (vector) formulation of such wholes-and-parts, namely as a product of
state vectors in Hilbert space. As such the relation between the wholes-and-parts are independent of
the distance between the different entities involved; it is also independent of time. Proper space and
time do not enter in any manner in this description of the relation between the state vectors which
means that the physics described by this formulation (i.e. non-separability) is independent of space-
time; it operates outside proper space-time.  
The relations between the wholes-and-parts are not governed by proper  space-time. The relations
between the parts are not structured in proper space (insofar as they are in complex Hilbert space);
the relation between the parts  are not  dependent  on time either  (the time framework does not
govern the relation between the parts, only the dynamic evolution of the system as a whole is in
time). This means that the relations between wholes-and-parts are not merely outside proper space
(see section 4.4.1); these relations exist in fact  outside space-time (its time-independent nature is
implicit  in the theory) even though the superposition of states on the whole is constrained in a
certain manner in time. We can view the dynamics described by the Schrödinger equation as placing
a certain constraint on the whole-and-parts description given by the product of state vectors. 
Although the quantum mode is constrained in time insofar as its dynamic evolution is concerned,
the quantum mode itself insofar as the internal relations of its wholes-and-parts are concerned are
not presentable in space-time. Wholes-and-parts are internally related and linked outside space-time
within the quantum mode of existence. Their relation is not that between aggregated parts in space-
time,  but  between  non-extended,  non-separable  parts  outside  space-time  to  which  measurable
properties cannot be individually (i.e. locally in some spatial region) ascribed (that would be to
allow for “hidden variables”). In that sense they are in fact beyond space-time similar to what is
specified  for  entities  in  quantum  fields  which  exist  outside  proper  space-time  before  their
realization in space-time. 
The rules governing spatio-temporal relations between objects only apply insofar as objects are in
fact  related  to  each  other  in  space  and  time.  In  Kant's  epistemology  the  principles  of  the
understanding (which govern objective cognition) only apply to appearances in space and time.
Even  Kant's  second  analogy  which  governs  temporal  relations  between  appearances  given  in
perception, presupposes spatial relations since both the material and formal (i.e. spatial relations)
aspects of perception are synthesized together into unified perceptions which are brought under the
rules of the principles of the understanding. 
When spatial and temporal relations between objects or parts of objects are, however suspended,
these principles (rules) are also suspended. Insofar as wholes-and-parts in quantum physics exist
outside space-time, those classical rules guided by deterministic causality, do not apply to them.
They are not deterministically connected insofar as that principle is restricted to Lorentzian space-
time in the framework of special relativity. One can say that the lawful regularity that we assign to
theoretical  terms  that  denote  the  properties  of  objects  consisting  of  matter  (in  space),  is  not
applicable to quantum systems (Earman 1996:94). (This obviously does not mean that theoretical
formulations, such as the product of state vectors, cannot be used to describe physics beyond space-
time although in that case we are restricted in our understanding of the reality described).  
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In quantum systems the wholes-and-parts are non-extended and their interrelatedness very different
from classical parts and wholes (via non-separability). This difference is not only reflected in the
relations between wholes-and-parts being outside proper space-time, it is also reflected in the fact
that there is no community between these different kinds of wholes existing in these different modes
of existence. This is manifest in the fact that we cannot access that realm experimentally (even if we
could bring the infinity of deterministic relations in nature into account) since there are no real
wholes or parts (with real amplitudes) that can commune with our mode of existence. This means
that  the  pre-measurement  quantum  mode  (in  quantum  mechanics  one  would  say,  the  internal
relations governing wholes-and-parts)  is outside nature – the causal relation which governs our
mode of existence (nature) do not extend to the quantum realm. 
Wholes-and-parts are not causally connected!  This is also the Kantian position in the third Critique,
namely that the wholes-and-parts that belong to the supersensible realm are outside nature, and
therefore  not  regulated  by  deterministic  causality.  As  such  deterministic  causality  (called
“mechanism” when applied to nature as a whole) does not apply to the internal relation between
wholes-and-parts.  Whereas  (deterministic)  causality  regulates  the  relation  between  aggregated
wholes consisting of parts  in space/time,  Kant  conceptualized another  kind of relation between
these wholes-and-parts, in which the parts are together the cause and the effect of their realization in
the framework of material wholes.  
This interpretation is supported by the EPR experiments. In this case two particles produced by
some source, which do not have well-defined spins, travel in opposite paths along the two arms of
the apparatus. When the spin of the one particle is measured, the other is immediately determined,
i.e. even though there is no time for the two outcomes to communicate their results. The interaction
between the entities is therefore not something that happens locally in space or time. This allows us
to say, as Albert does, that “the assumption that the physical workings of the world are invariably
local must (astonishingly) be false” (Albert 1992:69). 
Since the Bell  proof  involves the hidden assumption of deterministic  causality as  Redhead has
demonstrated,  the  experiments  also  proved  false  the  idea  that  everything  in  the  world  is
deterministically connected  (Redhead 1987:90).  Redhead also  formulated  a  version  of  the  Bell
inequality that is not dependent on local hidden variables and showed that the violation thereof
negates even “stochastic” determinism, by which I mean that even stochastic causal links between
the entities are dismissed (Redhead 1987:83, 103). 
Non-separability  (as  described  by the  product  of  state  vectors)  is  not  merely  characterized  as
operating outside proper space-time; it immediately implies that determinism (as defined above) is
also  not  applicable  in  such  contexts.  The  non-locality  demonstrated  by the  Aspect  experiment
involves giving up on determinism. All interpretations of quantum mechanics can agree that non-
separability as  described by the product  of  state  vectors  is  independent  of  space-time and that
deterministic causality does not apply to the extent that this concept is taken to apply only within
Lorentzian space-time (there is still the possibility that we may think of determinism in other terms,
for example, in the Bohm interpretation; see below).
When  we  regard  the  arrangement  of  the  EPR  experiments  in  the  context  of  my  Kantian
interpretation, we can say on the one hand that the dynamic evolution of the superposition of states
in the time framework is in accordance with deterministic causality (because it is continuous in
time). The internal whole-and-parts relations between the states of the two entities in the two arms
of the apparatus,  on the other  hand,  insofar as  they are situated outside space (they cannot  be
presented as continuously connected in space; we can only ascribe some mathematical space to
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them) and are independent of time (i.e. the interaction happens across a temporal gap; Cartwright
1989:249), are not governed by such causality. 
Since  the  whole-and-parts  connection  is  not  in  space  it  is  independent  of  spatial  relations  and
distance; since its internal relation is independent of time it is also not constrained to be continuous
in  time.  As such the relations  between the wholes-and-parts  are  not  governed by deterministic
causality which I take (with Redhead) as being restricted to the space-time framework. As such, the
wholes-and parts also do not stand in any community with the objects of our mode of existence (for
this it has to be part of the causal network of nature). This allows us to say, without contradiction,
that they belong to another mode of existence where deterministic causality does not apply. As such
their  internal relation operates non-causally and non-locally just  as is indeed found in the EPR
experiments. 
We can understand the results of the EPR experiments as not merely confirming quantum non-
locality,  but  more  specifically  that  such  wholes-and-parts  exist (there  is  obviously  a  real
connectedness  between the  states  of  the  quantum entities)  and that  this  whole-and-parts  is  not
locally  in  space-time.  The  states  of  the  two  entities  exist  as  wholes-and-parts  that  cannot  be
individualized (localized) in space; they are connected non-locally (i.e. outside space-time). As such
they exist outside nature where deterministic rules do not apply.  In Kantian terms we can say that
the superimposed mode of existence is not in nature and is therefore not guided by deterministic
causality in any relations between the whole-and-parts. 
In quantum mechanics, where time and Hilbert space are coupled in one system, we can ascribe
deterministic  causality  to  the  system's  evolution  in  time  (the  time  framework  incorporates  the
classical characteristics), but we cannot do so regarding the internal relations between its states
(which are in the quantum mode of existence). Since classical characteristics are combined with
quantum  modes  in  quantum  mechanics,  two  heterogeneous  rules  are  brought  together  in  one
system. The deterministic causality that is associated with the classical mode of existence does not
carry over to the internal relation between the wholes-and-parts in the quantum mode of existence. 
4.5.3 Quantum probabilities
The outcomes of measurement can now be understood in terms of parts and wholes. The reason for
this is clear: although the quantum and classical modes of existence are described very differently in
terms  of  parts  and  wholes,  they  are  nonetheless  both  describable  in  such  terms.  Whereas
superpositions of states can be conceptualized in terms of non-aggregated wholes-and-parts, the
outcomes  of  measurement  involve  aggregated  wholes  defined  in  terms  of  probabilities  in
accordance with the Born postulate (the individual outcomes form an aggregated whole as in all
probability formulations). 
Since definite values cannot be assigned to pre-measurement states in superposition, the outcomes
are  accordingly  not  determined  by such  values;  they  are  given  probabilistically.  In  fact,  since
causality (even stochastic causal links) does not extend from the classical mode to the quantum
mode (see above), there is an ontological gap between the non-aggregated wholes-and-parts in the
quantum mode and the aggregated parts and wholes that obtain in measurement in the classical
mode; a gap that can only be crossed probabilistically. 
We should,  however,  not  think  of  the  outcomes of  quantum measurements  merely in  terms  of
probabilities of possibilities (possible outcomes judged probabilistically). Quantum measurements
do not merely involve a possibility of outcomes judged in terms of probabilities – which can also
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refer to many possible transitions and (re)arrangements among the parts of an aggregated whole in
space-time. Such probabilities only involve objects in space. It is merely concerned with the relation
between two situations in space, namely before and after the outcome for which the probability is
calculated. In contrast, in quantum measurements there is a transition from a non-aggregated whole
in the quantum mode of existence outside nature to outcomes as part of an aggregated whole in the
classical  mode  of  existence  in  nature.  What  is  needed  in  this  case  is  some description  which
captures the capacity or potentiality (not merely the possibility) to produce outcomes in accordance
with certain probabilities.  
The idea of viewing quantum systems in terms of potentialities goes back to Heisenberg's later
writings. He invoked the Aristotelian idea of potentiality, namely that all change consists in the
actualization of potentialities, to describe the relation between the quantum state and its outcomes.
Margenau also thought in terms of propensities or latent quantities, i.e. that the measurement of an
observable converts latent values into possessed values (Redhead 1987:48). More recently Hughes
(1989) presented an event interpretation of quantum mechanics in which quantum properties are
replaced by “latencies”. When a particular latency is ascribed to a quantum system, probabilities are
assigned to  the  values  of  a  family of  observables  which  would  be realized  in  events  (Hughes
1989:309). Teller (1995), who also understands superimposed (i.e. quantum) properties in terms of
propensities, applies such concepts to quantum fields. 
Although potentiality or propensity captures something about the capacity of the quantum state to
produce its outcomes, it does not necessarily capture what happens when two different modes of
existence are involved in the process (the concept of potentiality can still apply to changes within
the same mode of existence). When such potentialities are not viewed as existing outside nature,
non-locality cannot be accounted for even when the quantum outcomes are viewed in terms of
potentiality and actualization. The reason for this is that such potentiality would then be situated in
the proper space-time manifold where such non-locality is in conflict with determinism. Even in the
Bohm  interpretation,  where  non-locality  is  viewed  in  terms  of  action-at-a-distance,  a  certain
potential  (the  “quantum  potential”)  that  is  not  in  proper  space  (it  is  in  an  abstract  so-called
“configuration”  space),  is  necessary  to  complete  the  picture  (Hiley  2010).  In  this  case  the
interaction between the particles, which are thought to be in space-time, happens through “action-
at-a-distance” made possible by the quantum potential.  
This means that it is not enough to acknowledge the difference between the quantum and classical
worlds  (Hughes  1989:316;  Teller  1995:);  it  is  also  necessary  to  say  what  is  going  on  in  the
actualization of quantum potentialities.  Where is this potentiality to be found and how does its
actualization  work?  What  is  important  here  is  that  things  are  actually  produced  within  the
framework of the classical mode of existence, i.e. something is brought into existence in nature
(although not into existence per se). The transition from wholes-and-parts involves the realization
of parts with definite properties. The quantum mode has the potentiality to produce something that
has not existed previously in nature. 
Kant conceptualized the capacity of non-extended wholes-and-parts in the supersensible substratum
of nature to produce extended parts and wholes in nature (and space/time) in terms of a “formative
force” (Kant speaks of “self-organization” in this regard; see section 3.4.1-2) that works hand in
hand with a different, ideal kind of causality (called “final causality”), which stands in contrast with
Newtonian  forces.  In  this  regard  the  non-extended,  interlinked  parts  have  the  capacity  or
potentiality to together produce the arrangements of parts in the extended aggregated whole. This
potentiality is grounded in absolute spontaneity:  it  is not merely that this potentiality is outside
space-time and therefore non-determinate in the sense of not partaking in the causal structure of
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nature; it is that this potentiality has a certain ability to from itself produce effects in nature. 
As such the quantum realm is not merely non-deterministically connected (as wholes-and-parts); it
also has a spontaneous potentiality to produce outcomes in nature.  Without such a spontaneous
potentiality it  is  difficult  to see why quantum objects which are outside nature,  would produce
outcomes in nature. This means that we move beyond a mere negative description of the quantum
realm as outside space-time and nature; we accept that this realm can be positively characterized
(i.e. thought of as a “noumenal” realm) as accessible for a different kind of intuition than ours, as
belonging to  a  different  abstract  space-time structure  (in  some manner  corresponding with  our
space-time) and operating in accordance with an absolute spontaneous potentiality that can produce
outcomes in nature. We therefore go beyond the mere logical possibility of such spontaneity (as in
Bohr's position) to the conceivability thereof. As such I regard the quantum mode as a different
ontological mode, through which absolute spontaneous potentiality becomes possible; as a different
mode  of  existence  it  serves  as  condition  for  the  possibility  of  absolute  spontaneity.  We  can
furthermore conceptualize this  spontaneous potentiality in a positive manner as I  do (following
Kant's approach).
This view stands in contrast with that of Bohm (1952, 1957) who also allows for a similar potential
(also characterized as a “force”) but whose theory is purely deterministic. In his case the potential is
closely  connected  with  his  acceptance  of  action-at-a-distance.  Although  Kant  also  tried  to
accommodate  (Newtonian)  action-at-a-distance  in  his  philosophy  of  science  presented  in
Metaphysical  Foundations  (1786)  where  he  discusses  it  in  the  context  of  his  concepts  of  the
repulsive  and  attractive  forces  in  nature  (4:513-9),  it  seems  to  me  better  to  discard  his  view
expressed there in favour of the one presented in the third Critique (1790) which I use here in my
interpretation. In this case the entities and their connectedness are outside space-time. In a certain
sense one can consider it as “action-at-a-distance” with respect to outcomes but it is obviously not
taking  place  over  any  “distance”  in  space-time.  This  means  that  it  can  co-exist  with  special
relativity which is only concerned with causality within proper space-time. 
The different kind of causality that Kant conceptualizes in the context of wholes-and-parts, stands
outside the deterministic causal network that belongs to nature, but produces effects in nature. The
parts produce each other mutually in their realization in nature. As such each part is the “cause and
effect” of the other in contrast with aggregated parts that cause an effect on each other. In Kant's
view this kind of causality involves an inter-linkage between the parts that is not only very different
from the classical causal series, but which has a certain capacity to collapse into it.    
Although Kant applies this general concept to the biological products of nature, there is no reason
why it cannot be applied to any structure in nature that is considered to be produced in this manner
(see section 3.4). In this regard the space-time realization of elementary quantum particles (like
electrons)  with  definite  qualities  adheres  to  the  Kantian  conception:  both  in  producing  certain
“arrangements” i.e. arranged in accordance with probabilities of outcomes, as well in “producing
each other”,  i.e.  that  the  realization  of  the  outcomes  are  non-separably (and even  non-locally)
linked. 
We can conceptualize, at least problematically (albeit with the risk of oversimplification), the states
of particles in quantum systems as virtual properties of entities that are interlinked with each other
in the manner that Kant proposes (since they are not realizable in space, individual property values
cannot be ascribed to these entities). As such the virtual properties of entities and their inter-linkage
can be viewed as having a certain capacity to produce outcomes in nature, that is, as a certain kind
of  causality  behind the  outcomes.  We can  think that  this  linkage (coupling)  involves  a  certain
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tension of which the spontaneous relaxation would result in a collapse according to which a whole-
and-parts  (or  even  only  some  part  of  it  in  the  case  of  large  superpositions)  is  realized  as
individualized parts in the framework of an aggregated whole. According to the Kantian conception,
this process, which belongs to the supersensible mode of existence, starts totally from itself and is
therefore absolutely spontaneous (for us). We have no direct empirical access to it. 
In  the Kantian view the entities  in  the supersensible  realm,  as  the substratum of  nature,  could
produce very complicated ordered structures in the framework of nature. Even in this regard the
application to quantum physics holds. Auyang writes: “[A]ccording to the current standard model of
elementary particle physics based on quantum field theory, the fundamental ontology of the world is
a set of interacting fields” (Auyang 1995:45). If we take Kant's supersensible substratum of nature
as being confirmed in the network of quantum fields that underlie nature, and through which nature
came into being, the agreement seems to be complete.  
I  have now completed my arguments that the quantum state,  in  a superposition of states,  is  in
another  mode  of  existence  than  the  classical  one.  I  based  this  interpretation  on  various
characteristics of the quantum system which together completes this picture, i.e. that its states and
amplitudes  are  supersensible  (unmeasurable),  that  these  are  not  representable  in  space-time
(another, mathematical space-time has to be associated with it)  and that the superimposed parts
conceptualized as wholes-and-parts are non-locally (and non-causally) linked and therefore do not
stand in a community with the objects belonging to our mode of existence. 
I  take  this  to  mean  that  the  quantum  mode  of  existence  (especially  in  the  quantum  fields
description) adheres to the basic characteristics of Kant's  supersensible realm,  namely that  it  is
supersensible, not in space-time and outside nature. I therefore identifies Kant's supersensible realm
with  the  quantum  realm.  My  analysis  shows  that  the  basic  rule  governing  nature,  namely
deterministic causality, does not apply to this realm. We can without contradiction think that another
law, namely spontaneity, governs that mode of existence. I have shown how such a spontaneous
potentiality can also be positively conceived of in this context.
4.6. Spontaneity
With this background, I am in a position to introduce one of the most important but also most
controversial aspects of quantum physics, namely the “reduction (collapse) of the wave packet”.
The reduction of the wave packet is said to take the system from the quantum state to reduced
states. On the level of the ensemble it  takes the superposition into a mix of pure (eigen)states.
Individually it takes superpositions into the components of the superposition (Cartwright 1983:168).
In Von Neumann's well-known formulation it is incorporated in the theory as a “replacement rule”
according to which the equation of the quantum state (in a superposition of states) is replaced with
the equation of the eigenstates with their associated eigenvalues (Earman 1986:207). It is called the
projection postulate. With the reduction of the wave packet a substantive element of indeterminism
which cannot be reduced to deterministic causality enters quantum physics (see below). 
4.6.1 The various views
The well-known interpretations of quantum physics can in my opinion be grouped together in three
general views regarding the projection postulate. The first view rejects it, the second view combines
it with measurement and the third view regards it as independent of measurement. Those adhering
to  the  first  view do  not  think  that  the  projection  postulate  is  a  necessary  feature  of  quantum
mechanics and they drop it altogether from their formulations. In their understanding of quantum
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physics there is no reason for thinking that the projection postulate has reference to any physical
process.  In this  view the gap between the quantum and the classical realms disappear (Hughes
1989:311). 
The interpretations that belong to this view are Bohm's theory, that uses a guiding equation to define
the positions of the particles (or configurations of fields) described by the wave function, Everett's
“relative state” formulation according to which subsystems “branch off” from the state vector of the
universe, and Van Fraassen's modal formulation according to which the quantum state delimits what
is possible whereas measured properties say what is actual (for discussions of these views, Healey
2009:274; Hughes 1989:311; Earman 1986:223). Bohm and Everett tried to preserve determinism,
Van Fraassen accepts non-determinism.
These views stand in opposition to my own because I argue that we have good reason to think that
the quantum realm is ontologically different from the classical realm (see section 4.5). If this is
indeed the case, the reduction of the wave packet would be a physical event which involves a move
from one mode of existence to another. 
From my perspective the main problem with these views is that, although they achieve a unified
position in bringing the quantum and classical descriptions together, they cannot achieve a truly
unified picture of the world if non-determinism is not explained. In Van Fraassen's approach non-
determinism  is  merely  accepted,  not  explained.  Although  the  other  views  may  overcome  the
problem of spontaneity associated with the reduction of the wave packet (in not taking it  as a
physical  event),  they  run  into  problems  when  trying  to  overcome  another  aspect  of  the  same
problem,  namely  the  non-determinism inherent  in  the  structure  of  the  two-particle  collapse  as
demonstrated in the EPR experiments. This means that the outcomes – even if they all occur in
different worlds – cannot be deterministically decided (which will be in which world?). 
In the case of Bohm's theory where determinism is  said to be preserved (although not through
deterministic causality but through the quantum potential), it may be difficult to give a realistic
description of  quantum fields  insofar  as  both the complete  deterministic  picture as  well  as  the
Bohmian view of quantum particles in space-time are concerned given the spontaneous nature of
field excitations and the difference in ontology (Hiley 1999; Healey 2009:209-11, 221). One should
ask  if  such  solutions,  which  may  reflect  metaphysical  (to  keep  determinism),  pragmatic  (for
simplicity) or other factors, are not forcing some view onto our world which may in fact encompass
(at  least)  two  ontologically  distinct  realms  governed  by  different  rules  (determinism  and
spontaneity) that come together in quantum mechanics.
The  second  view  was  that  held  by  Von  Neumann  and  Wigner.  According  to  Von  Neumann's
formulation in  Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1932) the superimposed states
of the quantum object couples with the classical indicator states of the measuring apparatus to form
a larger superposition of states in an accumulative process that would eventually include even the
observer's consciousness (subjective perception). As such, it is the consciousness of the observer
that in the final instance causes the collapse of the wave function and produces a final state in which
a measured eigenvalue is realized. 
In this approach the consciousness of the observer serves as cause for collapse. It seems quite a
metaphysical  leap  to  include consciousness  in  this  manner.  I  argue below that  collapse  is  also
triggered  without  measurement,  in  which  case  consciousness  would  play no role.  I  agree  with
Cartwright  (below)  that  reduction  could  happen  independent  of  measurement.  In  my  view  a
measurement is registered when the reduced state produced by the reduction of the wave packet
71
(which I regard as belonging to the classical mode; see Cartwright 1999:229) interacts with classical
instruments. The consciousness of the observer has no influence on the measurement.
The third view was held by Niels Bohr and is defended by Cartwright (1983), Hughes (1989) and
others. In this view the reduction of the wave packet is not understood in terms of measurement.
Rather, the reduction of the wave packet is viewed as a physical event that can be distinguished
from measurement. Although this view has something in common with that of Ghirardi-Rimini-
Weber  who  also  hold  that  collapse  is  a  spontaneous  physical  event,  it  upholds  the  classical
formulation whereas they introduce small amounts of non-linearity to the wave equations. 
Among the proponents of this view is Hughes who mentions that, in at least some views of the first
kind (see above), the rejection of the projection postulate is based on considerations that relate
solely to  measurement.  He argues that  the projection postulate  and measurement  are,  however,
conceptually separable (Hughes 1989:299). Cartwright (1983) also argues that the reduction of the
wave packet is independent of measurement. She regards it as a transition from one quantum state
to another. Since her view has a lot in common with my own, I discuss it in more detail below.   
4.6.2 How to accommodate spontaneity?
Cartwright defends two features of the reduction of the wave packet, namely that it is independent
of measurement and that it is a spontaneous transition from one quantum state to another. Regarding
its association with measurement she writes: “[O]n my view, as in the old quantum theory [i.e. Niels
Bohr's  view],  reduction of  the wave packet  occurs  in  variety of  situations,  and independent  of
measurement. Von Neumann claimed that reduction of the wave packet occurs when a measurement
is made. But it also occurs when a quantum system is prepared in an eigenstate, when one particle
scatters from another,  when a radioactive nucleus disintegrates, and in a large number of other
transition processes as well” (Cartwright 1983:194). 
Cartwright views atomic decay as the paramount example where the reduction of the wave packet
occurs  without  any  intervention.  The  “spontaneous  emission”  of  some  particle  is  the  “classic
indeterminate process”. By this she means that it is absolutely spontaneous without any cause in the
causal chains of nature. Which atom will decay, or when, is completely indeterminate. Suddenly,
without any external influence, the reduction of the wave packet initiates a transition from one state
to another:  “In some circumstances a quantum system will  make a transition from one state to
another. Indeterministically and irreversibly, without the intervention of any external observer, a
system can change its state: the quantum number of the new state will be different and a quantum of
some  conserved  quantity  –  energy,  or  momentum,  or  angular  momentum,  or  possibly  even
strangeness – will be emitted or absorbed” (Cartwright 1983:179). She views measurement in these
terms: only when systems exchange energy, is the detector activated and some observable quantity
measured. 
Cartwright  regards  non-deterministic  motions  like  the  reduction  of  the  wave  packet  just  like
deterministic ones as “naturally” occurring events (Cartwright 1983:202). Although she presents her
view in the framework of quantum statistical mechanics, she does not think that some deterministic
stochastic process underlie such motions. They are absolutely spontaneous. A question then arises:
How do we accommodate such freedom as part of a law-governed world? (how is it reconciled with
determinism?) Since as scientists we have no choice but to ascribe lawfulness to the world (this lays
at the heart of all theoretical science; see my discussion in section 3.2), how would we reconcile
such spontaneity with the deterministic lawfulness of nature? Cartwright's answer is that we should
give up on “theoretical laws”. She thinks that we should consider scientific (phenomenal) laws in
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the  context  of  a  “dappled  world”  (Cartwright  1999;  1983).  As  such  she  does  not  explain  the
possibility of freedom (in contradistinction with determinism) or how it is to be reconciled with
determinism.
I agree with Cartwright that the reduction or collapse of the wave packet involves a transition. I,
however, take this not as a transition between quantum states in general, but as a transition between
quantum states and reduced states, where this process could include transitions to other quantum
states. The reason for viewing this transition in more restricted terms is that “reduction” of the wave
packet does not refer to all the transitions involved, but to the transition from quantum modes to
reduced modes. It is this transition which produces the emission or absorption of “some conserved
quantity – energy, or momentum [etc]”. 
We can say that the quantum mode has the potentiality  to spontaneously induce  a transition to
reduced  states  with  measurable  properties.  In  this  regard  we can  conceive  of  the  operators  in
quantum mechanics as transition operators which tell us what property values can be realized when
a transition of a particular kind takes place. In this regard I agree with Cartwright when she says
that the probabilities in quantum mechanics are not position probabilities or probabilities for other
values of classical dynamic quantities, but transitional probabilities (Cartwright 1983:179, 191; see
section 4.5.3).
In  the  reduction  of  the  wave  packet  we  are  primarily  concerned  with  the  transition  from  a
superposition of states to reduced states (even though the system may still be in a superposition of
states insofar as another complementary property is concerned – see below), from the quantum
mode  to  the  classical  mode,  although other  transitions  between  quantum modes  could  also  be
involved. As such the reduction of the wave packet could be viewed in terms of causality, where
effects are produced in the classical realm. In this regard Cartwright mentions that transition plays a
“causal role” in quantum mechanics (Cartwright 1983:182). Elsewhere she argues that, in the EPR
experiments, the mathematics allows us to say that the quantum state operates as the common cause
behind both outcomes (Cartwright 1989:249). This agrees with my view that quantum wholes-and-
parts  are  the  spontaneous  cause  behind  outcomes  (see  section  4.5.3).  I  conceptualize  the
superposition of states as non-extended wholes-and-parts that are realizable as aggregated parts that
together constitute some probability class. 
When we view the reduction of the wave packet as belonging to another ontology,  namely the
quantum  mode  of  existence  outside  nature (see  section  4.5),  it  is  easy  to  accommodate  its
spontaneous character.  We can just  say that the wholes-and-parts in the quantum mode has the
capacity or potentiality to spontaneously introduce a transition from one state to another. Insofar as
the  transition  involves  a  transition to  reduced states,  we can  view it  as  a  kind  of  spontaneous
causality  that  has  measurable  effects  in  nature  which  cohere  with  other  effects  produced  in
accordance  with  deterministic  causality  (this  is  how  we  know  that  such  an  effect  has  been
produced). 
In  my  reworking  of  the  Kantian  position,  this  might  be  formulated  as  the  potential  that
superpositions of states existing outside proper space-time (and the quantum properties associated
with them) have to spontaneously make transitions to other quantum states as well  as reduced
states with individualized property values (of that observable) in space-time.  In contrast Bohm's
quantum potential, which is also said to involve an underlying structure outside proper space-time
that impacts on outcomes in space-time, is generally viewed in deterministic terms.
Since the quantum realm is outside nature and its whole-and-parts relationship is not governed by
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deterministic  causality,  this  different  kind  of  lawfulness  and  the  associated  causality  that
characterizes this mode can without contradiction be ascribed to it (and even be conceived of as
argued above). Since no community exists between nature and such wholes-and-parts (see section
4.5.2), it is difficult to see how determinism (as we normally understand it) can be operative in both
realms. We are therefore justified in ascribing a different kind of lawfulness to the quantum mode of
existence, namely absolute spontaneity, which stands in opposition to the deterministic lawfulness
of nature.  Insofar as effects  in nature are produced in accordance with this  lawfulness, we can
conceptualize  it  as  another  kind  of  causality than  the deterministic  causality which operates  in
nature.  This spontaneous causality grounds the potentiality that wholes-and-parts (in accordance
with Kant's concept of “formative force”) have to produce phenomenal outcomes.
When  we  take  the  quantum  realm  as  Kant's  supersensible  realm  (as  I  argued  above),  then
spontaneous transitions between quantum states are merely in accordance with the law of freedom
(also called the transcendental idea of freedom or the “concept of a causality through freedom”
(5:195-6)) that Kant ascribes to that realm. Then the reduction of the wave packet is merely in
accordance with the spontaneous causality which he first introduced in the first  Critique and later
used as basis for the “formative force” that he introduces in the third Critique. This kind of causality
is grounded in the context of the wholes-and-parts in the quantum realm, which correspond with
Kant's  noumena  or  non-extended  wholes-and-parts.  This  causality  coheres  with  deterministic
causality insofar as its outcomes in nature are concerned (section 3.5.1). 
4.6.3 Spontaneity and measurement
There is, however, an outstanding question: Even if we accept that the reduction of the wave packet
occurs  in  a  variety  of  situations,  it  nevertheless  seems  possible  that  it  is  also triggered  (i.e.
controlled) in measurement. If this is so, the question arises: How do we reconcile the spontaneity
of  the  reduction  of  the  wave packet  with  the  seemingly conflicting  observation  that  it  can  be
triggered in measurement? This seems to represent two conflicting positions, namely that collapse is
spontaneous  and  that  it  is  non-spontaneous.  To  understand  this,  we  should  again  consider  the
peculiarities of the quantum mechanical description (in contrast with quantum fields).
There are two features of quantum mechanical systems that are of importance at this point. The first
is  that  the  quantum  mode  of  existence  (i.e.  superpositions  of  states)  is  constrained  with  the
incorporation  of  the  time framework in  the  context  of  the  Schrödinger  description  in  quantum
mechanics (in a manner not found in quantum fields – see section 4.4.2). In its dynamic evolution,
the superposition of states evolve in time and is governed by deterministic lawfulness which subject
the state vector to given forces and constraints in a manner similar to classical equations of motion.
This evolution constrains the other kind of dynamics (so to speak) that belongs to the product of the
state  vectors  (the  inseparability  of  wholes-and-parts;  formulated  independently  from  the
Schrödinger description) which in my interpretation are governed by the law of spontaneity that
drives a different causal process where the parts are the cause and effect in the production of each
other in nature (which can also be conceptualized as a “formative force” as Kant does). What we
find in quantum mechanics, is that the dynamic evolution subjects the lawfulness that belongs to the
internal relations of wholes-and-parts. 
This  means  that  when deterministic  causality  (in  the  time  framework)  and  spontaneity (in  the
wholes-and-parts framework) are both included in quantum systems, the first has superiority over
the second. The reason is simple: we cannot have determinism when spontaneity rules. We can,
however, allow spontaneity in a constrained sense together with determinism, i.e. in the sense that
the system has the capacity (potentiality) under certain circumstances to operate in accordance with
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spontaneity  (when  the  mentioned  constraint  is  lifted,  the  lawfulness  belonging  to  the  internal
relation of the wholes-and-parts comes into action). 
When the quantum mode is constrained in this manner, the spontaneity ascribed to it is obviously
not  an absolutely spontaneous process  (starting from itself)  without  any outside interference.  It
nonetheless  incorporates  spontaneity in  the sense that  the  process  according to  which the  non-
extended wholes-and-parts  mutually  produce  each other  in  nature  has  its  own ability  to  do so
(without  any  deterministic  casualty  producing  it).  In  this  case  it  seems  better  to  speak  of
“potentiality” rather that “spontaneity”. Although this kind of causality involves spontaneity, this is
not in the sense of starting without any external intervention (see section 4.5.3)
The second important feature regarding the inclusion of the time framework is that it allows the
ascription of classical characteristics to quantum mechanical systems. As such quantum systems
stand in a certain relation to the classical world itself which enable us to control the evolution of
such systems  in time in a similar manner that we control classical dynamic systems. We can, for
example,  place  further  constraints  on  the  system that  would result  in  its  producing observable
outcomes (we can force collapse through various experimental settings). Such constraints would
disrupt  the  superposition  of  states  (or  relevant  part  thereof)  and  with  it  necessarily  also  the
deterministic evolution thereof. When the classical governing principle is suspended in this manner,
the constraint on the principle that governs the internal relations of the wholes-and-parts is lifted.
This  allows  that  principle,  namely  the  other  kind  of  causality  (potentiality)  which  takes  non-
extended wholes-and-parts to extended parts, to kick in and initiate a transition to reduced states. 
The Schrödinger description is therefore conditional and only valid as long as the system evolves
deterministically in time. When this governing principle is suspended, the other principle kicks in
and produces a transition to reduced states. The resulting reduced states, as classical states, stand in
a causal “community” (to use the Kantian terminology) with the measurement apparatus that can
register particular values of such states. As Cartwright says, the conserved quantity that is absorbed
or emitted after the reduction of the wave packet – energy, or momentum, or angular momentum, or
possibly  even  strangeness  –  activates  the  detector  (Cartwright  1983:179).  Although  a  further
constraint  on  the  system  (i.e.  the  disruption  of  the  superposition  of  states)  could  involve
measurement, measurement is conceptually distinct from this constraint imposed on the system. 
This interpretation of quantum mechanics resolves the so-called “measurement problem” (the name
originated in the framework of the second view in which the projection postulate (reduction) is
connected with measurement). The problem as it is traditionally understood, is that the two kinds of
evolution associated with the quantum mechanical description, namely the deterministic evolution
in accordance with the Schrödinger equation (that should be generally valid) and the projection
postulate (that should be deducible from the dynamic description), is flatly in contradiction with
each other (Albert 1992:37). 
In  my view these  should  not  be regarded as  conflicting  laws  that  should  be  reconciled  in  the
classical framework (to which the Schrödinger dynamics belong). They are heterogeneous laws that
can without contradiction be ascribed to two different modes of existence. We should not regard the
projection postulate as deducible from the dynamics of the system that proceed in accordance with
classical  characteristics  since  it  belongs  to  a  totally different  mode of  existence  and is  merely
constrained by the deterministic evolution of the system. I argued above that, although both laws are
included in the quantum mechanical description, they are conditional and mutually exclusive. The
deterministic evolution is subject to the condition that the system (i.e. the superposition of states) is
not being further constrained (i.e. disrupted); the reduction of the wave packet is subject to the
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suspension of that condition (with the disruption of the dynamical evolution, the potentiality that the
wholes-and-parts have to be realized in classical context, comes into action).    
When a definite property is measured on a reduced state, the system could still be in a superposition
of states insofar as another complementary property is concerned in accordance with the uncertainty
principle. In the vector description the definite property state can be described as a superposition of
the other property states. Albert generalizes this in the framework of two properties, called “color”
and “hardness”, and says: “states of definite color [black or white] are superpositions of different
hardness states and states of definite hardness [hard or soft] are superpositions of different color
states”  (Albert  1992:32).  This  means  that  the  inclusion  of  the  time  framework  in  quantum
mechanics allows us not merely to ascribe classical characteristics to quantum systems; it  even
allows the combining of reduced (classical) and quantum modes “back-to-back” in one system. 
The  control  that  we  have  over  the  activation  of  the  potentiality  (spontaneity)  rule  has  some
interesting consequences.  In  Kant's  philosophy,  spontaneous causality,  which I  take as  in some
manner embodied in the potentiality rule (although not as absolute spontaneity), is also called the
transcendental idea of freedom and is necessary to ground practical freedom, i.e. the ability of free
choice. In this context it seems quite significant that we have temporal control over this freedom
(we can also under  certain  circumstances  determine  outcomes  as  in  the  determination  of  axis-
direction in the EPR experiments). This is, however, not yet free will and in my interpretation a
much more comprehensive quantum framework would be necessary to account for it (a detailed
discussion falls outside the scope of the thesis).
 Although we have some control over the collapse of the wave packet in quantum mechanical
descriptions where the evolution of the system takes place in time, the same is not the case when the
system is outside space-time in the framework of quantum fields. In this case the system can only
be described in statistical terms – we have no control over individual interactions. In a scattering
experiment, for example, the particles that interact during scattering, are in the quantum mode of
existence described in the framework of a quantum field. As such the time component disappears
from the equations (Teller 1995:132). 
If we accepts Auyang's quantum fields interpretation, we can say that such a quantum system is
outside space-time and the collapse of the wave packets is absolutely spontaneous – we do not have
control over such realizations in space-time individually. The statistics of outcomes, however, are as
in all quantum physics experiments, governed by the Born postulate which was first introduced in
exactly  this  context  of  scattering  (Cartwright  1983:180).  The  same  process happens  in  both
quantum mechanics and quantum fields – in quantum fields we just have no control over it. In this
case we may regard the process as absolute spontaneous. 
Absolute spontaneity is a distinct feature of quantum physics. I have already mentioned in this
regard that atomic decay is the paramount example of this absolute spontaneity, which Cartwright
calls  the  “classic  indeterminate  process”.  The  primary question  is:  How is  it  explained?  Even
though we might allow it as a logical possibility which may be accepted without contradiction, we
should  still  answer  the  question  as  to  how it  is  possible?  In  my view absolute  spontaneity is
explained as the rule underlying the causality (potentiality) that belongs to the supersensible realm
outside nature. It becomes possible through this other mode of existence. In the same manner that
our classical mode of existence is structured in such a manner that all matter in nature is causally
connected, the supersensible mode of existence is ordered in such a manner that its non-extended
wholes-and-parts adhere to absolute spontaneous causality.
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Since the same process (driven by the same spontaneous potentiality) happens in both quantum
mechanics and quantum fields, these two descriptions are easily compatible in my interpretation –
which  gives  my  interpretation  some  force  above,  for  example,  that  of  Bohm  (where  such
compatibility is difficult) who also thinks in terms of some potential (the quantum potential) that is
not in proper space-time but tries to adhere to a complete deterministic picture of the world. In my
interpretation determinism and the non-determinism found in the Aspect experiment (which I take
as spontaneity) are reconciled in one conceptual framework that brings the classical world (nature)
and the quantum world (as a supersensible realm) together (although not in a unified position such
that the gap between those pictures is removed). In my view there is a real ontological gap between
the two realms and trying to remove that in our theory is to deny an important aspect of reality. 
4.7 Two kinds of appearances
I have now argued that two modes of existence come into play in quantum physics. These two
modes  are  governed  by  two  heterogeneous  laws,  namely  of  determinism and  spontaneity.  As
discussed in the previous section, both these laws regulate relations between objects. Generally, the
first  law  regulates  relations  between  objects  existing  in  space-time.  The  second  law  regulates
quantum entities that we can conceptualize as wholes-and-parts existing outside space-time which
produce effects in space-time. 
These laws co-habit in quantum mechanical systems where both are present in a constrained form:
as  such they together  regulate  quantum entities  that  evolve  in  time  even though these  are  not
situated in proper space. Quantum entities can produce outcomes in space-time in accordance with
the law of spontaneity. Given the very different origin of these two kinds of causality, the outcomes
associated  with  them  are  distinctly  different.  They  deliver  very  different  appearances.  The
representations (appearances) resulting from such transitions from quantum to classical modes are
distinctly different from those where no transition is involved (i.e. mere changes within the classical
mode). 
Since I follow a Kantian approach, the question arises whether these two kinds of appearances can
both be described in objective terms. In Kant's first  Critique he showed how all appearances in
space/time can be objectively given in experience. But what about those outcomes produced by the
other  kind  of  causality,  namely spontaneous  causality?  Kant  introduces  the  possibility  of  such
outcomes in the second part  of the first  Critique in the framework of the third antinomy. It is,
however,  only in  the third  Critique that  he discusses  them in more detail  when he develops a
scientific approach that takes the possibility of non-mechanistic (i.e. non-deterministic) causality
into  account  according  to  which  non-extended  wholes-and-parts  produce  ordered  outcomes  in
nature. In this case Kant seems to conclude that the divide between nature and the supersensible
realm prohibits us from establishing objectively that such products are indeed produced as such. We
can only estimate that through “reflective” judgments, which do not result in truth determination. 
In my reworking of the Kantian framework, nature is not merely contrasted with the supersensible
realm; these are brought together when time is combined with some ideal space that reflects the
supersensible  ontology.  I  argued  in  the  previous  sections  that  this  is  exactly  what  we  find  in
quantum mechanics.  In this  framework the possibility arises that  we can do more than merely
“estimate” that some outcomes in nature are produced by entities beyond space/time. We can in fact
establish that objectively. 
In this regard the approach by Bitbol (2007) is of special relevance to my Kantian interpretation. He
is a neo-Kantian influenced by the work of J. Piaget. He asks how quantum appearances can be
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incorporated in the framework of objective cognition (taken broadly in the Kantian sense)? Bitbol
discusses the distinct differences between material entities that are extended in space-time and those
that  merely “appear”  or  manifest  in  space-time.  These  include  those  microscopic  particles  that
become manifest by impacts, bubble chamber tracts and clicks on counters. 
To establish these as objective entities Bitbol proposes that the Kantian rules of the understanding
be replaced by other theoretical  structures,  especially symmetries.  He argues that  the collective
behavior of the different classes of particles, which are embedded in universally valid symmetries,
are law-like. Although it is not clear that single instances of phenomena ascribed to one isolated
quantum can be ordered like this, he thinks that in the context of quantized fields the individual
manifestations in space-time can be combined with global law-like ordering as is manifest in global
field equations. In the final instance he writes: “Manifestations in space-time, plus law-likeness
(objectivity) applied to probabilistic predictors of classes of phenomena, is enough to characterize
matter” (Bitbol 2007:255).
Another approach, not too different from Bitbol, is that of Pringe (2007). In contrast with Bitbol, he
uses classical Kantian philosophy to argue that measurable phenomena in quantum physics observe
systematic unity and objectivity. Pringe distinguishes two kinds of causality, namely quantum and
classical causality. Quantum causality signifies that quantum objects, taken to be outside space, time
and  causality,  are  the  ground of  quantum phenomena,  which  is  why such  objects  bring  meta-
contextual  systematic  unity  among  contextual  phenomena.  Such  a  non-sensible  ground  can  be
problematically assumed, and the interactions of quantum objects which constitute this ground are
discontinuous and uncontrollable; they may be conceived of as a series with an absolute beginning.
Classical causality, on the other hand, operates in the contextual situations as an element of a series
of causes and effects. As such it grounds the epistemic objectivity of quantum phenomena (Pringe
2007:156). 
Pringe's approach, which proceeds in Bohr's footsteps, is methodological. As such his approach is
very similar to that of Allison (2004) (although not the same, since Allison does not think in terms
of noumenal  objects,  which Pringe accepts in the context  of quantum mechanics).  In the same
manner  that  I  accept  Allison's  methodological  approach regarding Kantian epistemology,  I  also
accepts Pringe's application of such an approach to quantum physics. In the same manner that I
proceed beyond the methodological approach of Allison to establish an ontological reading in which
the noumenal realm is taken as an ontologically distinct realm to account for the conceivability
(instead of mere logical possibility) of freedom (see chapter 2), my application thereof to quantum
physics  also  goes  beyond  that  of  Pringe  (and  Bohr).  The  noumenal  realm  is  central  to  my
ontological approach; it barely figures in the methodological approaches. 
I argue that we have good reason to think that the quantum realm is in fact an ontologically distinct
realm (see my discussion in 4.3-4.5) which would be a condition for the possibility of absolute
spontaneity.  In  my view the  Kantian  metaphysics  of  nature,  supersensible  realm  and  absolute
spontaneous  causality  may  be  taken  as  confirmed  in  quantum  physics.  I  argue  that  absolute
spontaneity which is part and parcel of quantum physics, is the governing principle of the quantum
realm (as an ontological realm different  from nature where deterministic causality is  the ruling
principle) and underlies the potentiality that objects in that realm have to produce outcomes in
nature (in accordance with the potentiality that governs Kant's final causality in the third Critique). I
have  shown  how  we  can  conceive  of  such  a  potentiality  in  accordance  with  Kant's  concept
(involving wholes-and-parts) in the context of quantum physics. Both kinds of phenomena that we
observe in nature are therefore not only objectively grounded in Kantian epistemology; we can also




In this chapter I use the philosophy of science that Kant developed in the third Critique to formulate
an interpretation of quantum physics. Although the philosophy of science that Kant developed in the
Metaphysical Foundations played an important role in laying the philosophical foundations of the
mathematical  science that  has reference to  classical  systems,  the philosophy of  science that  he
developed in the third  Critique did not  get  similar  attention – especially because his  extensive
reference  to  a  supersensible  realm  was  taken  as  nonsensical.  In  my  analysis,  however,  the
“spontaneity of a cause” that forms an essential part of this part of his philosophy of science and the
accompanying necessary introduction of a supersensible realm to accommodate it, seem to capture
exactly what we find in quantum physics. In my Kantian interpretation of quantum physics these
Kantian concepts are taken seriously. 
On the other hand, insofar as quantum physics is concerned, I take the introduction of Hilbert space
seriously as  showing that  such systems cannot  be  presented  in  proper  space.  I  accentuate  that
Hilbert  space  and  proper  time  are  combined  in  one  system in  quantum mechanics  –  which  I
understand as referring to another mode of existence (the quantum mode) that is constrained in
time. In my view Kant's concept of nature agrees with the classical picture of the world (where the
theories of relativity apply) whereas Kant's supersensible realm is to be identified with the quantum
realm since it is supersensible (unmeasurable), outside space-time and outside nature; this follows
from the mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics and is confirmed in empirical testing as
far as these features are testable. Characteristic but problematic features of quantum mechanics,
including non-separability and non-locality,  that involve a breakdown in the sufficiency of both
space-time descriptions and deterministic causality, are explained in my interpretation: the quantum
coupling of wholes-and-parts belong to a different ontology outside space-time and nature and can
therefore without contradiction manifest those features.  
My  interpretation  also  explains  other  persistent  problems  in  the  interpretation  of  quantum
mechanics, for example how to understand the gap between the quantum and classical descriptions
(between a superposition of states and reduced states). Much has been written about this gap. For
Bohr the difference is self-evident and differentiates where predicates can be legitimately used and
where  not.  Bitbol  writes  that  “we  are  faced  with  a  persistent  dialect  between  two  irreducible
domains of discourse (objectified and situated)” (Bitbol 2007:258). But why is this so? Hughes
writes: "Quantum theory may require that we divide the world into two... What is the conceptual
relation between the quantum world and the classical world? This is the touchstone, pyx, assay,
ordeal,  the  High  Noon,  the  Big  Enchilada  for  all  interpretations  of  quantum theory"  (Hughes
1989:312, 316).  In my view the answer is simple: the descriptions of two ontologically distinct
realms come together in quantum mechanics. 
When quantum states are viewed as ontologically distinct from classical ones, we can ascribe a
potentiality grounded in absolute spontaneity to it without any contradiction. Instead of trying to
overcome the obvious fact of the spontaneity of collapse as is manifested in, for example, atomic
decay, or in the structure of such collapse in the context of the EPR experiments (or having to call
upon “action-at-a-distance” or “many worlds”), I present a coherent scientific picture in which the
quantum and classical pictures of the world are united in one coherent conception (although not in
one  position  where  the  gap  between  those  pictures  is  removed)  in  such  a  manner  that  both
determinism and spontaneity can  conceivably be  accounted  for  within  the  framework of  those
pictures. The classical and quantum realms are integrated in the framework of one world, in which
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the first  can be viewed as the substratum of the other.  There are even contexts where they are
closely interwoven – where the quantum mechanical description applies. 
In  my  interpretation  spontaneity  is  accounted  for  as  the  lawfulness  that  belongs  to  another
ontological realm than the classical one. In ascribing two heterogeneous laws to the two different
modes of existence I also account for the measurement problem. In my view the reduction of the
wave packet occurs  because  of another kind of causality (that is inherently spontaneous or non-
deterministic) that takes non-extended wholes-and-parts to material parts as part of an aggregated
whole when the deterministic evolution thereof is suspended (disrupted). This is the explanatory
power  that  my interpretation  has  over  its  rivals:  although the  superposition  of  states  and their
potential for transition are outside empirical reach (because this is the way the world is), my view
explains  how  spontaneous  potentiality  is  possible as  well  as  all  the  manifestations  of  non-
determinism in quantum physics within one coherent conceptual framework. 
Since the measurement problem is dissolved, there is no reason to try and rid quantum theory of the
collapse of the wave packet as a physical event that involves spontaneity (non-determinism). Views
that do this, can either not account for non-determinism in quantum mechanics (i.e. they merely
accept this;  in Fraassen's  modal formulation) or try to save the deterministic description of the
world (like Bohm's theory) which face the problem of extending that picture to quantum fields – a
problem that does not arise in my interpretation since in my view both the particles of quantum
mechanics and the entities in quantum fields belong to the same quantum realm that is outside
space-time (even though in the first case they are constrained in some manner) and is governed by
the same principle (spontaneity). 
Whereas the quantum potential is necessary for Bohm to establish a complete deterministic causal
theory, in my view the corresponding Kantian potential is necessary to account for spontaneity. The
question is: Who is correct? Or is it just two ways of modeling and interpreting the same underlying
physical potential? Basil Hiley (2010:14) (who worked for many years with Bohm) recently argued
that  the  generally  accepted  idea  in  the  literature  that  Bohm tried  to  “return to  a  deterministic,
mechanical view of the word” is wrong. I fact, the manner in which Hiley interprets and develops
Bohm's concepts, shows remarkable agreement with my Kantian approach. 
According to Wiley (2010) Bohm understood the quantum potential in terms of a “whole” that
determines the properties of the individual particles and their relationship (and not the other way
round). In Wiley's view the quantum potential can be regarded as a non-local energy (different from
kinetic and (classical) potential energy) necessary for energy conservation which is involved in a
“self-organizing” process (which would be spontaneous!) involving a basic underlying field! (Hiley
1999:7; Kant also speaks of “self-organization” in this regard, see sections 3.4.1-2). He even writes:
“[T]here is a deep underlying process from which not only particles and fields emerge, but this
process is  the source of space-time itself” (Wiley 2010:14).  A detailed comparison (which falls
outside the scope of this thesis) may produce new insights regarding the inner workings of the
world of quantum physics.  
The work presented in this chapter does not take the quantum fields description into account (only
matter fields are considered). I focus only on matter, not on field forces. Kant's view in the third
Critique is that the supersensible realm would account for both matter and forces. It seems to me
that such an enterprise would be possible within the framework of the basic conceptual framework
developed here. In this regard one can think that the Kantian potential could also account for the
spontaneous  “creation”  of  field-entities  which  construe  the  force  fields.  I  hope  that  the  work
presented here would provide a solid basis on which a more extended Kantian interpretation could
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be established.
Note 3: General relativity and nature
In my approach I distinguish between 1) The epistemic conditions for knowledge, when matter is
presented empirically in space and time. This stands under Kant's Analogies of Experience (see
section 2.2). As such matter is regulated by deterministic causality. This describes the “classical”
situation where Newtonian physics apply. 2) When we move beyond the epistemic conditions of
knowledge, the empirical use of reason may be logically extended (in the anti-thesis position of the
third antinomy) to conceptualize the sensible world as “nature”, which is comprised of the totality
of casual relations which is called “mechanism” (see section 2.3). In this case space-time becomes a
conceptual  construct  which belongs to  nature,  outside the reach of  human perception.  Abstract
mathematical theories like general relativity and theoretical descriptions of stochastic behavior –
which can never be brought under sensible conditions – are descriptions of aspects of nature. 3) I
also distinguish an ontologically distinct supersensible realm outside nature (in accordance with my
ontological reading of Kant's first and third Critiques) through which absolute spontaneity becomes
possible (i.e. that realm serves as condition for the possibility of such freedom). I ascribe a certain
spontaneous potentiality to this realm in accordance with Kant's “final causality”. 
Although the mathematical models used in the formulation of classical physics – from Newtonian
science to special and general relativity – include some features which challenge the deterministic
description of the world, these do not present a significant challenge to that view (especially in the
case of the theories of relativity) because it could be regarded as mere features of the mathematics
(Earman 1986). It is, however, true that general relativity also describes a kind of non-local energy
of gravitation which might be similar to the Bohm potential (Hiley 1999) – which I relate to the
Kantian concept of spontaneous potentiality (see section 4.8).
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5. Conclusion
In the introduction I mentioned that the problem of reconciling determinism and spontaneity in
quantum physics is now more than one hundred years old and no answer as to how such spontaneity
can be conceived of as possible in our understanding of how the world is like (in contrast to its mere
logical possibility) has been provided. The main questions that I engaged with was: How is such
spontaneity possible and how can it be accommodated in physics as part of our overall conception
of the world? My answer is a simple (and I hope an elegant) one: We can effectively delineate two
modes of existence in quantum physics,  the one being the substratum of the other,  namely the
quantum and classical modes, governed by two very different principles, namely determinism and
freedom. Freedom enters physics in the form of the reduction of the wave packet which I interpret
as a transition from the quantum to the classical modes. 
This unified conceptual picture emerges in the framework of Kant's philosophy that allows for two
modes  of  existence,  namely  nature  and  the  supersensible  realm  outside  nature,  governed  by
determinism and freedom respectively, which I interpreted as the classical and quantum modes of
existence. I showed (I hope convincingly) in the context of my third alternative to the interpretation
of the first Critique (and reading the third Critique consistent with this interpretation), that Kant did
not merely allow for the logical possibility, but for the conceivability of freedom – both in the first
Critique and in his philosophy of science in the third Critique. As such freedom becomes something
that  could  conceivably  exist  if  his  critical  metaphysics  can  be  presented,  not  merely  as  a
metaphysics, but as a scientific hypothesis that finds application in the field of quantum physics. 
Kant argues in the first and third Critiques that such freedom can co-exists with determinism in one
conceptual framework if we accept his critical metaphysics. I applied these concepts to the field of
quantum physics with one adaptation: I allowed that time be combined not with space, but with that
mathematical space which is associated with the quantum mode of existence. This allowed me to
apply the Kantian concepts also to quantum mechanics where the two modes of existence come
together in one description.
Kant's approach allows us to also bring classical physics (Einstein's theories) and quantum physics
together in one conceptual framework. He laid the basis for this unified picture in the first Critique,
where his first two moves formalize an epistemology that he used in the Metaphysical Foundations
of Natural Science to establish the philosophical foundations of not merely Newtonian science, but
of classical science in general (including Einstein's theories) as Friedman (2001) has shown. His
third move showed how determinism and freedom can co-here. He reworked these concepts in the
third Critique as part of his philosophy of science that accommodates freedom. The first  Critique
therefore provides the groundwork for mathematical science whereas his later work allows us to
bring physics, biology and even the life sciences (in the framework of his concept of “reflective”
judgment) together in one unified conception or meta-research programme.
In the final instance I have shown that we can achieve much more with his conceptual framework
than Kant thought possible. I showed (I hope successfully) that the supersensible realm is confirmed
in the quantum realm. I also showed that Kant's “final causality”, which is conceptualized as a
spontaneous potentiality in the third Critique, is realized in the spontaneous reduction of the wave
packet. More generally, the ascription of freedom (in the context of a Kantian “potential”) to the
quantum realm explains non-determination in cases like atomic decay and the EPR experiments. In
my interpretation both determinism and freedom can be accounted for  within the constrains  of
contemporary physics without having to call upon “action-at-a-distance” or “many worlds”. My
interpretation may be the only one which explains how such freedom is possible and how it can be
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accommodated as part of a unified conception of the world. 
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